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• W155896265 abstract "I When Hume is mentioned in connection with Kant's theory of experience, we tend to think only of the problem of the application of the categories to appearances, the solution to which is found in the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories and the Analytic of Principles of the Critique of Pure Reason. Yet it often goes unremarked, or at least is not paid much attention, that this is only the second of a two-stage response to the Humean challenge, of which the Metaphysical Deduction of the Categories (chapter 1 of the Analytic of Concepts) is the first. For Hume did not only call upon philosophers to justify their assumption that metaphysical concepts like cause and effect hold necessarily and universally of appearances, he defied them also to show that any such concepts are actually in our possession in the first place: Since the Essays of Locke and Leibniz, or rather since the rise of metaphysics . . . no event has transpired which could have been more decisive to the fate of this science than the attack made upon it by David Hume. . . . Hume principally targeted a single, but important metaphysical concept, namely, the connection of cause and effect (and so too its derivative concepts like force and action). He demanded that reason, which allegedly produced this concept in its womb, stand to account and answer him, by what right she thinks she can supply anything so that, by positing it, something else must thereby necessarily also be posited; for this is what the concept of cause prescribes. He irrefutably demonstrated that it is wholly impossible for reason, a priori and from concepts, to think any such combination (Verbindung), since it contains necessity; it cannot however be foreseen how, because something is, something else must necessarily also be, and thus how the concept of such a connection can be established a priori. From this Hume concluded that reason utterly deludes itself with this concept, which it falsely holds to be its own child, since it is nothing at all but a bastard (Bastard) of imagination, which, impregnated by experience, has brought certain representations under the law of association, and imputes an objective necessity [arising] from insight to a subjective necessity originating from itself (custom). He then concluded from this that reason has no capacity at all to think such connections, even in general, because her concepts would then be mere fictions, and all her pretended a priori cognitions would be nothing but mislabeled common experiences, which is just to say that there would be no metaphysics at all, and could be none.(1) Kant lauded Hume for posing the question of the origin of the concept of cause and effect and distinguishing it from that of the indispensability of its use (were the former ascertained, then the conditions of its use and the scope of its validity would already be given of themselves.)(2) Yet, Hume's own account of the origin of the concept of cause and effect in custom was, in Kant's eyes, tantamount to a denial that any such concept exists: The concept of cause so obviously contains the concept of a necessity of connection with an effect and of a strict universality of the rule that it would be completely lost if, as Hume has done, we sought to derive it from . . . a custom of connecting representations.(3) To redeem cause and effect, along with other metaphysical concepts, Kant had therefore to find a way to reconcile their putative a priori origin and objectivity with Hume's insight that we are endowed with no concept of a necessary connection in objects, be they things in themselves or appearances.(4) Kant took up the issue of origin in the Metaphysical Deduction of the Categories.(5) He sought to demonstrate that the concepts of metaphysics, considered in themselves, are mere logical functions, that is, ways of synthesizing concepts to form judgments (irrespective of whether they are analytic or synthetic.)(6) Accordingly, the metaphysical concept of substance/accident contains nothing more than the logical form of subject/predicate, whereby any arbitrary pair of concepts may be united in a judgment; cause and effect merely the hypothetical form of judgment, whereby any arbitrary pair of judgments may be united as condition and conditioned; totality the form of subordination of one concept to another whereby any species of the one has the other as its genus; and so forth. …" @default.
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• W155896265 date "1995-06-01" @default.
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• W155896265 title "Kant on the Possibility of Thought: Universals without Language" @default.
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