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• W1520955062 abstract "The legal structure called Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT), or Build-Operate-Own-Transfer (BOOT), has frequently and typically been used in Latin America and Asia to finance and implement infrastructure-building projects for the developing nations. Typically implemented with privately funded Project Financing, a BOT structure can bring about the development of infrastructure for the developing nations without the use of public funds. However, the BOT mechanism is also suitable for receiving multilateral funding from the international financial institutions (IFI’s) specializing in infrastructure building or economic reconstruction and development projects for the developing world, such as the World Bank group or the Regional Development Banks for various continents. Or, multilateral funding can be combined with Project Financing provided by the international commercial banks. The BOT legal structure has been used with varying degrees of success to finance the building of critically needed infrastructure such as power (electricity) plants and water treatment plants in the lesser- or least-developed nations. However, the implementation of the BOT structure in its current form is not without problems. In advocating for a global regulatory regime governing foreign direct investment transactions, this paper dissects and takes a critical look at the BOT structure by examining its various negative potential impact upon the developing world. Presently, international BOT agreements lack sufficient and efficient regulatory oversight. Although BOT project developers are certainly accountable to the taxing authorities and corporate authorities of their home country in matters such as public financial disclosure and shareholder protection, these regulatory voices do not represent the intended beneficiaries of the BOT systems – the inhabitants of the developing nations for which the infrastructure is built. They are often the missing voice, because their interests are safeguarded only by the national law system of the host country where the BOT project is situated. But, the least developed nations are often ill-equipped to oversee and regulate complex BOT systems that involve multi-layered financial engineering. These countries quite often suffer from governmental corruption, political instability, and a still-developing legal system that may not be consistent with international norms or otherwise may not sufficiently address the complexity of large-scaled and multi-layered infrastructure projects. For example, a typical BOT structure arranged by private interests from the developed nations can be full of room for self-dealings, conflicts of interest, and related party transactions. This is because these players (and the host government) often take an equity interest in the project while contracting with the BOT entity at the same time. Equity sharing would secure the needed long-term partnership among the technical players. Further, the availability of World Bank funding or multilateral financing often can create the illusion of effective risk management and control, which serves as an impetus for attracting commercial Project Financing. The private project financier may find comfort and in the country’s eligibility for funding from multilateral entities such as the World Bank and the IMF as a form of de facto risk assurance, especially because these IFI’s carry certain supervisory and advisory role in their relationships with the host country. Thus, the private project financier may rest his or her decisions upon less than effective risk assessments during the loan evaluation process, simply because he or she knows hat multilateral funding is available to the country. Additionally, because the technical players from the developed nations often seek to build their integrated presence and collaboration with host countries in a particular region, often the same players are seen in various parts of the world, forming long-term partnerships with both host governments and other multinational corporations due to their leading technical capabilities and dominant market share. Hence, there is also the danger that global infrastructure or economic development projects have become a growing, de facto state of monopoly in which syndicated players and multinationals occupy the scenery of both the financing as well as the technology markets. This alliance or monopoly may impede the growth of a true “free enterprise,” or economic growth for the private sector in the host country, where local businesses can develop and prosper. (As a sad reality for the lesser or least-developed countries, where private entities in a corrupt country can participate in BOT structures, typically these companies have been instrumentalities formed, approved, or controlled by corrupt government officials. This reality in turn has enlarged the gap between the poor mass public the rich or privileged few.) With these potential negative outcomes, BOT structures as currently implemented may not have safeguarded the interest or voice of the inhabitants of the least developed countries, although they are supposed to be the intended beneficiaries of infrastructure and economic development. These beneficiaries are not represented in the structuring of BOTs or at the BOT negotiating table, because their governments either are not their true representatives, or otherwise are technically equipped to protect their interests. Yet, when BOT loans are defaulted, leading to economic crises, these beneficiaries must eventually labor under extreme economic austerity in order to pay the international debts of their countries, regardless of any any international bailout systems implemented by the IFIs and their nation-shareholders. The solutions for these potential negative outcomes of BOT structures must therefore lie in the well-drafted and thoughtful creation of a global or regional regulatory oversight system – one that safeguards against ills such as self-dealings and anti-competitive alliances or monopolies. That future vision must be part of any global legalization movement supporting the new economic order for the 21st century." @default.
• W1520955062 created "2016-06-24" @default.
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• W1520955062 date "2010-01-01" @default.
• W1520955062 modified "2023-09-25" @default.
• W1520955062 title "Revisiting the BOT Structure in Direct Foreign Investment Transactions" @default.
• W1520955062 doi "https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1651971" @default.
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