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• W1505145655 abstract "THE ARMY FACED new challenges after the Cold War. Bipolar antagonism between the Soviet Union and the United States no longer dominated the world's geopolitical climate. Instead, a setics of regional crises occurred hi the 1990s that increased the frequency of American overseas deployments. While maintaining a powerful presence in Europe and South Korea, the Army also found itself supporting a growing number of contingency operations (CONOPs). (1) Senior military leaders anticipated the continuation of this trend into the 21st century. However, they did not consider the Army's force structure as being well suited for CONOPs. Organizations, training programs, materiel, and doctrine favored conventional, high-intensity combat. The Army lacked the means to inject a powerful military presence quickly into an emerging trouble spot. Lacking a viable, rapid-response capability, the Army could do little to prevent crisis escalation or to avoid a subsequent large time and force commitment. Moreover, tactical organizations designated for CONOPs needed first to modify unit structures designed for the central European battlefield. Heavy forces offered considerable combat power and survivability at the expense of rapid deployment. Light forces offered rapid deployment with only limited survivability and lethality, especially when confronted by an armored threat. Neither force offered an ideal solution for CONOPs. Ad hoc force packages sufficed only while these missions remained exceptional. As the frequency of CONOPs increased, the Army required a more permanent solution. In October 1999, the Army defined a series of initiatives intended to improve its effectiveness in the operating environment of the future. Collectively known as Transformation, these initiatives aimed at a fundamental redesign of the Army. The innovative application of new technologies to improve operational and strategic effectiveness lay at the core of this effort. Rather than a mix of heavy and light formations, the Army sought a single, high-tech force capable of achieving strategic dominance across the entire spectrum of military operations. In 1999, the Army called this force the Objective Force. [Today, the Army no longer uses the term Objective Force. The Objective Force is now called the Future Force.] Fielding the Objective Force required time in which to develop the related technologies, and to complete research and design work. Therefore, the Army also sought a more immediate enhancement of its capabilities through the creation of Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs). The IBCTs, designed as rapid deployment units with better survivability and lethality than light force elements, constituted a medium force that bridged the capability gap between heavy and light formations. [Just as the Objective Force has become the Future Force, the IBCTs have evolved into today's Stryker Brigade Combat Teams. The Army no longer uses the term Interim Brigade Combat Team.] The IBCTs and the Objective Force of 1999 served different purposes. The IBCTs addressed a specific, near-term capability; the Objective Force represented the future Army. However, both shared similar organizational and operational characteristics, including the following: (2) * Deployability via airlift into a theater of operations within 4 days. * Agility to transition quickly between contingency and warfighting missions. * Versatility to reconfigure tactical organizations on short notice. * Improved lethality and survivability through leveraging advanced technologies, precision maneuver, fires, and leadership. * Sustainability through improved mechanical reliability, reduced logistical requirements, and freedom from the supply lines and the iron mountain associated with past combat organizations. * The ability to respond to the nation's will in an effective, timely manner. Collectively, these ilities are desirable in any corn bat organization. …" @default.
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• W1505145655 date "2003-11-01" @default.
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• W1505145655 title "The Army Vision: The 4th Ad in World War II" @default.
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