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• W1516785259 abstract "THE TERRORIST ATTACKS of 9/11 have ushered in a new era of counterinsurgency to deal Al-Qaeda-linked insurgent and terrorist organizations. The U.S. military's initial success in Afghanistan, impressive it was, forced the enemy to adapt. To survive, Al-Qaeda has transformed itself into a flatter, more cellular organization that seeks to outsource much of its work.1 Thus, insurgency has become an Al-Qaeda priority in terms of rhetoric, recruitment, and spending.2 The connection between terrorism and insurgency is now well established, and in fact there is tremendous overlap between the two.3 The U.S. military, though, is struggling to adapt to protracted, insurgenttype warfare. America's affinity for high-tech conventional conflict and quick, kinetic, unilateral solutions that avoid contact the local populace has slowed its response to this complex form of conflict.4 How, then, can the U.S. military tailor a more efficient, more effective approach to future military efforts against Al-Qaeda-linked groups around the globe? Specifically, how can the U.S. military implement a sustainable, low-visibility approach that is politically acceptable to our current and future partners, and that can help change the moderate Muslim community's perception of U.S. operations in the War on Terrorism (WOT)? The history of insurgent conflict during the Philippines Insurrection (1899-1902), Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), and Hukbalahap Rebellion (1946-1954) shows that successful COIN operations are protracted efforts that rely heavily on indigenous security forces.5 Therefore, the U.S. WOT strategy should emphasize working indirectly through, by, and with indigenous forces and building their capacity to conduct effective operations against common enemies. The Unilateral Approach As free societies gain ground around the world, the U.S. military is going to be increasingly restricted in terms of how it operates. An age of democracy means an age of frustratingly narrow rules of engagement. That is because fledgling democratic governments, besieged by young and aggressive local media, will find it politically difficult-if not impossible-to allow American troops on their soil to engage in direct action. -Robert Kaplan6 The current COIN campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated that unilateral U.S. military operations can be ineffective and even counterproductive to the democratic institutions we are trying to establish. To reduce our footprint in Iraq, our top priority now is to stand up Iraqi security forces to take over the fight against insurgents. These forces must prevail if Iraq is to achieve and maintain long-term stability. A large foreign military presence or occupation force in any country undermines the legitimacy of the host-nation government in the eyes of its citizens and the international community. As we now know, large U.S. occupation forces in Islamic regions can create problems for us. A senior British military officer who served in Iraq has remarked that the U.S. Army there has acted much like fuel on a smoldering fire; he suggests that this is as much owing to their presence their actions.7 If he is right and our mere presence can be counterproductive, then a tailored, low-visibility approach that plays well in the moderate Muslim community and is politically acceptable to our potential WOT partners makes sound strategic sense. Blowback Osama bin Laden has made the presence of U.S. forces in the Middle East a rallying point for global jihad by a new generation of Muslim holy warriors.8 Just the war in Afghanistan against the Soviets created the leaders of today's global terrorist network, so Iraq has the potential to produce far more dangerous second- and third-order effects. Blowback from the current war in Iraq might be even more dangerous than the fallout from Afghanistan. Fighters in Iraq are more battle-hardened than the Arabs who fought demoralized Soviet Army conscripts in Afghanistan. …" @default.
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• W1516785259 date "2006-11-01" @default.
• W1516785259 modified "2023-09-26" @default.
• W1516785259 title "Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and the Indirect Approach" @default.
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