FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W1510452539> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W1510452539 abstract "Introduction. In the field of experimental economics one of the most studied topic is subjects’ reaction when a cooperation norm or a redistribution norm is violated. This implies that the experimental literature concerning norms mainly corresponds to studies on fairness and, consequently, on punishment of defectors (f.i., Fehr and Gachter, 2000, for second-party punishment; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004, for third-party punishment). A further implication of these mainstream experimental designs is that updating the classical figure of the Homo Oeconomicus by introducing social preferences (inequity aversion, reciprocity, altruism, spitefulness) into the economic theories is sufficient to explain the experimental results.At the same time, models like Grimalda and Sacconi (2005), Sacconi and Grimalda (2007) and Bicchieri (2006) deal with the problem of the compliance with social norms, whose role is crucial when formal sanctions cannot be used and the reputational mechanism cannot be fully implemented as enforcement device. In both models the willingness to conform to shared social norms - which imply non-self-interested behaviour - depends on expectations about what people do (First – Order Empirical Expectations – FOEE, Second – Order Empirical Expectations - SOEE) and/or what people expect ought to be done (Second – Order Normative Expectations - SONE). In particular, according to Bicchieri’s theory of social norms, in presence of a conflict of interests among agents conformity is conditional on both NE and EE. [We have Empirical Expectations (EE) when a subject believes that a sufficiently large subset of the population conforms to the norm. We have Normative Expectations (NE) when a subject believes that a sufficiently large subset of the population expects him/her to have to conform to the norm. ]. In Sacconi and Grimalda’s model compliance is the consequence of both of agents’ participation in choosing the norm in a social contract setting and of the existence of expectation about others’ willingness to conform (FOEE and SOEE).The main contribution of this paper is twofold. First of all, it focuses on the decisional process that leads to the creation of a social norm. Secondly, it analyses the mechanisms through which subjects conform their behaviour to the norm. In particular, our aim is to check for the existence of NE and EE and their influence on people’s decisions. Experimental Design. The tool is the Exclusion Game (Sacconi and Faillo, 2005; Faillo and Sacconi, 2007), a sort of ‘triple mini dictator game’. It represents a situation where 3 subjects – players A - have to decide how to allocate a sum S among themselves and a fourth subject - player B - who has no decisional power. The payoff of players A is exactly the sum asked for themselves (a1, a2 and a3 respectively), while the payoff of player B is the remaining sum (S – a1 – a2 – a3). The experiment consists of three treatments: the Baseline Treatment (BT), the Agreement Treatment (AT) and the Outsider Treatment (OT). In the BT participants are randomly distributed in groups of four players and play the Exclusion Game. In the AT participants are randomly distributed in groups of four players and are instructed about the stages of the experiment an about the Exclusion Game. In the first stage, before knowing their role in the game they are involved in a voting procedure. In particular, in each group participants are invited to vote for a specific allocation rule. Players have the possibility to bargain - through the computer - to reach a unanimous agreement on the rule within a limited numbers of trials. Only groups who reach an agreement in this first stage have the chance to participate to the second stage. In the second stage the composition of the groups is unchanged and roles are randomly assigned to implement the Exclusion Game. In this case, players A can decide either to implement the voted rule or to choose one of the alternative allocations. In the OT participants are randomly distributed in groups of four players and are instructed about the stages of the experiment an about the Exclusion Game. The first stage is the same as in the AT. At the beginning of the second stage, players are informed about their role and groups are rematched. In particular, a player A for each group (the outsider) is reassigned to a different group. After the rematching subjects participate in the Exclusion Game. Experimental Procedure. We are planning to run the experiment in September. We will run two sessions for each treatment. In each session 32 players – undergraduate students – will be involved. Overall, 192 subjects will participate to the experiment. Control questions will be asked in order to be sure that players understand the rules of the game. At the end of the game first order and second order expectations (both normative and empirical) will be elicited through a brief questionnaire (see, for example, Guth et al., 2005 and Dufwenberg et al., 2006). Moreover, subjects will be asked to fill in a brief survey to check for socio – demographic data. Experimental Hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 (H1): According to psychological game theory models (Geanakoplos et al., 1989; Rabin, 1993) individual preferences depends on their expectations (of different orders and nature). Consequently, individuals’ choices in the Exclusion Game could be explained in terms of their expectations about others’ behaviour.Hypothesis 2 (H2): The possibility of agreeing with a distributive norm enhances conformity by inducing a convergence of individual expectations. In other words, compliance can be explained in terms of emergence of reciprocal expectations of conformity due to the agreement. Hypothesis 3a (H3a): According to Sacconi and Grimalda (2007), the outsider will comply with the norm chosen by the group in which he/she plays the Exclusion Game if and only if this norm is the