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• W1189212796 abstract "The claim by a recent public opinion poll that only 1 percent of adult Lebanese Sunnis are supportive of self-proclaimed Islamic State of and Syria (ISIS)1 must be taken with a large pinch of salt since is a vast gulf between how people say they behave and how they actually behave.2 In fact, since Lebanese Sunnis are willing to support whoever can defeat their enemies and restore their pride, many of them find ISIS appealing for quite a few reasons: They have an aversion to Shiites and feel estranged from Lebanese state while harboring nostalgia for caliphate. Many admire power in any form, and others have a predisposition to anomic terrorism.Aversion to ShiitesThe rise to preeminence of Lebanese Shiites began after Amal movement evicted Lebanese army from southern suburbs of Beirut in February 1984. A year later, Hezbollah made its debut and formed a militia to fight Israel Defense Forces and its Southern Lebanese Army surrogate. The Sunnis thus lost political prerogatives that had accrued to them from 1943 National Covenant with Maronites. Having already lost support of Palestine Liberation Organization due to 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Sunnis suddenly found themselves giving way to a new Shiite contender that enjoyed strong regional support.The appearance of Rafiq Hariri on political scene in 1992 revived Sunni hopes, but his assassination in February 2005 put a damper on their expectations. In May 2008, Hezbollah stormed mostly Sunni west Beirut and, in a matter of hours, liquidated militia of Future Trend movement, headed by Hariri's son Saad. So after a long period of Shiite ascendance, Sunni street rejoiced when an ISIS offensive rapidly seized Mosul and a large swath of Iraqi territory in June 2014. As a neighborhood leader in Tripoli put it: Iraq witnessed a Sunni triumph against Shiite oppression. Forcing Tripoli's Sunnis to denounce ISIS amounts to coercing them to exercise political self-suppression.3 The truth of matter is that hatred for Iran and Hezbollah has made every Lebanese Sunni heartily supportive of ISIS, even if its brutal methods will eventually affect them adversely.4Estrangement from Lebanese StateWhen Hezbollah shattered main Sunni leadership, Lebanese army watched but decided not to interfere. Weak Sunni leadership, both clerical and political, created a vacuum and caused sect to drift apart and turn to radical Islamic leaders. One such leader was Salafi sheikh Ahmad al-Asir, whose movement had enjoyed support and loyalty of hundreds of Sidon's families. They were routed from city by Lebanese army and Hezbollah in June 2013. Going underground after debacle, Asir transferred allegiance from an-Nusra's Abu Muhammad Julani to ISIS's Abu Bakr Baghdadi.5 This defection also underscored eclipse of Sunni clerical institution Dar al-Fatwa, which in recent years had been subject of financial scandals and political weakness. The decimation of office of Sunni prime minister, to whom Dar al-Fatwa reports, rendered it rudderless, and it lost its traditional role maintaining cohesion of Sunni community.In addition, some government officials privately admit that ISIS has established itself in Lebanese Sunni areas, including Beirut,6 and there are examples to support this belief. Government-salaried Sunni clerics in Sidon, hometown of former prime minister Saad Hariri, were impelled to react angrily to spate of proISIS wall graffiti in that city and warned that unless trend was arrested, Sidon would become a fertile land for breeding terrorism.7 The Lebanese army frequently implements large-scale security measures in Sidon, despite insisting that is no fostering environment for ISIS in city.8In Tripoli, Lebanon's second largest city and its most important Sunni hub, Future Trend parliamentary deputies continue to refuse to admit publicly that ISIS is present in city, but their denials have failed to hide the existence of a radical Islamic environment in city. …" @default.
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• W1189212796 date "2015-07-01" @default.
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• W1189212796 title "Dateline: Why Lebanon's Sunnis Support ISIS" @default.
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