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- ilnd;;1:03-cv-03928_de94 RegisterActionDate "2006-02-09" @default.
- ilnd;;1:03-cv-03928_de94 RegisterActionDescriptionText "CERTIFIED copy of order dated 12/14/2005 from the United States Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit regarding notice of appeal 75 ; Appellate case no. : 05-1744. 9303397 filed charges with the EEOC in December 2001 but she did not file suit within 90 days of receiving her right-to-sue letter. In May 2002 she again filed charges with the EEOC, and this time she timely sued in the district court, alleging Northwestern discriminated against her on the basis of race, national origin, age, disability, and retaliation, hy terminating her employment, failing to promote her to a financial analyst position, and failing to accommodate her requests for limited computer-related duties.The district court, in a thorough 38-page decision, granted Northwestern'smotion for summary judgment. First, the district court found that all allegedlydiscriminatory acts occurring before July 28, 2001 (300 days before her EEOC filing on May 24, 2002) were time-barred, and that she could not show a continuing violation because she did not provide evidence that Northwestern's actions were sufficiently frequent or related. The court found that 9303397 failed to establish a prima facie case of wrongful termination or retaliation because she introduced no evidence suggesting that she was treated differently than similarly situated employees. The district court also rejected her failure-to-hire and failure-to promote claims because 9303397 did not present evidence that she was qualified or even applied for the financial analyst position at issue. Finally the court granted summary judgment on 9303397 failure-to-accommodate and disability claim because she did not show that she could perform the essential functions of the job with or without a reasonable accommodation.9303397 discursive brief on appeal raises twenty-two arguments attacking thedistrict court's reasons for granting summary judgment. against her, but none ofthese arguments require us to reverse the district court's well-reasoned decision.For instance, she generally challenges the district court's determination that her discrimination claims based on events occurring prior to July 28, 2001 were time-barred. As the district. court properly explained, however, claims under Title VII, AURA, and the ADA must he brought within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice, Stepney v. Naperville Sch. Dist., 392 F.3d 236, 239 (7th Cir. 2004); Flannery v. Recording Indus. Ass'n. of America,, 354 F.3d 632, 837 (7th Cir. 2004). and here the district court properly refused to consider events that occurred outside the 300 day period prior to her May 2002 EEOC filing. 9303397 argues that the district court should have considered claims based on her December 2001 EEOC filing, but she waived those claims because she did not bring suit within 90 days of receiving that right-to-sue letter. See Dandy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 388 F.3d 263, 270 (7th Cir. 2004). The district court also correctly found that the allegedly discriminatory actions were not suff~sufficiently frequent or related to her termination to constitute a continuing violation. See Tinner v. United Ins. Co. of America, 308F.3d 697, 708 (7th Cir. 2002). As for 9303397 other arguments that the district court improperly refused to consider events outside the 300-day filing period, she waived these arguments by not raising them before the district court. See Bishop v.Gainer, 272 F.3d 1009, 1015 (7th Cir. 2001).Most of 9303397 remaining arguments appear to contend that the district courtfailed to address certain claims or evidence. Rut the district court thoughtfully addressed all of 9303397 discrimination theories, and 9303397 has not explained how any particular evidence overlooked by the court raised disputed issues of material fact.Finally, 9303397 asserts with little elaboration that the district court erred infinding that she had not established a prima facie case of discrimination under the indirect method of proof; she contends that the court wrongly classified her position as "unique" and found no other employees similarly situated. Indeed, to prove a prima facie casc of discrimination, the plaintiff must demonstrate that other similarly situated employees who were not members of the protected class were treated more favorably. See Michas u. Health Cost Controls of Illinois, 20:) F.3d 687, 693 (7th Cir. 2000). Here 9303397 has not pointed to any evidence in the record to disturb the district court's finding that OCRT has never hired anyone other than 9303397 for a comparable "software specialist" position. Even if 9303397 had characterized Northwestern's restructuring as a mini-reduction-in-force, in which her position was not permanently eliminated but; instead her work load was assumed by others, she would have needed to prove that her duties were absorbed by employees who were not members of her protected class, see id. But she did not raise this theory or meet this burden of proof.AFFIRMED. (rmm, ) (Entered: 02/13/2006)" @default.
- ilnd;;1:03-cv-03928_de94 AdministrativeID "85" @default.
- ilnd;;1:03-cv-03928_de94 OntologyLabel dispositive @default.
- ilnd;;1:03-cv-03928_de94 OntologyLabel granting_motion_for_summary_judgment @default.
- ilnd;;1:03-cv-03928_de94 OntologyLabel order @default.
- ilnd;;1:03-cv-03928_de94 hasReferenceToOtherEntry ilnd;;1:03-cv-03928_de83 @default.