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- ilnd;;1:17-cv-01010_de46 RegisterActionDate "2017-08-30" @default.
- ilnd;;1:17-cv-01010_de46 RegisterActionDescriptionText "MINUTE entry before the Honorable Susan E. Cox:The Defendants in this action have moved the Court to decline exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Count IV of the Plaintiffs complaint. For the reasons stated below, the Court denies defendants motion. Plaintiff 6331533 ("Plaintiff") alleges that while he was standing on a public sidewalk outside the Village of Maywood police station, Defendant Chief of Police Valdimir Talley ("Talley") demanded that Plaintiff produce identification without any reasonable suspicion that Plaintiff was engaged in illegal conduct. Talley informed Plaintiff it was not legal to take pictures of the exterior of the police station and, after Plaintiff refused to show any identification, Talley and Defendant Police Commander Theodore Yancy ("Yancy") placed Plaintiff under arrest and turned him over to Defendant Sergeant Daryl Fairley ("Fairley"). Plaintiff then provided his identification to Fairley. After he provided his identification, Plaintiff was informed that he violated Maywood Municipal Ordinance § 130.20(A)(5), which defines disorderly conduct as "[r]esisting or obstructing the performance of one known to be a police officer...." Shortly before his administrative hearing on this arrest, Plaintiff also was charged with a violation of Maywood Municipal Ordinance § 130.20(A)(1), which forbids "making, aiding or assisting in making any improper noise, riot, disturbance, breach of peace or diversion tending to be a breach of the peace." Specifically, Plaintiff's photographing police officers coming and going from the police station was alleged to be such a breach of the peace. Ultimately, Plaintiff was acquitted of the second charge, but convicted of the first after an administrative hearing during which he represented himself. Plaintiff alleges that his initial seizure by the police lacked reasonable suspicion and his custodial arrest was not supported by probable cause under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments (Counts I and II); that his prosecution was malicious under state law (Count III); and that the administrative decision convicting him of resisting or obstructing a police officer should be overturned as invalid under Illinois law and the United States Constitution (Count IV). Defendants have asked the Court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Count IV. As both sides acknowledge, the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is a matter of the Court's discretion, Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 245 (2009), and the grounds for declining jurisdiction are set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1)-(4). The only ground fairly raised in Defendants' motion is Section 1367(c)(2), which permits the Court to decline a claim that substantially predominates over those for which the court has original jurisdiction. Essentially, the Defendants argue that if the Court sustains the finding made in the administrative hearing that Plaintiff resisted or obstructed Talley, his other claims fail. The Court disagrees with this contention. First, Plaintiff in Count IV not only alleges that the administrative finding is contrary to the evidence presented to the hearing officer, but also that the conduct forming the basis of the charge is an unconstitutional application of the ordinance. Thus, a finding that the evidence presented to hearing officer was sufficient to sustain the finding is not dispositive of the constitutional issue that Plaintiff also alleges in Count IV, over which the Court has original jurisdiction. Second, even if the Court upholds Plaintiff's conviction, Plaintiff has alleged two additional constitutional violations: whether Talley and Yancy had reasonable suspicion to detain Plaintiff in the first place, and whether there was probable cause under the United States Constitution to arrest him with resisting arrest and disturbing the peace (i.e., the charge on which he was acquitted). It is also worth pointing out both sides likely would spend more money and time on this case if Court were to grant Defendants' motion than if the entire case is adjudicated here. More judicial resources will be expended. Given that the damages in this case are modest, dismissal would frustrate the resolution of this case rather than expedite it. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants Motion to Dismiss 24 . Mailed notice (lp, ) (Entered: 08/30/2017)" @default.
- ilnd;;1:17-cv-01010_de46 AdministrativeID "45" @default.
- ilnd;;1:17-cv-01010_de46 hasJudgeReference SJ000266 @default.
- ilnd;;1:17-cv-01010_de46 hasReferenceToOtherEntry ilnd;;1:17-cv-01010_de25 @default.