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• W1520781291 abstract "Preface The strategic status of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the world and in the region and the Middle East, in particular, demands that we have a strong military capability. We will not ask for anyone's permission in order to strengthen our defense and military capabilities. Defending oneself and deterring others from committing aggression is the most important right of every country. --Mohammad Khatami, August 1998 Iran, driven in part by stringent international export controls, is acquiring the ability to domestically produce raw materials and the equipment to support indigenous biological agent production ... [Iran] could quickly advance their nuclear aspirations through covert acquisition of fissile material or relevant technology. --George J. Tenet, March 2000 Scholars and other specialists on Iran have argued about that country's political intentions and strategic ambitions since the overthrow of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979. In the 1980s Iran's efforts to export its revolution and support international terrorism raised the question of whether a moderate Islamic republic that was able to deal with the West could ever exist. The death of the Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 and the succession of Ali Hashimi-Rafsanjani as president raised new issues for the 1990s. As the European and American oil and investment communities considered the race to open Iran commercially, scholars and diplomats debated Iranian efforts to recover from nearly a decade of war and revolution. They compared the merits of the European approach of initiating critical dialogue with the U.S. policy of containing and isolating Iran. Neither approach seemed to have much impact, both conceded, and Iranians continued to sort out their domestic political agenda and to decide how best to protect their strategic and national interests. The U.S. Government, for example, tried to estimate how much time and money Iran would need to modernize its military and to acquire new weapons systems despite projected low oil prices and the country's need to rebuild its damaged and neglected civilian and industrial infrastructure. (1) The assumption underlying the U.S. projections was that Iran would be pursuing weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear technology and long-range missile systems. This essay begins with the assumption that Iran is intent on acquiring nuclear weapons and the long-range missile systems needed for their delivery. The assumption is based on documented evidence of Iranian efforts to acquire the elements essential for development of a nuclear program and on Iranian leaders' expressed interest in regional power projection based on weapons of mass destruction. (2) This analysis does not attempt to determine whether Iran possesses nuclear weapons now or how long it might take to acquire them, both of which are important questions whose answers have significant consequences for the security of the United States. Instead, we focus on the approaches that policymakers have taken or could still take to avert or to slow this development, and we examine the potential impact on national interests, particularly on U.S. nonproliferation strategy, when Iran becomes a nuclear weapons state. We believe the issue that merits careful consideration has become how to manage a nuclear-armed Iran. This essay is meant principally as a policy analysis rather than an academic treatise. That is, it intends to build intellectual capital about how to manage the problem of a nuclear-armed Iran and to suggest courses of action that would minimize the negative impact on national interests. Not all specialists on Iran share our assumption. Some scholars argue that Iran has no intention of developing a nuclear weapons capability and no aspirations to use its acquisition of nuclear technology to dominate regional security debates or to bolster territorial ambitions. …" @default.
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• W1520781291 modified "2023-09-23" @default.
• W1520781291 title "Strategic Implications Of A Nuclear-armed Iran" @default.
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