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• W128274321 abstract "On December 8, 1987, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev signed Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty in Washington, D.C. The treaty was followed seven months later by sight of a friendly Reagan and Gorbachev strolling across Moscow's Red Square, after having signed final documents implementing INF treaty. Reagan's actions were those of a president who had attacked both evil empire and arms accords, while relying on huge increases in defense expenditures. This seemingly paradoxical presidential behavior elicited many attempts to explain seemingly inexplicable, with governing assumption being that changes in independent variables had somehow produced a dramatic shift in presidential stance. This posits that no paradox existed for president. For Reagan, INF treaty represented an unfolding of events long predicted by his beliefs, and treaty was a step toward what he most sought--the actual abolition of nuclear arms. The following discussion begins by critically examining contemporary explanations of Reagan paradox, and then elaborates an alternative belief-system analysis. It is combination of Reagan's developing views of arms control and Soviet Union, testimony of close advisers, choices made during bargaining over arms control, and content of press conference responses that establishes roots in personal of presidential behavior judged paradoxical. Explaining Anomalous: A Critique The INF treaty led to destruction of 859 American and 1,836 Soviet nuclear missiles, all with ranges of 300 to 3,400 miles. Only about four percent of total nuclear armaments were eliminated, but accord was first Soviet-American treaty to provide for on-site monitoring and physical destruction of nuclear weapons. Reflecting on these events, Gorbachev expressed common wonderment at seemingly protean Reagan: Who would have thought in early eighties that it would be President Reagan who would sign with us first nuclear-arms reduction agreement in history?(1) Scholars and other observers shared Gorbachev's puzzlement at a president acting counter-intuitively.(2) Contemporary attempts to explain Reagan's presumably anomalous embrace of arms control often reflected varying premises of scholarship bearing on presidential choice, while also sharing pervasive inattention to presidential beliefs as significant explanations of presidential behavior. Although some analyses focus on presidential ideology or on belief systems to understand presidential choices,(3) Most contemporary scholarship looks elsewhere. Approaches tacitly taking their bearings from Richard Neustadt, with his portrait of modem president as an isolated officer seeking to maximize personal power through presidential choice, tend to focus on models of rational choice, electoral calculation, or processes of governmental politics Graham Allison identifies. Very different analyses draw 6n logic of James David Barber's preoccupation with character to focus largely on presidential personality. Other scholars find key to explanation in specific elements of president's environment, from Stephen Skowroneck's eroding cycles to Theda Skocpol's powerful bureaucrats.(4) However distinctive these approaches, in aggregate most seem to imply a view of how presidential choice should not be regarded. For example, Neustadt instructs us that the purposes of presidents are not to be confused with their intentions at start; these are a matter, rather, of responses to events. Barber warns that publicly proffered reasons of presidents are never a guide to explanation: analysis of content of reasons actor offers for his actions is of limited utility . . . nor are his expressed intentions much help.(5) In short, American presidency is no teleological tale, marked by unfolding of sustained and publicly stated presidential intents as they encounter, re-shape or are tempered by circumstance and event; instead, presidential choices more closely resemble game of pin-ball-whatever a president's original beliefs, he is impelled forward by unpredictable events, and hurled into an environment constrained by barriers of political space or regime sequences or bureaucratized state, with presidential decisions usually emerging largely as adaptations to these exigencies. …" @default.
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• W128274321 date "1997-06-22" @default.
• W128274321 modified "2023-09-26" @default.
• W128274321 title "Presidential Beliefs and the Reagan Paradox" @default.
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