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• W13908082 abstract "The relationship of the Russian government to the central Moscow media has changed enormously during the last eight years. Once fully in control of the media, the government is now forced to resort to various tactics of persuasion and pressure to influence them. In a country where the struggle for power and resources is intense, and the media are often the only means of communicating one's designs to the Russian masses, access to television air time and press coverage has become more coveted than ever by politicians. During the ongoing struggle for glasnost and freedom of speech, many journalists and editors have gained an attitude of independence that has rendered them skeptical of government efforts to reassert control and endowed them with a belief that they possess a right to report and comment on events as they see fit. While in some media this is manifested as journalists strive for fact-based reporting and unbiased coverage, other organs of the media actively participate in the political struggle. This article traces the steps that eased Soviet and Russian government control over the centrally controlled media and elaborates on recent developments in media-government relations. It also lays out some concrete examples of how media content has changed over the last eight years, illustrating both media independence and instances in which objective media coverage fell victim to the political game that seems perpetually to rule Russia. Finally, it analyzes the role of the media in the ongoing power struggle in Moscow and concludes that, given the precedent of government manipulation of the media and the difficult financial position of most newspapers and television, the media are unlikely to be freed from political influence in the near future. However, because of the independent attitudes cultivated by glasnost, the net result is somewhat of a balance: While the political power struggle continues to influence the media, the media likewise continue to exert a certain independent influence on the power struggle, as well as on their own future. THE PRE-GORBACHEV ERA The characteristics of the media in the pre-Gorbachev era are well-documented.(1) journalists were rigorously educated in a fashion which, like most Soviet curricula of higher education, was based on the Marxist-Leninist theories and the current policies of the Communist Party. For most editors and journalists in the 1980s, a book issued in 1979, CPSU [The Communist Party of the Soviet Union]: On the Mass Media and Propaganda functioned as the essential guide to the limits of permissible reporting.(2) Editors at the central news agencies were at the fingertips of the Kremlin via the verkhushka, or direct-line Kremlin telephone on their desks, and their local counterparts were similarly connected to the City Soviet and Regional Party Committees. Judicious following of the party line and working for a central newspaper or major local agency were usually sufficient to become a card-carrying member of the Union of journalists, which united the more loyal journalists and aided in the oversight of their work.(3) Central control of the media produced predictable results. Altered pictures of the Politburo and glorifying photographs of socialist workers were splashed across front pages of newspapers. Accompanying text reported the outstanding political and economic achievements of the Party and detailed propagandistic speeches at length. It has been frequently recounted that Soviet citizens learned to read the newspapers back to front, searching the back columns for four-line accounts of major accidents or hints of social or political nonconformity. The controlled press was countered by the presence of samizdat, or self-publishing. A widespread phenomenon in the early 1970s and 1980s, samizdat usually consisted of typewritten carbon copies of censored literature, poetry and political thought. Like the press, television was strictly controlled. …" @default.
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• W13908082 date "1993-06-22" @default.
• W13908082 modified "2023-09-26" @default.
• W13908082 title "The Press and Power in the Russian Federation" @default.
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