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• W1500428599 abstract "We introduce the concept of a sink equilibrium. A sink equilibrium is a strongly connected component with no outgoing arcs in the strategy profile graph associated with a game. The strategy profile graph has a vertex set induced by the set of pure strategy profiles; its arc set corresponds to transitions between strategy profiles that occur with nonzero probability. (Here our focus will just be on the special case in which the strategy profile graph is actually a best response graph; that is, its arc set corresponds exactly to best response moves that result from myopic or greedy behaviour). We argue that there is a natural convergence process to sink equilibria in games where agents use pure strategies. This leads to an alternative measure of the social cost of a lack of coordination, the price of sinking, which measures the worst case ratio between the value of a sink equilibrium and the value of the socially optimal solution. We define the value of a sink equilibrium to be the expected social value of the steady state distribution induced by a random walk on that sink. We illustrate the value of this measure in three ways. Firstly, we show that it may more accurately reflects the inefficiency of uncoordinated solutions in competitive games when the use of pure strategies is the norm. In particular, we give an example (a valid-utility game) in which the game converges to solutions which are a factor n worse than socially optimal. The price of sinking is indeed n, but the price of anarchy is close to 1. Secondly, sink equilibria always exist. Thus, even in games in which pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) do not exist, we can still calculate the price of sinking. Thirdly, we show that bounding the price of sinking can have important implications for the speed of convergence to socially good solutions in games where the agents make best response moves in a random order. We present two examples to illustrate our ideas. (i) Unsplittable selfish routing (and weighted congestion games):we prove that the price of sinking for the weighted unsplittable flow version of the selfish routing problem (for bounded-degree polynomial latency functions) is at most O(2/sup 2d/ d/sup 2d + 3/). In comparison, we give instances of these games without any PSNE. Moreover, our proof technique implies fast convergence to socially good (approximate) solutions. This is in contrast to the negative result of Fabrikant, Papadimitriou, and Talwar (2004) showing the existence of exponentially long best-response paths. (ii) Valid-utility games: we show that for valid-utility games the price of sinking is at most n+1; thus the worst case price of sinking in a valid-utility game is between it and n+1. We use our proof to show fast convergence to constant factor approximate solutions in basic-utility games. In addition, we present a hardness result which shows that, in general, there might be states that are exponentially far from any sink equilibrium in valid-utility games. We prove this by showing that the problem of finding a sink equilibrium (or a PSNE) in valid-utility games is PLS-complete." @default.
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• W1500428599 date "2005-11-15" @default.
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• W1500428599 title "Sink Equilibria and Convergence" @default.
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• W1500428599 doi "https://doi.org/10.1109/sfcs.2005.68" @default.
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