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• W1567804369 abstract "Beginning in the 1950s, development strategies in most developing countries empha sized increase in agricultural production. A vicious circle of low capital, low productivity, low incomes, low savings and consequently low capital was assumed to operate in rural areas. Rural credit was perceived as an instrument which could break this cycle. But it was also widely held that rural credit markets are imperfect, with money lenders usually dominating and borrowers often paying usurious interest rates. High rural interest rates were attributed to the monopoly power of lenders or to the high risks of default in rural lending. The policy response was to introduce subsidized agricultural credit programs. Yet most subsidize credit programs have been notable failures (Adams et. al., 1984). It is contended in this paper that failures of credit market intervention resulted from an incorrect perception of the nature of the rural credit markets. Classical models of monopoly or competitive markets do not adequately explain features of rural credit markets, such as the co-existence of formal and informal lending, credit rationing, interlinking and market segmentation. The characteristics that makes credit markets unusual is the high degree of imperfect information, and hence a high degree of risk, that prevails. Risk is generally not so important in markets for other goods. It is because credit markets involve a contract between two parties to be executed over time that imperfect information and risk are important. Imperfect information in credit markets create adverse selection and moral hazard problems for lenders, as explained later in the paper. These problems increase lenders' risks and can affect the way the market for credit operates. The risks involved in credit markets are discussed in the literature (eg. Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990: 235-50), but little attention appears to have been given to the effects of risk attitudes of borrowers and lenders. The importance of risk attitudes has been mentioned by Binswanger and Rosenswing (1986), but no empirical work on this aspect appears to have been reported. In this paper, a study to estimate borrowers' and lenders' risk attitudes is reported. The effect of these attitudes on credit transactions in formal and informal credit markets is explored. Informal credit markets have been better able to accommodate the information and risk problems than have the formal markets. Hence, formal markets can seldom compete effectively with the informal credit markets. Understanding the reasons can lead to useful prescriptions for managers of formal lending institutions and for government rural credit policy. This question too is explored in the paper with the aid of some survey data." @default.
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• W1567804369 date "2016-01-01" @default.
• W1567804369 modified "2023-09-27" @default.
• W1567804369 title "RURAL CREDIT MARKETS AND IMPERFECT INFORMATION: A NEW PERSPECTIVE" @default.
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