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• W1567376805 abstract "Modeling nonprofit governance and conduct is complicated by the absence of a formal residual claimant. Fama and Jensen (1983b) argue that insiders should be denied governance authority in nonprofit organizations (NPOs) to guard against expropriation of donations. Empirically, however, the opposite is frequently found, with insiders enjoying significant decision rights over organizational policies. In this paper, I propose that residual claimancy in commercial NPOs is divided between donors and insiders in a ‘de facto’ sense. Because donations flow in one direction, donors assume a greater share of residual claims when their donations are needed (i.e., in “down” economic periods) while insiders enjoy private benefits when the organization earns high levels of economic surplus. I develop a model based on this assumption and explore the relative efficiency of insider versus donor governance for financial decisions such as capital acquisition and insider compensation. I find that donor governance is efficient in the special case where the nondistribution constraint does not constrain distribution of the financial residual. In all other cases, donors under-invest in risky capital assets (“capacity”). Conversely, insider boards set compensation inefficiently, failing to tie wages to the level of the financial residual. Insiders may also over-invest in risky assets, but are disciplined by bond markets and donors’ willingness to support the organization in times of financial need. The model yields clear empirical predictions about the consequences of insider versus donor governance on investment and compensation policy. Inefficiencies in both donor and insider-dominated governance are consistent with the empirical observation that decision rights are typically divided between donors and insiders." @default.
• W1567376805 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W1567376805 date "2010-01-01" @default.
• W1567376805 modified "2023-09-25" @default.
• W1567376805 title "'De Facto' Residual Claimants and Nonprofit Governance: Who Benefits When Nonprofits Profit?" @default.
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• W1567376805 doi "https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1621714" @default.
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