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- ilnd;;1:16-cv-01963_de336 RegisterActionDate "2019-04-23" @default.
- ilnd;;1:16-cv-01963_de336 RegisterActionDescriptionText "MINUTE entry before the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall. The Court previously took the defendants' motion for leave to take limited fact discovery 325 under advisement. In the motion, the defendants explained that the Prisoner Review Board (PRB) recently produced Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) intake process materials as well as documents relating to plaintiff's clemency petition to the PRB. The defendants therefore seek to engage in the following additional discovery: (1) re-depose plaintiff about his statements to IDOC officials when he first entered their custody; (2) depose the two IDOC staff members that participated in the plaintiff's admission to the correctional facility; (3) re-depose plaintiff's sister about her statements to the PRB during its hearing on plaintiff's clemency petition; and (4) re-depose plaintiff's former attorney regarding his statements in the PRB hearing. The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing it is frivolous because the defendants have had knowledge of these facts for years 333 . The defendants did not, in fact, recently obtain the information pertaining to plaintiff's admission to IDOC; they have had the intake form for years, so the first and second requests are entirely too late. The third and fourth requests are also without merit. As an initial matter, the documents are the Board's summary of its hearing and not what the plaintiff's sister and attorney actually said. Moreover, the underlying premise--that the plaintiff had communicated to them something different from what the sister and attorney asserted during their depositions in this case--adds another degree of separation (e.g. the Board's summary of what the sister and attorney stated that the plaintiff told them). The unreliability of this telephone game is reason enough to harbor doubt, but the fact of the matter is that all the documents say is that the individuals made legal arguments (or attested to facts supporting a legal argument) to the PRB. ( 325 , #5 Exhibit.) In the same vein, an attorney's legal claim to an administrative body during a hearing hardly constitutes a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. There is no indication in the record that the attorney repeated any of the plaintiff's statements to the Board. That matters, of course, because it is the plaintiff's privilege to waive. There is not enough here pointing in the direction of the plaintiff's voluntary disclosure of his communications with counsel. What is more is that the information that the defendants claim is new seems to line up with what the attorney included in his petition to the Board. It appears, then, that these facts are generally more consistent than contradictory. Besides that, the defendants already moved for summary judgment, and the Court sees no reason to delay a 2016 case after fact discovery has been closed for eight months (and even after the close of expert discovery). This case must move forward. The Court accordingly denies the defendants' motion 325 . Additionally, at the 4/10/2019 motion hearing, the Court raised the following matter with the parties: whether the Court of Appeals' recent grant of rehearing en banc in Savory v. Cannon et al. (17-3543) (7th Cir. Mar. 6, 2019) (ECF No. 59) (order granting petition for rehearing en banc) affected the pending case in this Court. Plaintiff's counsel responded that it was "directly at issue in this case" and the statute of limitations would impact all the claims. Because the ability of a former prisoner to challenge the legality of his conviction currently hangs in the balance, the prudent course to chart is to wait and see. It does not make much sense to empanel a jury for a month-long trial when the Seventh Circuit is likely clarifying its Heck jurisprudence this year. The question of accrual--either when a conviction is set aside or at some earlier time--is one of exceptional importance in this case and many others in this Circuit. Only once the Court of Appeals definitively answers that question may this Court be confident that the legal landscape is firm enough to support a trial. The Court therefore exercises its discretion to strike the trial date and sets a status hearing for rescheduling purposes on 4/25/19 at 9:00 a.m. See LR 16.1(9) ("Any case ready for trial will be subject to trial as specified by the court."); Ruark v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 916 F.3d 619, 630 (7th Cir. 2019) (noting trial courts have broad discretion to manage their caseloads and dockets, including scheduling trials).Mailed notice (lk, ) (Entered: 04/23/2019)" @default.
- ilnd;;1:16-cv-01963_de336 AdministrativeID "336" @default.
- ilnd;;1:16-cv-01963_de336 OntologyLabel minute_entry @default.
- ilnd;;1:16-cv-01963_de336 hasReferenceToOtherEntry ilnd;;1:16-cv-01963_de325 @default.
- ilnd;;1:16-cv-01963_de336 hasReferenceToOtherEntry ilnd;;1:16-cv-01963_de333 @default.