Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W1482717973> ?p ?o ?g. }
Showing items 1 to 85 of
85
with 100 items per page.
- W1482717973 endingPage "177" @default.
- W1482717973 startingPage "172" @default.
- W1482717973 abstract "Economists in an antitrust case have at their disposal quite a large bag of tools and truisms, but for the most part these are derived from studies of static models. In many industries the policy issues concern the implications of firm behavior on market structure and performance over time. A case in point is a recent Federal Trade Commission complaint against the DuPont Corporation. The FTC alleged that DuPont had engaged in a strategy designed to monopolize the market for titanium dioxide, better known as the coloring agent in white paint. The alleged strategy was, in essence, what some would recognize as the Boston Consulting Group story: When a firm has a lead in an industry with significant learning economies, the firm should price below competitors' costs and expand to take further advantage of learning effects and, in the process, to increase market share.' This paper summarizes the results of an analysis of dynamic competition with scale and learning effects. The research is a preliminary exploration. All results are obtained under rather special assumptions about the production technology, the effects of experience on costs, and the strategic interactions between firms. Two kinds of strategic behavior are considered. In the first case, each firm takes the production decisions of competitors as given (the Nash assumption). In the second case, firms consider pre-emptive capacity investments, taking into account that competitors will alter their future investment plans to achieve nonnegative profits. We call this a Stackelberg (CS) game. Using the maximization of net surplus as a socially optimal benchmark, neither form of competition yields an efficient outcome when new investment exhibits increasing returns to scale. In the absence of learning effects, smaller firms in a Nash competition have a greater incentive to add new capacity than do larger firms, and the equilibrium industry structure approaches equal market shares. Introducing learning effects in the Nash game causes a tendency toward increased concentration, but monopoly is not an inevitable consequence. The CS game is competitive than the Nash game in the sense that firms compete for the right to invest at each instant of time. With identical firms and no learning effects, the market structure in a CS equilibrium is indeterminate, although the sequence of industry investments is well defined. Introducing firm-specific and nonstochastic learning has a dramatic effect on the CS equilibrium. All new investment is undertaken by a single firm, even if the learning economies are small. Moreover, the level of output could be lower (and price higher) in a CS equilibrium than it would be in a Nash equilibrium. In this sense more competition can lead to a lower rate of output over time." @default.
- W1482717973 created "2016-06-24" @default.
- W1482717973 creator A5013366521 @default.
- W1482717973 creator A5021513462 @default.
- W1482717973 date "1981-01-01" @default.
- W1482717973 modified "2023-09-26" @default.
- W1482717973 title "Investment Decisions with Economies of Scale and Learning" @default.
- W1482717973 cites W2037657897 @default.
- W1482717973 cites W2169044080 @default.
- W1482717973 hasPublicationYear "1981" @default.
- W1482717973 type Work @default.
- W1482717973 sameAs 1482717973 @default.
- W1482717973 citedByCount "17" @default.
- W1482717973 countsByYear W14827179732012 @default.
- W1482717973 countsByYear W14827179732014 @default.
- W1482717973 countsByYear W14827179732016 @default.
- W1482717973 countsByYear W14827179732020 @default.
- W1482717973 crossrefType "posted-content" @default.
- W1482717973 hasAuthorship W1482717973A5013366521 @default.
- W1482717973 hasAuthorship W1482717973A5021513462 @default.
- W1482717973 hasConcept C10138342 @default.
- W1482717973 hasConcept C127576917 @default.
- W1482717973 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
- W1482717973 hasConcept C175444787 @default.
- W1482717973 hasConcept C17744445 @default.
- W1482717973 hasConcept C187736073 @default.
- W1482717973 hasConcept C18903297 @default.
- W1482717973 hasConcept C199510392 @default.
- W1482717973 hasConcept C199539241 @default.
- W1482717973 hasConcept C27548731 @default.
- W1482717973 hasConcept C2778348171 @default.
- W1482717973 hasConcept C2778348673 @default.
- W1482717973 hasConcept C29321873 @default.
- W1482717973 hasConcept C40700 @default.
- W1482717973 hasConcept C86803240 @default.
- W1482717973 hasConcept C91306197 @default.
- W1482717973 hasConcept C94625758 @default.
- W1482717973 hasConceptScore W1482717973C10138342 @default.
- W1482717973 hasConceptScore W1482717973C127576917 @default.
- W1482717973 hasConceptScore W1482717973C162324750 @default.
- W1482717973 hasConceptScore W1482717973C175444787 @default.
- W1482717973 hasConceptScore W1482717973C17744445 @default.
- W1482717973 hasConceptScore W1482717973C187736073 @default.
- W1482717973 hasConceptScore W1482717973C18903297 @default.
- W1482717973 hasConceptScore W1482717973C199510392 @default.
- W1482717973 hasConceptScore W1482717973C199539241 @default.
- W1482717973 hasConceptScore W1482717973C27548731 @default.
- W1482717973 hasConceptScore W1482717973C2778348171 @default.
- W1482717973 hasConceptScore W1482717973C2778348673 @default.
- W1482717973 hasConceptScore W1482717973C29321873 @default.
- W1482717973 hasConceptScore W1482717973C40700 @default.
- W1482717973 hasConceptScore W1482717973C86803240 @default.
- W1482717973 hasConceptScore W1482717973C91306197 @default.
- W1482717973 hasConceptScore W1482717973C94625758 @default.
- W1482717973 hasIssue "2" @default.
- W1482717973 hasLocation W14827179731 @default.
- W1482717973 hasOpenAccess W1482717973 @default.
- W1482717973 hasPrimaryLocation W14827179731 @default.
- W1482717973 hasRelatedWork W1561945930 @default.
- W1482717973 hasRelatedWork W1998691772 @default.
- W1482717973 hasRelatedWork W2021129825 @default.
- W1482717973 hasRelatedWork W2047212489 @default.
- W1482717973 hasRelatedWork W2058246535 @default.
- W1482717973 hasRelatedWork W2060827592 @default.
- W1482717973 hasRelatedWork W2105828471 @default.
- W1482717973 hasRelatedWork W2134412515 @default.
- W1482717973 hasRelatedWork W2139984237 @default.
- W1482717973 hasRelatedWork W2169044080 @default.
- W1482717973 hasRelatedWork W2758656006 @default.
- W1482717973 hasRelatedWork W3016002635 @default.
- W1482717973 hasRelatedWork W3121793564 @default.
- W1482717973 hasRelatedWork W3121930161 @default.
- W1482717973 hasRelatedWork W3123541943 @default.
- W1482717973 hasRelatedWork W3123698428 @default.
- W1482717973 hasRelatedWork W3124201178 @default.
- W1482717973 hasRelatedWork W399124922 @default.
- W1482717973 hasRelatedWork W582409344 @default.
- W1482717973 hasRelatedWork W630784817 @default.
- W1482717973 hasVolume "71" @default.
- W1482717973 isParatext "false" @default.
- W1482717973 isRetracted "false" @default.
- W1482717973 magId "1482717973" @default.
- W1482717973 workType "article" @default.