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• W1489635757 abstract "Waldo (1984) characterizes the politics-+administration as a perdurable feature of American public administrative thought. Two recent exchanges between Svara (2006, 2008) and Overeem (2006, 2008) testify to this fact: the former rejecting dichotomy as a term in favor of complementarity, the latter valuing dichotomy for its implied political neutrality. From the time that Wilson (1978) articulated the possibility that administration is a sphere of activity distinct from politics, the notion has been with us as an empirical statement, historico-cultural consequence, reform rationale, behavioral norm, myth, intellectual aberration, and a process gap. Conceptual arguments not withstanding, the has provided a perspective for assessing the neo-liberal managerialism that has permeated administrative thinking for the past three decades (Box, 1999; Cox, 2002; Kobrak, 1996; Rosenbloom & Ross, 1994). The dichotomy, as fact or ideological invention, continues to be debated and to withstand attacks on its orthodoxy. It persists despite evidence that politics and administration are inseparably linked in a number of ways: (a) administrative acts have political consequences; (b) administrators initiate policy; (c) administrators shape policy after the fact; (d) civil servants are not politically neutral; (e) legislators investigate and intervene in administrative processes. Despite this evidence the remains a seminal idea in American public administration and appears unlikely to go away. Explaining the relationship between the nominal policy makers, elected or appointed, and the nominal implementers of policy presents political science and public administration with one of the greatest of theoretical challenges (Moe, 1990). This paper points to evidence regarding organizational decision processes, identified in the institutional literature, which may add to the explanation for this concept's perdurability while amplifying our understanding of the connections between these two spheres. The implications of this interpretation for public administration theory, the prospects for organizational reform and the implications for governance are explored below. (2) EXPLANATIONS FOR THE DICHOTOMY'S PERDURABILITY Waldo (1984a, 1984b, 1987) suggests two reasons for the persistence of this notion. In The Administrative State (1984a) he finds the source of the politics-administration divide in unresolved issues arising from the separation of powers doctrine expressed in the U.S. Constitution. The division allowed rationales for Progressive administrative and political reforms. These reforms strengthened the executive under the guise of efficiency while protecting establishment interests from politicians manipulating immigrant newcomers for other ends. Although he admits that, by the end of the 1930's, no one took a practical separation of the two activities seriously and most recognized the role of administrators as policy initiators, the popularity of the continued. Later Waldo (1987) finds the idea sustained in part by two philosophical streams in Western culture, the Greek civic-culture (political) tradition and the Roman imperial (administrative) tradition, inherited by the American system. He concludes, [H]istory has presented us with a between politics and administration, then presumably the distinction is deeply grounded indeed (p. 106). Rosenbloom and Ross (1994) give support to the argument that the was and is sustained in the interest of expanding the executive side of the federal power equation in order to achieve efficiency and effectiveness. The allows public managers to take credit for efficiently run programs while blaming failure on legislative interference and micromanagement. Rosenbloom and Ross provide examples of legislation from 1946--the Administrative Procedure Act, Legislative Reorganization Act, Tort Claims Act, and the Employment Act--based on the principle of the dichotomy, that have yielded power to the executive at the expense of the legislative. …" @default.
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• W1489635757 title "The Persistence of the Politics-Administration Dichotomy: An Additional Explanation1" @default.
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