FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W150933450> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W150933450 startingPage "627" @default.
• W150933450 abstract "Hundreds of recently declassified documents now reveal details of the complex negotiations leading to Iranian occupation of Abu Musa Island and outright invasion of the two Tunbs islands in 1971. Whitehall was so concerned about the prospects of invasion that it quickly fashioned contingency plans to defend the islands. The British undertook fourteen months of complex shuttle diplomacy to resolve the dispute and introduced many formulae to satisfy the conflicting demands of Iran, Ras Al Khaimah, and Sharjah. London succeeded only when it convinced Sharjah and Tehran to suspend the debate over sovereignty over Abu Musa. London failed when Ras Al Khaimah and Tehran failed to reach a similar understanding. London's role in facilitating Iran's occupation of the disputed Tunbs and Abu Musa islands in November, 1971, remains controversial. Acting on behalf of its protectorates, the Trucial States, the United Kingdom (UK) attempted to resolve the fate of the contested islands under the self-imposed deadline of its impending withdrawal from the Gulf. Ultimately, Shaykh Saqr bin Muhammad Al Qasimi of Ras Al Khaimah refused to relinquish his claim to sovereignty or to permit Iran to occupy either of the Tunbs Islands. Iran simply invaded them on November 30, 1971-the last day of the UK's treaty obligation to defend them. In contrast, Sharjah's Shaykh Khalid bin Muhammad Al Qasimi reached an eleventh hour agreement allowing Iranian troops onto the northern part of Abu Musa and sharing oil revenues. Iran and Sharjah left the issue of ultimate sovereignty in abeyance. Sharjan officials greeted the Shah's troops when they finally landed on Abu Musa on November 30, 1971.1 (See Map at end of article.) There is more to the story. For the last three years, the United Kingdom has declassified hundreds of documents outlining its diplomatic and military strategy for first protecting and then relinquishing the islands. They reveal that British policymakers were acutely aware of the importance of the Tehran connection. Indeed, some Foreign Office mavens recommended against using force to protect the islands even for the remaining three years they were under British protection. Yet, Whitehall remained concerned about British ties to the Arab world. London's overarching ambition was therefore to preserve the status quo and regional stability while Grafting good relations with both sides of the fence. This would lead the senior British negotiator, Sir William Luce, to introduce a succession of formulae to encourage a compromise. The negotiations were difficult, because neither side was prepared to compromise on sovereignty. Consequently, the record shows that Luce worked on the margins of the problem-oil rights, economic compensations, presence of flags in respective areas, etc. Pursuing shuttle diplomacy among London, Tehran, and the Trucial States for approximately 14 months before Iran occupied the islands, Luce would find his proposals rebuffed by one side or the other. He then developed complex counter-proposals only to have these attacked as well. In short, the new record shows that despite internal controversies, Britain was serious about its commitment to defend the islands against Iran (or Arab guerilla forces). Although London ultimately pursued what one UK official called the Pontius Pilate solution, as far as the Tunbs were concerned, Whitehall remained determined to try to negotiate the best possible deal within the constraints of its imminent military withdrawal. It is to this new diplomatic record that we now turn. THE ISLANDS Although suspecting the existence of oil deposits west of Abu Musa, none of the disputants treated the islands themselves as intrinsically important. The Tunbs lie 17 miles southwest of Iran's Qeshm Island and 46 miles northwest of the nearest point on the United Arab Emirates (UAE) coastline. Greater Tunb is roughly 2.5 miles in diameter and in 1970 the British estimated approximately that 150 Arabs lived there. …" @default.
• W150933450 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W150933450 creator A5003570447 @default.
• W150933450 date "2003-10-01" @default.
• W150933450 modified "2023-09-24" @default.
• W150933450 title "The Tunbs and Abu Musa Islands: Britain's Perspective" @default.
• W150933450 hasPublicationYear "2003" @default.
• W150933450 type Work @default.
• W150933450 sameAs 150933450 @default.
• W150933450 citedByCount "3" @default.
• W150933450 countsByYear W1509334502013 @default.
• W150933450 countsByYear W1509334502015 @default.
• W150933450 countsByYear W1509334502018 @default.
• W150933450 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W150933450 hasAuthorship W150933450A5003570447 @default.
• W150933450 hasConcept C121332964 @default.
• W150933450 hasConcept C17744445 @default.
• W150933450 hasConcept C186229450 @default.
• W150933450 hasConcept C195244886 @default.
• W150933450 hasConcept C199539241 @default.
• W150933450 hasConcept C199776023 @default.
• W150933450 hasConcept C24890656 @default.
• W150933450 hasConcept C2778447849 @default.
• W150933450 hasConcept C2779010840 @default.
• W150933450 hasConcept C2779796141 @default.
• W150933450 hasConcept C557252395 @default.
• W150933450 hasConcept C94625758 @default.
• W150933450 hasConcept C95457728 @default.
• W150933450 hasConceptScore W150933450C121332964 @default.
• W150933450 hasConceptScore W150933450C17744445 @default.
• W150933450 hasConceptScore W150933450C186229450 @default.
• W150933450 hasConceptScore W150933450C195244886 @default.
• W150933450 hasConceptScore W150933450C199539241 @default.
• W150933450 hasConceptScore W150933450C199776023 @default.
• W150933450 hasConceptScore W150933450C24890656 @default.
• W150933450 hasConceptScore W150933450C2778447849 @default.
• W150933450 hasConceptScore W150933450C2779010840 @default.
• W150933450 hasConceptScore W150933450C2779796141 @default.
• W150933450 hasConceptScore W150933450C557252395 @default.
• W150933450 hasConceptScore W150933450C94625758 @default.
• W150933450 hasConceptScore W150933450C95457728 @default.
• W150933450 hasIssue "4" @default.
• W150933450 hasLocation W1509334501 @default.
• W150933450 hasOpenAccess W150933450 @default.
• W150933450 hasPrimaryLocation W1509334501 @default.
• W150933450 hasRelatedWork W153175288 @default.
• W150933450 hasRelatedWork W1601812050 @default.
• W150933450 hasRelatedWork W162669795 @default.
• W150933450 hasRelatedWork W162720936 @default.
• W150933450 hasRelatedWork W187547680 @default.
• W150933450 hasRelatedWork W1980631157 @default.
• W150933450 hasRelatedWork W1997965127 @default.
• W150933450 hasRelatedWork W2015510439 @default.
• W150933450 hasRelatedWork W2022633415 @default.
• W150933450 hasRelatedWork W2026801349 @default.
• W150933450 hasRelatedWork W2044305628 @default.
• W150933450 hasRelatedWork W2088840115 @default.
• W150933450 hasRelatedWork W209776546 @default.
• W150933450 hasRelatedWork W22830829 @default.
• W150933450 hasRelatedWork W2476016988 @default.
• W150933450 hasRelatedWork W2478243140 @default.
• W150933450 hasRelatedWork W2484185369 @default.
• W150933450 hasRelatedWork W2501398428 @default.
• W150933450 hasRelatedWork W2905324273 @default.
• W150933450 hasRelatedWork W316084154 @default.
• W150933450 hasVolume "57" @default.
• W150933450 isParatext "false" @default.
• W150933450 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W150933450 magId "150933450" @default.
• W150933450 workType "article" @default.