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• W1562990147 abstract "it does today. The main difference is that today we speak of central bank “transparency” or “policy guidance” rather than central bank “secrecy.” I remember thinking that it was unlikely that central bank secrecy would ever be debated openly, and if it ever were, then I thought the case for transparency would quickly win the day. I wasn’t quite correct on either outcome. In any case, it is useful to recall how far we’ve come. For themost part, central banks havemoved away from secrecy toward transparency, partly by being more explicit about longer-run inflation objectives and partly by communicating shortterm policy concerns and intentions more explicitly. Few would now claim that secrecy is a tool of monetary policy. Quite the contrary, communication is today widely recognized to play a central role in monetary policy. That said, we have come to the point where even those who favor transparency in principle worry that excessive forward guidance on monetary policy might be counterproductive. This is the thrust of the concern expressed by Bill that motivates Carl Walsh’s (2008) paper. The balance of my remarks addresses the limits of forward guidance by drawing a distinction between two dimensions of information policy: (i) transparency with regard to a long-run inflation objective and (ii) discretionary announcements used by central banks to substitute for transparency about a long-run inflation objective. Transparency and communication help to implement interest rate policy in two ways— B ack in 1984, I was invited by Bill Poole, then a member of the President’s Council of Economic Advisors, to work as a senior staff economist for money and banking at the Council. When I arrived at the Old Executive Office Building that fall, I brought with me an early draft of a paper on central bank secrecy that I had just finished. I gave a copy to Bill, who I knew had a longstanding interest in central bank communications. I remember his reaction: Bill put the paper in an envelope, signed it, wrote on it “for my eyes only,” and had his secretary put it in a safe. How appropriate, I thought! Later, Bill asked for a briefing and I described among other things the substance of the FOMC defense of monetary policy secrecy in a recently concluded Freedom of Information Act lawsuit. My interest in the topic was initiated by a headline in the American Banker that read “Secrecy Primary Tool of Monetary Policy.” How could that be? The assertion seemed at odds with everything Bill taught us in graduate school at Brown—that, according to rational expectations theory, more information should be better than less. Bill emphasized that private agents have an incentive to use to their advantage whatever information they have, whatever its source. I wrote the paper to explore under what circumstances, if any, central bank secrecy could be justified. I would never have predicted that “information policy” would have generated so much interest among central bankers or as much research as" @default.
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• W1562990147 date "2008-01-01" @default.
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• W1562990147 title "Commentary on Announcements and the role of policy guidance " @default.
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