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• W65897076 abstract "The dominant institutional approach to nuclear weapons (and other WMDs), has been containment. During the Cold War, nuclear technology was kept classified in the hopes that other states would not develop nuclear weapons, while the two superpowers amassed enormous stores of weapons. In the 1970s, a non-proliferation treaty promised to cut the stores of weapons of the superpowers, and required signatory states to forego nuclear weapons development. We contend that this dominant non-proliferation regime is both immoral and risky. Its immorality is based on past-actions, fair assumptions, and autonomy. We demonstrate its riskiness with a one-shot game-theoretic model that is an extension of the models that dominated cold war nuclear weapons policies. This model shows that the risk of first-use drops dramatically as the number of players increases.(ProQuest: ... denotes formulae omitted.)INTRODUCTIONImmediately after World War II, and due to the USA's successful development and use of the world's first nuclear weapons, the focus of the Soviet Union and the US shifted from the goal of defeating the Nazis to containing each other. While some who had worked on the development of the A-bomb suggested that the moral course was to publicize the technology and immediately offer to disarm, others embraced the inevitability of an arms race and ascribed to the goal of dominance. When, in 1949, the Soviets successfully tested their own nuclear device, the arms race was on and both sides pursued the even more devastating H-bomb. Once perfected, and with the parallel development of advanced delivery devices such as rockets and high-altitude bombers, weapons production and accumulation reached two peaks (Cirincione, 2007). The total megatonnage of yield available to the US peaked at around 20,000 in the mid 1960s, and for the USSR, peaked at about the same level in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Total numbers of weapons held by each side were in the range of 30,000 to 45,000 (Cirincione, 2007).Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, nuclear weapons technologies remained out of reach of all but a few of the richest, most technologically advanced countries. While the US and the USSR each focused on policies designed to contain the other, the spread of nuclear technology to countries allied with them was encouraged in some cases by cooperative ventures, or perceived as an opportunity to strengthen cooperative defense treaties (such as NATO). Nuclear states were mostly, for the time being> neatlY divided geopolitically as either us or USSR-allied, or at least Western bloc vs Eastern bloc Evcn so, the numbers of these states, and the weapons possessed by each, were (relatively) small (Brodie, 1978). Butas knowledge of the underlying science and technology spread, and as access to the raw materials and wealth necessary to develop a nuclear weapon became more available, other non-aligned nations entered the fray. With the prospect of the nuclear monopoly held by the superpowers becoming broken by third parties who were not clearly allied with either side, and thus who were apparently unpredictable, and with the goal of stepping down the huge and expensive stores of nuclear weapons stockpiled on either side, the international Non-Proliferation Treaty was initiated in 1968 and ratified by 1970. among its provisions, now agreed to by 187 nations, is an agreement by all non-nuclear states to pursue only peaceful uses of nuclear energy, foregoing weapons development, and agreements by nuclear states to reduce their stockpiles (Bunn, 2003).By all accounts, the non-proliferation treaty is a success and since then the world's stockpiles of nuclear weapons have shrunk, with the help of the various Strategic Arms Limitations and Reduction Treaties among the superpowers (SALT and START). And even though the nuclear club has added a few members who defied or ignored the treaty's restrictions (including South Africa, India, Pakistan, and now North Korea, and unofficially Israel), the non-proliferation model has been agreed generally to be a success (Bunn, 2003). …" @default.
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• W65897076 date "2012-06-01" @default.
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• W65897076 title "Non-proliferation regimes: immoral and risky - a game-theoretic approach" @default.
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