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• W3125679780 abstract "Table of ContentsI. Introduction 50II. From Rules to Standards 55A. Collusion 57B. Exclusion 65III. The Possibility of (Real) Rules 71IV. Efficiency Considerations 80A. Costs of Promulgating and Administering the Legal Command 81B. Underinclusion, Overinclusion, and Incentive Effects 84C. Choice of Ultimate Decision-Maker 91D. Strategic Manipulation and Public Choice 95E. Synthesis and Decisional Principles 98V. Non-Efficiency Considerations 101A. Distributive Justice, Personal Autonomy, and Equal Treatment 101B. Maintaining the Expressive Core 106VI. Conclusion 109I. IntroductionAntitrust law finds itself in the midst of a creeping transition from rules to standards. Adjudicatory categories that have long held sway-such as the dichotomy between the per se rule and the rule of reason for collaborative conduct or categorical rules of liability and immunity in monopolization law-are progressively being replaced by a multi-factor, ex post approach to antitrust adjudication. As antitrust has become de-politicized and de-ideologized, flexible technocratic expertise has replaced legalist conceptualism. Once the stars of the antitrust courtroom, lawyers now play the supporting cast to economists. Economic theory and post-hoc, contextual examination of facts, rather than a priori legal categories, take center stage in antitrust proceedings. Gone are the days when the Supreme Court advocated stark antitrust rules and condemned rambl[ing] through the wilds of economic theory in order to maintain a flexible approach.1 The wilds are being tamed, and adjudicatory flexibility favored.Why this transition? The Chicago School's dramatic influence on antitrust law since the mid-1970s accounts for a significant part of the story. Economic theory has rehabilitated practices once condemned as per se illegal because courts thought it a waste of time to see whether that conduct might be justified by efficiency considerations.2 Full-blown review of the context and motivation of practices once viewed as necessarily anticompetitive often reveals that they are competitively benign.3 Yet the move toward greater adjudicatory flexibility-the move from rules to standards-cannot be attributed solely to a less interventionist preference. In recent years, the growing inclination toward fulsome review of the facts has led a number of courts to reject bright-line rules that would have immunized defendants from liability. In monopolization cases in particular, prominent decisions have emphasized the need to consider the fullness of the defendant's conduct on a case-by-case basis, thus denying defendants the sort of categorical legal rules most helpful for avoiding jury trials.4 It appears that the move toward standards has been motivated in part by a sense that antitrust cases are too complex and socially important to turn on simplistic legalist commands.If history is a reliable teacher, the pendulum will eventually swing back toward rules. Morris Cohen once noted that periodic waves of reform during which the sense of justice, natural law, or equity introduces life and flexibility into the law and makes it adjustable to its work are often followed by periods where under the social demand for certainty, equity gets hardened and reduced to rigid rules. …" @default.
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• W3125679780 date "2007-01-01" @default.
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• W3125679780 title "Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication" @default.
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