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• W149668892 abstract "Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkmenistan has been considered one of the most bizarre regimes in the post-Soviet area and one of the closest to the totalitarian ideal.1 In attempting to understand the character of the Turkmen regime after 1991, scholars usually pay attention to the legacy of the pre-Soviet period and the Soviet regime.2 The transformation of tribal Turkmen society into a regional-based kinship backed by the Russian and then Soviet authorities has contributed considerably to the current regime's character. This article argues, however, that, aside from this Soviet continuity, the political culture and the personality of the leader should be considered an important element of regime formation. The interaction between these two factors, namely political culture and the president's personality, suggests the neopatrimonial logic at work in contemporary Turkmenistan. I contend that a leader's character works to shape the political culture, especially when that leader is a founding father of a newly independent country.3 Successors to the first leader are generally expected to behave in similar fashion to their predecessors, often with only slight changes in style due to differences in social background.This article thus focuses on recent developments in the Turkmen elite structure, particularly post December 2006, i.e., under the second president, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow.4 The first section discusses the formation of Turkmen elites in the pre-Soviet, Soviet, and post-Soviet periods, while the second focuses on the continuities and discontinuities of elite formation after 2006. The analysis of the political elite in Turkmenistan lacks a solid empirical basis. The isolated character of the regime stands in the way of field research and direct access to information. Consequently, Turkmenistan has, with some exceptions, remained outside mainstream research on Central Asia.5 All research on the elite has to be based upon incomplete biographies of key leaders, indirect observations, analogies, unofficial sources and interviews, as well as the subjective statements and extrapolations by Turkmen living abroad who draw on their previous experience to describe the current situation. Conducting research on the elite in Turkmenistan as a key element of the regime is extremely difficult, always incomplete, and even speculative, but it remains the only way we have of understanding current Turkmen politics.Soviet and Post-Soviet Elite FormationAfter the establishment of Tsarist dominance over Turkmen tribes at the end of the nineteenth century, the role played by the Ahalteke tribe gradually expanded, as the center of the trans-Caspian area-Ashkhabad-was located on its territory. The Ahalteke were subject to much greater Russification than other Turkmen populations, especially those living under the Uzbek-dominated Bukhara or Khiva administration.6 The Ahalteke continued to remain dominant even after the October Revolution had transformed nomadic or semi-nomadic society into settled communities. 7 The prerevolutionary elites were mostly liquidated during the civil war and the 1920s and new institutions of power (state institutions, the party apparatus, kolkhozes etc.) were established. At the same time, the central Soviet leadership maintained maximum possible parity between tribes.8 The Soviet period created a kind of hybrid system amalgamating elements of the traditional tribal social structures-assembled according to regional ties-and the modern power hierarchy. New structures and institutions began to arise at the end of the 1930s, as the last representatives of pre-Soviet leaders had been replaced by new cadres whose loyalties were based upon Soviet-formatted nationality and linguistic knowledge (Russian, and Russified Turkmen) or party affiliation, whereas tribal identity constituted only one precondition for social promotion.Starting in the 1940s, but especially since the 1960s, local first secretaries with more developed ties within the republics accrued greater power, whereas the role of the Russian-speaking second secretaries, sent to the periphery republics from the center, became much more formal. …" @default.
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• W149668892 date "2012-09-22" @default.
• W149668892 modified "2023-09-26" @default.
• W149668892 title "The Elite in Post-Soviet and Post-Niyazow Turkmenistan: Does Political Culture Form a Leader?" @default.
• W149668892 hasPublicationYear "2012" @default.
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