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• W1148740797 abstract "The study examines magnitude of voluntary ratio disclosure in India and association of magnitude of voluntary disclosure of ratio with performance of company, size and industry classification. The companies selected for study were CNX100 National Stock Exchange (NSE) companies. Multiple regression and correlation were used to understand relationship between disclosure index and selected independent variables. The study found magnitude of voluntary disclosure of ratios to be low. The regression and correlation results revealed that magnitude of ratio disclosure was significantly influenced by size of company. The study concluded that companies in India must disclose ratios, as it would help stakeholders understand and interpret statements better. For better investment decisions, securities market regulator of India, SEBI needs to take a view on making reporting of selected ratios mandatory. For comparability purposes, SEBI may also standardize method of calculating ratios.Key Words: Correlation, Financial ratios, India, Multiple regression, Voluntary disclosures(ProQuest: ... denotes formulae omitted.)INTRODUCTIONStanga (1976) stated that good corporate disclosures, among others foster a healthy relationship between a company and professional analysts; tend to reduce fluctuations in security prices, and help to eliminate insider profits and related legal problems. Over years, both mandatory and voluntary disclosure requirement have risen and thus have been focus of attention. Voluntary disclosure has been an area of interest to researchers for many years (Cerf, 1961; Singhvi and Desai, 1976; Firth, 1979 and 1984; Verrecchia, 1983 and 1990; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1989 and 1991; Skinner, 1994; Hossain and Adams, 1995; Raffournier, 1995; Courtis, 1999). Variations in corporate disclosure practices exist since corporations are managed by groups with varying managerial philosophies and wide discretion in disclosing information to investing public. Motivation for voluntary disclosures as identified by Subramanyam and Wild (2014) are legal liability, expectations adjustments, signaling and manage expectation s. Agency th eory may also explain why manage rs disclos e volu ntary information (Firth, 1979). Competitive market forces may induce management to disclose more information voluntarily. Better corporate disclosure practices are helpful in boosting brand name and goodwill, building a tenacious corporate culture, mitigating frauds, and in avoiding litigations and fines (Narayanaswamy, 2011). According to Singhvi and Desai (1971) inadequate corporate disclosures is likely to widen fluctuations in market price of a particular security since investment decisions, in absence of adequate information, are based on less objective measures.Of various voluntarily disclosed items in an annual report, one noteworthy item is Gibson (1982) suggests, probably no tool is more effective in evaluating where a company has been financially and in projecting future of a company than proper use of ratios. If ratios are valuable to users then companies should disclose them in order to reduce user uncertainty, thereby lowering cost of capital. It increases quality of annual reports. As per, Watson et al. (2002), the disclosure of ratios in company accounts may provide users of statements with new information not calculable elsewhere, or may simply provide information available elsewhere in same or different form. In case this information is included in annual report it brings down cost of obtaining information elsewhere and saves time apart from increasing understanding of stakeholders. As per Barnes (1987), financial ratios are used by accountants and analysts to forecast future variables and by researchers for predictive purposes, namely credit rating, assessment of risk and corporate failure. …" @default.
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• W1148740797 title "Voluntary Disclosure of Financial Ratios in India [Dagger]" @default.
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