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• W148400738 abstract "For the past 35 years the US Army and the North Vietnamese have claimed victory in the October to November 1965 Ia Drang Valley Battle. While the United States' side of the battle has been extensively documented, the Vietnamese version has remained obscure. Although heavily colored by communist hagiography and propaganda, recently published People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) accounts provide answers to many questions and acknowledge a number of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) mistakes and command failures. When added to information from US sources, these accounts reveal how greatly the fog of war, overoptimism and blind fate influenced the battle. The B3 Front Plan According to PAVN, the Ia Drang Battle grew out of the B3 (Central Highlands) Front's plan to lure US and South Vietnamese forces into battle on terms favorable to the communists. The plan included besieging the remote Plei Me border outpost south of Pleiku in South Vietnam's Central Highlands and forcing US and South Vietnamese forces to come to the rescue. The goal was to annihilate five or six US companies.1 The NVA 320th and 33d Regiments were to launch the campaign, but one of the NVA's forest units-- the 304th Division-would reinforce the B3 Front. In August 1965 the 304th received orders to move south to the Central Highlands. The 304th's lead element, the 66th Regiment, was scheduled to arrive in time for the campaign's final phase.2 Aware they could not match newly arrived US forces' power, NVA commanders knew their strategy was risky. During political indoctrination sessions before the campaign began, 320th Regiment troops expressed serious doubts.3 Stunning Blows The troops had reason to be skeptical. The 33d Regiment, launching the Plei Me siege on 19 October 1965, was stunned by unexpectedly powerful US air strikes that inflicted heavy losses and totally disrupted communications between regimental headquarters and forward units. After the battle, B3 Front headquarters admitted that this loss of communications with front-line units severely hampered its ability to make timely and informed command decisions during this phase of the battle.4 The 320th Regiment's ambush of a large South Vietnamese relief column on 23 October also resulted in heavy NVA casualties.5 On 26 October, two days after the 1 st Brigade, 1st US Cavalry Division, arrived in Pleiku, the B3 Front commander decided that discretion was the better part of valor and ordered troops back to the Ia Drang base area.6 From 24 October to 9 November, 1st Brigade, Ist US Cavalry Division, heliborne airmobile elements fought a series of engagements against retreating communist troops in the Ia Drang Valley. The 33d Regiment bore the brunt of the US attacks. The regimental hospital was overrun on I November. On 4 November, US 2d Squadron, 12th US Cavalry Regiment forces engaged two 33d Regiment, 3d Battalion companies in a stiff battle. On 6 November, two 2d Squadron, 8th US Cavalry Regiment companies estimated several hundred NVA 1st and 2d Battalion, 33d Regiment forces killed. Twenty-six US soldiers were killed; 53 were wounded.7 The B3 Front viewed the 4 and 6 October engagements as victories and claimed that from 29 October to 9 November five US platoons had been annihilated and that 385 US troops were killed or wounded.8 Actual 1st Brigade losses were 59 men killed and 196 wounded.9 The NVA 33d Regiment suffered catastrophic losses, being reduced to less than half its authorized strength.10 Postbattle NVA analyses conclude that US helicopter leap-frog attacks into the heart of the base area had thrown the NVA back onto the defensive, disrupted command and control, and prevented the NVA from concentrating forces. The US 1st Brigade withdrew, setting the stage for the arrival of the two principal participants in the Ia Drang Battle-the 1st US Cavalry Division's 3d Brigade and the NVA's 66th Regiment. …" @default.
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• W148400738 date "2001-01-01" @default.
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• W148400738 title "The Fog of War: The Vietnamese View of the la Drang Battle" @default.
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