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• W1567158659 abstract "INTRODUCTION Budget forecasts tend to be wrong. Random error, an essential part of generating future budget projections, guarantees that public budgeting is an uncertain business. Uncertainty, therefore, ensures a strong connection between economics and politics when setting and implementing government's priorities (Shick 1990). The inability of states to forecast exactly the rate of revenues and expenditures plays a critical role in their fiscal health (Wagner and Garrett 2004). In the short term, forecasts are generated to reduce uncertainty in the proceeding year's budget; yet, future allocations of public resources are subject to greater levels of uncertainty. This results in political pressures intervening in the budget process and inevitably places stress on the states' financial commitments. So, regardless of how technically competent or correct specific forecast models tend to be in determining future estimates, the budget process is, nevertheless, influenced by competing actors attempting to shape the budget into a form that is most amenable to their needs. Incumbent politicians seek to ensure certainty in the process in order to convey to the public a high level of competence in managing the public purse, while opponent politicians do so by capitalizing on the uncertain. Research to date on budgeting, not addressed how the political-business cycle effects budget forecast errors. Recent work by Dohan and Thompson (2007) finds that policymakers attempt to stabilize the rate of spending growth when they must do so to keep a state solvent (for a review of this constraint when there is no-Ponzi scheme, see Buiter 1990) given current information on revenue growth and volatility (Dohan and Thompson 2007). By applying a buffer stock model to budgeting, they predict that spending growth will be more stable than revenue growth. This approach, however, ignores the fact that public spending tends to be more sensitive to lagged revenue growth than their modeling allows. Stability in spending growth is not based on fixed time preferences but rather can be endogenous to the political-business cycle. I suggest that spending preferences depend upon the timing of the electoral cycle. This article builds a forecasting model of state-level expenditures, and revenues that incorporates economic conditions, as well as incremental spending and revenue patterns. The model utilizes state-level and national-level political variables to explain the errors generated by budget forecasts. The research will provide a deeper understanding of how states manage fiscal policy by addressing how the political-business cycle effects budget projections. A BRIEF REVIEW OF RESEARCH ON STATE BUDGET FORECASTS Public budgeting sets the priorities for government by not only determining how much money is available to spend, but also which policies and programs would be implemented (Clynch and Lauth 1991). Typically the budget process is defined by revenue forecasts and spending budgets that are enacted into law (Buiter 1990). The process of developing revenue projections has a heavy influence on budget execution in which forecasts can, at times, restrict current and future disbursements (Hale and Douglass 1977, p. 370). From this perspective, revenue forecasts direct the entire state government policy (Corina, Nelson, and Wilko 2004, p. 165). In most states, incumbent governments use varying strategies to develop short-term and long-term projections to set the political agenda (Corder 2005). In the short-term, annual forecasts of revenue and spending budgets tend to be unbiased by political factors, while long-term forecasts are likely to be biased by political calculations. Therefore the process of developing revenue forecasts and spending budgets serve as a political tool by incumbents who seek to manage the electorate's expectations of overall job performance, particularly during an election cycle (Bruck and Stephan 2006). …" @default.
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• W1567158659 date "2012-03-22" @default.
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• W1567158659 title "THE POLITICS OF BUDGETING: EVALUATING THE EFFECTS OF THE POLITICAL ELECTION CYCLE ON STATE-LEVEL BUDGET FORECAST ERRORS" @default.
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