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• W149039331 abstract "Land management problems such as the loss of biodiversity and degraded water quality are often the result of the failure of the market to produce a socially optimal outcome. In particular, the presence of externalities, the existence of public goods and the absence of adequate information mean that a freely operating market does not supply an efficient level of ecosystem services. As a result, government intervention may be necessary. Conservation auctions have become increasingly popular in recent years amongst all levels of government. A conservation auction requires landholders to submit bids nominating a management plan for their property and a price for undertaking this plan. The bids that represent the best ecological value for money are then chosen. An auction encourages landholders to reveal their opportunity cost and the purchaser to reveal information on the best management actions. This leads to better coordination of demand and supply of conservation services. It also provides the potential for more cost-effective use of public funds than alternative policy mechanisms. However there are still many aspects of the application of conservation auctions that remain to be investigated and subsequently enhanced. The aim of this thesis is to examine the theory underlying conservation auctions and investigate the use of the mechanism in Queensland using the Vegetation Incentives Program (VIP) as a case study. In particular, the following research questions are addressed: 1. Is a conservation auction an appropriate NRM tool for vegetation management in regional Queensland? 1. 1. What factors influence participation in MBI schemes, particularlyconservation auctions?2. 2. What factors influence bid levels of participants? 3. 3. What impact does including a conservation covenant have on conservation auctions? 4. 4. What recommendations for conservation auction design does the VIP provide? The Queensland government’s VIP was selected as a case study for this thesis because it was the first wide-scale application of the conservation auction mechanism in Australia. It was run across virtually all of Queensland in an effort to encourage landholders to protect and manage non-remnant native vegetation on private land. It is anticipated that the findings from this research will inform current conservation auction theory and contribute to the design of future natural resource management programs. Investigating the characteristics of the VIP participants and what they considered important when deciding to participate enlightens the reasons behind participation in conservation auctions. Similarly, examining the characteristics of the people who withdrew from the program, and the reasons they did so, is useful to understand the limits to greater participation. This thesis also assesses the influences on bids submitted to the VIP and explores the characteristics of bids and bidders who did not require a high payment for signing a covenant. These investigations test the theory underpinning bidding in conservation auctions and the findings will go someway to improving the cost-effectiveness of conservation auction design. Key lessons for auction, process and contract design in conservation auctions are produced. The important role that the reserve price played in the VIP in ensuring that a lack of competition did not lead to funding of low value properties is an important lesson for other conservation auctions around Australia as they move out of their pilot phases with small budgets into larger programs. Other lessons for auction design include recommending that multiple rounds within an auction are likely to be appropriate when the market is uninformed and there is a large budget to be devolved. Effective process design needs to take the benefits and possible problems of using a third party to deliver a program into account. Finally, the results suggest that using a covenant as part of the contract design may limit the potential audience for a program. Sufficient participation and honest bidding is a vital ingredient for the effectiveness of conservation auctions. As a result, great care must be taken when designing an auction so as not to deter potential participants and forgo opportunities for greater cost¬effectiveness." @default.
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• W149039331 date "2007-07-01" @default.
• W149039331 modified "2023-09-27" @default.
• W149039331 title "Designing more effective conservation auctions: lessons from Queensland’s Vegetation Incentives Program" @default.
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