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- W1569456367 abstract "Auction theory is a very interesting topic whichstudies mechanisms of various formats for buying and selling goods.There are all kinds of mechanisms covered in the ambit of auctiontheory, ranging from sealed bid auctions like first-price or secondprice auctions, to open bid auctions like the English or Dutchauctions. One interesting kind of auction is the all-pay auction,in which, as the name suggests, all the players pay their bids.Analysis of all-pay auctions with virtual money has so far beenneglected in the auction theory literature. However, it can be usedto design a mechanism with a wide variety of applications includingequitable resource allocation, and fairer systems for legislationand corporate management. In this thesis, we shall present thisnovel mechanism, analyze it in a game-theoretic framework andconsider the variants of the problem including the perfect andimperfect information cases. Furthermore, we shall outline how tofind the equilibrium bidding strategies for this mechanism whichlead to equitable distribution of resources. One possibleapplication of this is in equitable resource allocation, such as ina battlefield where different agents have competing needs forlimited resources to complete their missions. Finally, we shalldraw the connection between this mechanism, and the process ofvoting in the legislature or the company board rooms. Currently, aparty needs just more than 50% of seats in the legislature tocontrol 100% of the bills. Similarly, a shareholder needs just 51%of shares to completely control the company. We shall show how itis possible to modify these voting systems, using the proposedmechanism to enable even the minority players to have an equitablesay in the decisions." @default.
- W1569456367 created "2016-06-24" @default.
- W1569456367 creator A5043213993 @default.
- W1569456367 date "2011-01-01" @default.
- W1569456367 modified "2023-09-28" @default.
- W1569456367 title "Equitable resource allocation using all-pay auctions" @default.
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