FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W1552608715> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W1552608715 abstract "This dissertation investigates the different rolesthat networks play in political economy. In the first chapter, Istudy how a political party uses electoral data to monitor andincentivize the political brokers who control its clientelisticnetworks. I study networks organized around rural communal lands inMexico, which are largely controlled by the InstitutionalRevolutionary Party (PRI). I use the fact that the level at whichbrokers operate (the communal land) does not necessarily coincidewith the level at which the electoral data is disclosed (theelectoral section). Guided by a simple model, I compute a measureof how informative the available electoral data is about theperformance of the PRI's political brokers, as a function of thedegree of overlap between communal lands and electoral sections. Icompare the vote share for the PRI in communal lands where theelectoral data is more or less informative, both when the PRI doesand does not have access to resources to fund and incentivizebrokers. The results suggest that clientelistic networks contributesignificantly to the enforcement of clientelistic transactions. Inthe second chapter, which is co-authored with Joana Monteiro, westudy the role of media in compensating political biases. Inparticular, we analyze how media presence, connectivity andownership affect the distribution of federal drought relieftransfers to Brazilian municipalities. We find that municipalitiesthat are not aligned with the federal government have a lowerprobability of receiving funds conditional on experiencing lowprecipitation. However, we show that the presence of radio stationscompensates for this bias. This effect is driven by municipalitiesthat have radio stations connected to a regional network ratherthan by the presence of local radio stations. In addition, theeffect of network-connected radio stations increases with theirnetwork coverage. These findings suggests that the connection of aradio station to a network is important because it increases thesalience of disasters, making it harder for the federal governmentto ignore non-allies. We show that our findings are not explainedby the ownership and manipulation of media by politicians. In thethird chapter, which is co-authored with Arun Chandrasekhar andEmily Breza, we shed light on the relationship between networkcharacteristics and investment decisions through a lab experimentin the field. We focus on the role for third parties to act asinformal contract enforcers. Our protocol builds on a basictwo-party trust game with a sender and receiver, to which weintroduce a third-party to serve as either a monitor or punisher.The ex-ante benefits of a third party judge are ambiguous. On onehand, a third party may result in larger sender transfers due toher ability to punish. On the other hand, the punisher might act ina way to build reputation or may crowd-out intrinsic motivation.Importantly, these costs and benefits of a punisher might vary withher centrality in the network. Our findings are…" @default.
• W1552608715 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W1552608715 creator A5002028862 @default.
• W1552608715 creator A5008317258 @default.
• W1552608715 date "2013-01-01" @default.
• W1552608715 modified "2023-09-24" @default.
• W1552608715 title "The role of networks in political economy" @default.
• W1552608715 cites W1504157790 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W1509039412 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W1533368239 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W1571700172 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W1580618312 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W1817961225 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W1831075710 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W1854379977 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W1871919170 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W1883896725 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W1903153103 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W1922355402 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W1995275894 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W2007674873 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W2026999751 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W2029126207 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W2045633722 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W2053269151 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W2059218518 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W2104511263 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W2105098060 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W2114298149 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W2115551465 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W2122765552 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W2127347227 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W2129848538 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W2135363208 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W2137933513 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W2145412979 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W2147304877 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W2148228039 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W2149464668 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W2158908829 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W2160087534 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W2168060994 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W2171121910 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W2276206067 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W2418031407 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W3121175533 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W3121554487 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W3121812901 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W3122220690 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W3122371828 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W3122716796 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W3122749883 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W3124531746 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W3124674038 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W3125190222 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W3125755007 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W3144040573 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W383262277 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W602563117 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W67833199 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W8198091 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W170102742 @default.
• W1552608715 cites W2196692431 @default.
• W1552608715 hasPublicationYear "2013" @default.
• W1552608715 type Work @default.
• W1552608715 sameAs 1552608715 @default.
• W1552608715 citedByCount "0" @default.
• W1552608715 crossrefType "dissertation" @default.
• W1552608715 hasAuthorship W1552608715A5002028862 @default.
• W1552608715 hasAuthorship W1552608715A5008317258 @default.
• W1552608715 hasConcept C100001284 @default.
• W1552608715 hasConcept C110121322 @default.
• W1552608715 hasConcept C134306372 @default.
• W1552608715 hasConcept C138885662 @default.
• W1552608715 hasConcept C138921699 @default.
• W1552608715 hasConcept C144133560 @default.
• W1552608715 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W1552608715 hasConcept C17744445 @default.
• W1552608715 hasConcept C187736073 @default.
• W1552608715 hasConcept C199539241 @default.
• W1552608715 hasConcept C2775924081 @default.
• W1552608715 hasConcept C2778137410 @default.
• W1552608715 hasConcept C2779777834 @default.
• W1552608715 hasConcept C2781035477 @default.
• W1552608715 hasConcept C3116431 @default.
• W1552608715 hasConcept C33923547 @default.
• W1552608715 hasConcept C41895202 @default.
• W1552608715 hasConcept C555826173 @default.
• W1552608715 hasConcept C558001185 @default.
• W1552608715 hasConcept C94625758 @default.
• W1552608715 hasConceptScore W1552608715C100001284 @default.
• W1552608715 hasConceptScore W1552608715C110121322 @default.
• W1552608715 hasConceptScore W1552608715C134306372 @default.
• W1552608715 hasConceptScore W1552608715C138885662 @default.
• W1552608715 hasConceptScore W1552608715C138921699 @default.
• W1552608715 hasConceptScore W1552608715C144133560 @default.
• W1552608715 hasConceptScore W1552608715C162324750 @default.
• W1552608715 hasConceptScore W1552608715C17744445 @default.
• W1552608715 hasConceptScore W1552608715C187736073 @default.
• W1552608715 hasConceptScore W1552608715C199539241 @default.

• next