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• W1484713385 abstract "The academic debate about European cooperation on immigration has focused on bigtreaty negotiations, presented an undifferentiated picture of the subfields of immigration,and has only recently begun to make use of the abundant literature on nationalimmigration policies. As a macrostructure, this study uses a bureaucratic politicsframework to understand the preference formation of national governments on liberalisingeconomic migration policies. This allows unpacking the process of preference formationand linking it to a number of causal factors, which, by influencing the cost and benefitsdistribution of the relevant actors – intra-ministerial actors, employer associations, tradeunions, and other sub-state actors – shape the position of the government. The influenceof the causal factors is underpinned by different theories derived from the literatures onEuropeanisation, immigration policy-making, and foreign policy. Germany is used as alongitudinal case study with four cases within it, as it has undergone a U-turn in a way noother relevant Member State has, from a keen supporter of EU involvement to being highlysceptical with regard to economic migration policies at the EU level. The empirical data isbased on 43 open-ended interviews, archival research and newspaper analysis.The bureaucratic politics framework supplanted with the theoretical strands of domesticpolitics and foreign policy concerns provides a number of themes that can explain why andunder what conditions a Member State supports liberalising economic migration policies atthe EU level from 1957 until the Treaty of Lisbon. The thesis argues that if the Europeanpolicy measure applies to a particular group of sending countries and the domesticsalience of immigration is low, sending countries can lobby Member State governments tosupport EU-level liberalisation of immigration policies. The misfit between the existingnational regulations for economic migration and European-level policies cannot be significant as otherwise the economic and political adaptation costs for actors involved aretoo high. A heated national debate on immigration is negatively related to governmentalsupport for such measures as the political costs of support skyrocket. Conversely, if thedecision-making process happens bureaucratically, this helps to attain governmentalsupport as the political costs of doing so are kept minimal." @default.
• W1484713385 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W1484713385 creator A5023107035 @default.
• W1484713385 date "2011-05-01" @default.
• W1484713385 modified "2023-09-23" @default.
• W1484713385 title "Governmental preferences on liberalising economic migration policies at the EU level: Germany’s domestic politics, foreign policy, and labour market" @default.
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