FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W1480305065> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W1480305065 abstract "We describe a spatial duopoly in a Hotelling model with quadratic transportation costs where consumers are distributed according to a symmetric density whose degree of concentration is variable. By solving the two-stage game in prices and locations as a function of the concentration index, we analyse the effects on the firms’optimal choices in a unbounded strategy space of an increasing agglomeration of consumers in the middle. Traditional horizontal differentiation-locational models assume that consumers are uniformly distributed over the characteristics space. With a few exceptions, the situations in which the consumers' preferences are concentrated on a subsection of the available varieties have been neglected. This issue was successfully addressed by Tabuchi and Thisse (1995), who explicitly solved the price-location problem for two firms in the presence of a symmetric triangular consumers’ distribution. They showed that in this case any symmetric location cannot be an equilibrium, due to a discontinuity of the reactions functions generated by the non-differentiability of the consumers’ density at its modal value; rather, their model exhibits two subgame perfect asymmetric equilibria characterised by strong product differentiation. In this paper, we assume that consumers are distributed according to a trapezoid distribution. This allows a simple parametrization of the degree of consumers' concentration, which includes the uniform and the triangular distribution as limit cases, and makes possible to solve the price-location problem as a function of the concentration index. Therefore we are able to find a more general explicit solution which covers those previously discussed in the literature. The basic results of the paper are the following. A symmetric equilibrium exists for all values of the concentration parameter, provided that the density is differentiable at the centre of its support. A higher degree of the consumers’ concentration around the middle induces firms to move inwards, in order to locate closer to the growing share of consumers: competition in the highly populated central area of the market reduces differentiation and strengthens price competition. The overall equilibrium shows clearly that the demand effect outweighs the strategic effect. However the symmetric equilibrium may be not unique. When concentration becomes sufficiently high, two asymmetric specular equilibria coexist with the symmetric one. They arise for a degree of concentration lower than that implied by a triangular distribution, with price-location choices collapsing in the limit to those identified by Tabuchi and Thisse. At these equilibria one firm locates in the central area of the market, while the other locates outside the market space. These results are consistent with the idea that a higher concentration of consumers around the centre induces firms to reduce the optimal product differentiation and offer theoretical support to the intuition that homogeneity of consumers might have important implications in terms of reducing the firms' market power. However, our findings suggest that in models of spatial competition realistic representations of the demand side may generate a ‘strange’ interplay between the strategic effect and the demand effect which may cause a failure of the uniqueness property and weakens the economic interpretation of equilibria." @default.
• W1480305065 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W1480305065 creator A5054970930 @default.
• W1480305065 date "2003-08-01" @default.
• W1480305065 modified "2023-09-27" @default.
• W1480305065 title "Symmetric and Asymmetric Equilibria in a Spatial Duopoly" @default.
• W1480305065 cites W1978369028 @default.
• W1480305065 cites W2014974770 @default.
• W1480305065 cites W2036454494 @default.
• W1480305065 cites W2046922396 @default.
• W1480305065 cites W2049152959 @default.
• W1480305065 cites W2111205403 @default.
• W1480305065 hasPublicationYear "2003" @default.
• W1480305065 type Work @default.
• W1480305065 sameAs 1480305065 @default.
• W1480305065 citedByCount "0" @default.
• W1480305065 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W1480305065 hasAuthorship W1480305065A5054970930 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConcept C110121322 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConcept C111472728 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConcept C111919701 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConcept C134306372 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConcept C138885662 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConcept C14036430 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConcept C144237770 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConcept C16520705 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConcept C175983524 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConcept C180456769 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConcept C2778572836 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConcept C2780586882 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConcept C33556415 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConcept C33923547 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConcept C41008148 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConcept C46814582 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConcept C78458016 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConcept C86803240 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConceptScore W1480305065C110121322 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConceptScore W1480305065C111472728 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConceptScore W1480305065C111919701 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConceptScore W1480305065C134306372 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConceptScore W1480305065C138885662 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConceptScore W1480305065C14036430 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConceptScore W1480305065C144237770 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConceptScore W1480305065C162324750 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConceptScore W1480305065C16520705 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConceptScore W1480305065C175983524 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConceptScore W1480305065C180456769 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConceptScore W1480305065C2778572836 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConceptScore W1480305065C2780586882 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConceptScore W1480305065C33556415 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConceptScore W1480305065C33923547 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConceptScore W1480305065C41008148 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConceptScore W1480305065C46814582 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConceptScore W1480305065C78458016 @default.
• W1480305065 hasConceptScore W1480305065C86803240 @default.
• W1480305065 hasLocation W14803050651 @default.
• W1480305065 hasOpenAccess W1480305065 @default.
• W1480305065 hasPrimaryLocation W14803050651 @default.
• W1480305065 hasRelatedWork W1974735786 @default.
• W1480305065 hasRelatedWork W2006174130 @default.
• W1480305065 hasRelatedWork W2008337840 @default.
• W1480305065 hasRelatedWork W2038415997 @default.
• W1480305065 hasRelatedWork W2052901635 @default.
• W1480305065 hasRelatedWork W2080133833 @default.
• W1480305065 hasRelatedWork W2107101651 @default.
• W1480305065 hasRelatedWork W2147332448 @default.
• W1480305065 hasRelatedWork W2289463794 @default.
• W1480305065 hasRelatedWork W2337326446 @default.
• W1480305065 hasRelatedWork W2372747831 @default.
• W1480305065 hasRelatedWork W2383209739 @default.
• W1480305065 hasRelatedWork W2494868282 @default.
• W1480305065 hasRelatedWork W2598950553 @default.
• W1480305065 hasRelatedWork W2622289112 @default.
• W1480305065 hasRelatedWork W2762538436 @default.
• W1480305065 hasRelatedWork W2990126452 @default.
• W1480305065 hasRelatedWork W3151257016 @default.
• W1480305065 hasRelatedWork W561423882 @default.
• W1480305065 hasRelatedWork W2186242233 @default.
• W1480305065 isParatext "false" @default.
• W1480305065 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W1480305065 magId "1480305065" @default.
• W1480305065 workType "article" @default.