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• W1497642800 abstract "Leaders who fail to vote as their constituents would risk defeat in subsequent elections. Two key assumptions underlying this basic formulation of representative democracy are that (A) citizens know how their elected officials vote in the legislature and (B) they base their electoral support on that knowledge. However, scholars studying the degree to which legislators act in the public interest often use measures that make it hard to judge the extent to which representation occurs in this manner and they do not consider whether citizens have the information needed to hold leaders accountable. Drawing upon a large national survey with detailed knowledge and opinion measures, we find that representation is rewarded when citizens are politically knowledgeable. Across seven issues spanning domestic politics and foreign affairs, respondents base their electoral decisions on both correctly stating how their Senator voted on major legislation and their perceived agreement with the Senator’s votes. Furthermore, we show that state-level variations in the amount of media coverage devoted to legislative behavior influences the degree to which citizens hold their representatives accountable. These findings underscore the important role of public knowledge in securing political representation. * Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, jason.barabas@fsu.edu ** Graduate Student, Department of Political Science, jmw07u@fsu.edu Does being knowledgeable enhance democracy? Many studies outline the contours of knowledge and suggest that it structures political reasoning (e.g., Althaus 2003; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Gomez and Wilson 2001). Yet, the vote of any single citizen is unlikely to be pivotal and for many people it is simply not worth the effort to become informed about political matters (Downs 1957; Hardin 2009). Perhaps most of all, even though political knowledge has undergirded the study of political behavior for more than fifty years, there is no clear sense that possessing political knowledge facilitates representation. This is important because democratic theory, at a rudimentary level, speaks to the relationship between elected representatives and their constituents. Ideally, legislators ought to enact policies consistent with the will of the people they represent (Dahl 1963; Pitkin 1967; cf. Burke 1774). For many years the normative ideal of representation enjoyed empirical support. Beginning with the landmark investigation of constituency influence in Congress by Miller and Stokes (1963) and continuing over the following three decades, study after study showed high degrees of democratic responsiveness across issues and institutions (e,g., Bartels 1991; Page and Shapiro 1983; Monroe 1979; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995; Wlezien 1995; for reviews see Manza and Cook 2002 or Burstein 2003). From this impressive body of work one might be tempted to conclude that public opinion is a reliable predictor of public policy. However, recent trends suggest responsiveness may be on the decline (Monroe 1998; Jacobs and Shapiro 2000) or that it may have severe upper-class biases (Bartels 2007; Gilens 2005; Jacobs and Page 2006; cf. Soroka and Wlezien 2010). In light of these findings, and given the significance of the topic more generally, it seems important to ask whether citizens reward representation or punish deviations from it. Ultimately, democratic responsiveness hinges on an electoral mechanism. When legislators act in opposition to the views of their constituency they risk removal from" @default.
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• W1497642800 title "Political Knowledge, Representation, and the Mass Media" @default.
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