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• W116862904 abstract "Two-sided markets are markets where there are two distinct groups of economic agentsninteracting with each other via one or several platforms. Through cross-group externalities,nthese two groups are interconnected such that the agents from one group gainnbenefits when there are more agents from the other group joining the same platform,nand vice versa. While the existing literature provides a comprehensive theoreticalnanalysis of such markets, there is a striking lack of empirical evidence to supportnthe theory. By employing a price setting duopoly experiment, this thesis contributesntowards the empirical studies of competition in two-sided markets.n In the experiment, there are two horizontally differentiated platform forms offeringngoods to two groups of consumers who incur transportation costs when they make anpurchase from one of these firms. One group (Group 2) is assumed to receive a networknbenefit which increases with the number of consumers from the other group (Groupn1) buying from the same platform. Under this setting, by charging a relatively lownprice to Group 1, a firm gains dominant market share in Group 1, which subsequentlyncontributes towards its bid for Group 2 market share. Four treatments are conductednin which the level of transportation costs and network benefits is varied. One uniquenaspect that separates the present experiment from previous experimental studies isnthat human subjects played the role of platform firms and they selected the pricesnwhile the demand from each group was computerised.n The main results from the experiment are largely in line with the theory. Firstly,nthere is a positive relationship between the prices charged to agents from one groupnand the transportation costs incurred by these agents. Secondly, the prices paid bynagents are negatively affected by how much the participation of these agents benefitsnthe other group. In other words, the higher the positive externalities exerted fromnone group, the lower the prices charged to the agents in this group. Nevertheless,nthe results also suggest that human subjects who were self-proclaimed non-profitnmaximisers set prices that deviate from the theoretical benchmark. This challengesnthe routine assumption of profit maximising firms in the model.n Overall, while the observed effects of both transportation costs and network benefits on market prices were consistent with the theory, empirically, the magnitude ofnboth aforementioned relationships was less than what is suggested by the theory.n" @default.
• W116862904 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W116862904 creator A5007454968 @default.
• W116862904 date "2012-11-01" @default.
• W116862904 modified "2023-09-27" @default.
• W116862904 title "An experimental study of competition in two-sided markets" @default.
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