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- W1567696605 abstract "[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] The art of war was always to start with ... adapting [forces] to the requirements of the particular case. Carl von Clausewitz, On War AS THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN CLOSES, there is an almost tangible sense of relief within the Army. Military services are shifting their focus toward Asia. The frustration and grief of the last decade have convinced many that guerrilla wars are best left to the guerrillas. Decisive victory in conventional terms has been elusive. However, special operations forces in Colombia, the Philippines, eastern Africa, and other locations around the globe have achieved successes. Even during the initial phase of the campaign in Afghanistan, special operations forces achieved many objectives. Organized as small task forces, special operations forces worked efficiently and effectively, while the larger staffs of brigade combat teams and divisions tended toward regimentation and institutionalism. Conventional headquarters and formations in the Army are too slow and bulky to manage small, persistent, irregular conflicts. The massive multinational headquarters during the late phases of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan seemed to produce little more than colossal plans for an ever-fleeting victory. Moreover, such military organizations tend to cause massive disruptions in civilians' lives and induce counterstate violence. In Afghanistan, conventional military organizations were asked to implement the difficult social policies needed to end persistent, irregular conflict--rooted in social problems--while lacking the expertise and experience for the job. It is no wonder conventional forces were marginally successful in Afghanistan; they are designed and resourced to destroy an opposing state's ability to resist. They will always be needed for conventional types of conflict, but irregular warfare needs other types of organizations and tools. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) assets are better suited to the persistent, low-intensity conflicts likely to characterize operations in the near future. This is because USSOCOM is focused on its role as a partner in long-term, strategic, interagency engagement aimed at resolving conflicts that cannot be settled by purely military means. Future Conflicts Irregular conflicts will continue to characterize the global security environment. From 2002 to 2011, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's online UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia counted over 370 small or nonstate conflicts--nearly ten times the number of interstate wars. (1) Irregular conflicts take the form of insurgencies, guerrilla wars, terrorism, smuggling, and even simple banditry. Nations are likely to avoid state-versus-state conflict because it is so expensive. Nonstate groups will increasingly seek to achieve their goals using asymmetric and irregular methods because they cannot compete directly against the overwhelming power of U.S. conventional military forces. A range of conflicts. The United States must remain prepared for very different types of conflicts. On one hand, the U.S. military faces near-peer competitors with the ability to cause significant harm to U.S. interests. The Department of Defense (DOD) will attempt to remain unmatched in its ability to destroy the offensive or defensive capabilities of enemy nations in conventional wars. However, the U.S. military will inevitably find itself confronting more unconventional threats. The United States must remain ready to counter insurgencies, state-supported guerrilla wars, and transnational terrorism--the hallmarks of persistent conflict. The United States will not be able to afford large conventional deployments for these types of persistent conflict. Nor will the nation stomach engagement in large-scale nation building after Iraq and Afghanistan. Calls within the DOD to refocus on high-intensity conflicts are consistent with analyst Martin Van Crevald's prediction that governments will literally contract out their responses to low-intensity conflicts, seeing them as not worth the blood and expense of a military designed to deter global challenges and topple states. …" @default.
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- W1567696605 date "2014-05-01" @default.
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- W1567696605 title "Persistent Conflict and Special Operations Forces" @default.
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