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• W1507493706 abstract "If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the Untted States. (1) --President Theodore Roosevelt, May 20, 1904 We particularly condemn the perversity where vulture funds purchase debt at a reduced price and make a profit from suing the debtor country to recover the full amount owed--a morally outrageous outcome. (2) --Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown, May 10, 2002 I INTRODUCTION Three things are eternal: death, taxes, and sovereign default. The latter is surprising in light of the fact that creditors continue to provide hundreds of billions of dollars to governments, despite a long and dolorous history of default. (3) One might imagine that the threat of losing access to future credit might be enough to discourage sovereign default, but there are ample reasons to believe otherwise. Investors do not deny credit to governments with a history of default, and the interest-rate penalties that do arise are not very large. (4) Markets have short memories is practically a truism among investors. Insofar as countries do repay their debts, they appear to do so either because of their domestic political institutions or because defaults are often associated with painful macroeconomic crises. Can sanctions play a role in improving sovereign debt markets? Sanctions, of course, play a key role in sustaining private-debt markets. The possibility of sanctions--asset seizures or income garnishments--makes private debtors less likely to default. Sovereign governments, on the other hand, are free from any sort of supranational authority that might enforce debt contracts. Sanctions against sovereign debtor governments, however, were relatively commonplace before 1913. Between 1870 and 1913, defaulting governments ran a forty-percent chance of facing foreign intervention via blockades or, more commonly, via the imposition of foreign over their domestic finances under the threat of blockade. (5) In this essay, we contrast the efficacy of two sanctioning regimes: U.S. Dollar Diplomacy of the early 20th century and private litigation in the contemporary period. II DOLLAR DIPLOMACY During the epoch of Dollar Diplomacy (roughly from 1904 through 1929), the United States applied a strong debt-enforcement regime. First, the United States used its influence to facilitate restructuring. The United States brokered negotiations between Colombia and Venezuela in 1905. In 1913, the U.S. government arranged a deal in which Guatemala would start paying interest on its defaulted debts. (6) In 1923, the U.S. State Department sent a mission to Bogota to propose reforms to Colombia's banking system, tax collection, and public administration. The Colombian legislature passed the proposed reforms, and two members of the mission stayed on as employees of the Colombian government. (7) Second, the United States arranged loans in which the debtor country pledged to allow the United States or U.S.-appointed agents to take over tariff collection in the event of default. The United States took over the customhouses of the Dominican Republic in 1905, Cuba in 1906 (as part of a broader intervention), Nicaragua in 1911, and Haiti in 1915. (8) The United States arranged a controlled loan with Costa Rica in 1911 but did not take over the customhouses. (9) An additional loan in 1926 stipulated that the United States would take over Costa Rica's internal tax collection should it default. (10) In 1918, after Panama used the proceeds from a railroad loan to meet current expenses, the United States forced the Panamanian government to allow an American fiscal agent to take control and charge of the national treasury. (11) El Salvador signed a controlled loan in 1921. (12) In 1926, a loan to Honduras required the country to impose a dedicated three-percent export tax as collateral. …" @default.
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• W1507493706 date "2010-09-01" @default.
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• W1507493706 title "Lawsuits and Empire: On the Enforcement of Sovereign Debt in Latin America" @default.
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