same as the one chosen by his/her original group.Hypothesis 3b (H3b): According to Bicchieri (2006), the outsider will comply with the norm chosen by the group in which he/she plays the Exclusion Game if and only if he/she describes the situation as one in which the norm is saliente and the other players will conform with it. In particular, he/she will comply when both the following conditions hold: a) he/she expects that the members of his/her new group will comply with the norm (FOEE) and b) he/she expects that the members of his/her new group believe that he/she ought to comply (SONE).ReferencesBicchieri, C. (2006), The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms, Forthcoming Cambridge University Press. Bochet O., Page T., Putterman L. (2005), Communication and Punishment in Voluntary Contribution Experiments, Working Papers 2005-09, Brown University, Department of Economics.Camerer, C.F. (2003), Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction, Princeton; NJ; Princeton University Press.Dufwenberg M., Gachter S., Hennig – Schmidt H. (2006), The Framing of Games and the Psychology of Play, Discussion Papers 2006-20, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.Faillo, M. and Sacconi L. (2007), “Norm Compliance: The Contribution of Behavioral Economics Theories”, Discussion Paper. Department of Economics University of Trento. Forthcoming in Innocenti, A. and Sbriglia, P. Games, Rationality and Behavior, Palgrave.Fehr E., Fischbacher U. (2004), ‘Third Party Punishment and Social Norms’, Evolution and Human Behavior, 25, 63-87.Fehr E., Gachter S. (2000), ‘Cooperation and Punishment in Public Good Experiments’, American Economic Review, 90(4), 980-994.Fehr, E. and K.M. Schmidt (2000) “Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity. Evidence and Economic Applications”, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics University of Zurich Working Paper Series, n.75.Geanakoplos, J., D. Pearce and E. Stacchetti (1989), “Psychological Games and Sequential Rationality”, Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 1, pp. 60-79.Grimalda, G., L. Sacconi (2005) “The Constitution of the Not-for-Profit Organisation: Reciprocal Conformity to Morality”, Constitutional Political Economy, Vol 16(3), 249-276.Guth W., Levati M.V., Ockenfels A., Weiland T. (2005), “Buying a pig in a poke: An experimental study of unconditional veto power, Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction 2005-39, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.Rabin M., 1993, ‘Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics’, American Economic Review, 83(5), 1281-1302.Sacconi, L. and Faillo, M. (2005), “Conformity and Reciprocity in the “Exclusion Game”: An Experimental Investigation” Discussion Paper. Department of Economics University of Trento.Sacconi L. and G. Grimalda (2007) “Ideals, conformism and reciprocity: A model of Individual Choice with Conformist Motivations, and an Application to the Not-for-Profit Case” in (L.Bruni and P.L.Porta eds.) Handbook of Happiness in Economics, Edward Elgar, London (in print)." @default.
• W1510452539 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W1510452539 creator A5001838081 @default.
• W1510452539 creator A5011416697 @default.
• W1510452539 creator A5058277432 @default.
• W1510452539 creator A5061085683 @default.
• W1510452539 date "2007-11-09" @default.
• W1510452539 modified "2023-09-23" @default.
• W1510452539 title "SOCIAL NORMS AND BELIEFS: AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION" @default.
• W1510452539 cites W1556726625 @default.
• W1510452539 cites W1599656298 @default.
• W1510452539 cites W1713503745 @default.
• W1510452539 cites W1970032202 @default.
• W1510452539 cites W2034278352 @default.
• W1510452539 cites W2036951652 @default.
• W1510452539 cites W2157228429 @default.
• W1510452539 cites W2999780717 @default.
• W1510452539 cites W3122359888 @default.
• W1510452539 cites W3122867100 @default.
• W1510452539 cites W3123027183 @default.
• W1510452539 cites W3149117794 @default.
• W1510452539 hasPublicationYear "2007" @default.
• W1510452539 type Work @default.
• W1510452539 sameAs 1510452539 @default.
• W1510452539 citedByCount "0" @default.
• W1510452539 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W1510452539 hasAuthorship W1510452539A5001838081 @default.
• W1510452539 hasAuthorship W1510452539A5011416697 @default.
• W1510452539 hasAuthorship W1510452539A5058277432 @default.
• W1510452539 hasAuthorship W1510452539A5061085683 @default.
• W1510452539 hasConcept C15744967 @default.
• W1510452539 hasConcept C77805123 @default.
• W1510452539 hasConceptScore W1510452539C15744967 @default.
• W1510452539 hasConceptScore W1510452539C77805123 @default.
• W1510452539 hasLocation W15104525391 @default.
• W1510452539 hasOpenAccess W1510452539 @default.
• W1510452539 hasPrimaryLocation W15104525391 @default.
• W1510452539 hasRelatedWork W1496975520 @default.
• W1510452539 hasRelatedWork W1558324918 @default.
• W1510452539 hasRelatedWork W1591619270 @default.
• W1510452539 hasRelatedWork W1995941253 @default.
• W1510452539 hasRelatedWork W2003508070 @default.
• W1510452539 hasRelatedWork W2121216674 @default.
• W1510452539 hasRelatedWork W2140837526 @default.
• W1510452539 hasRelatedWork W2156371164 @default.
• W1510452539 hasRelatedWork W2165579327 @default.
• W1510452539 hasRelatedWork W2172208104 @default.
• W1510452539 hasRelatedWork W2298585843 @default.
• W1510452539 hasRelatedWork W2418031407 @default.
• W1510452539 hasRelatedWork W2595975005 @default.
• W1510452539 hasRelatedWork W2749902383 @default.
• W1510452539 hasRelatedWork W300146522 @default.
• W1510452539 hasRelatedWork W3121479608 @default.
• W1510452539 hasRelatedWork W3122916963 @default.
• W1510452539 hasRelatedWork W3124793237 @default.
• W1510452539 hasRelatedWork W3125258780 @default.
• W1510452539 hasRelatedWork W2395250617 @default.
• W1510452539 isParatext "false" @default.
• W1510452539 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W1510452539 magId "1510452539" @default.
• W1510452539 workType "article" @default.