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• W1572274902 abstract "I. INTRODUCTION Twenty-four years after pronouncing that Congress[,] . . . not . . . this Court[, must remedy] any inconsistency or illogic in the long standing exemption baseball, but not other sports from the reach the antitrust laws,(1) the Supreme Court last term reduced substantially the uniqueness Major League Baseball's control over its labor market. The Court did so not by exposing baseball antitrust attack, but rather by clarifying that restrictions on player labor mobility and freedom contact imposed by all North American leagues professional sports teams(2) also enjoy an exemption from antitrust scrutiny as long as their labor markets are subject collective bargaining.(3) In Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.,(4) the Court held that employers could conspire and agree take actions impose controls on a labor market, if those actions grew out of and were directly related to a multiemployer bargaining process, did not offend the federal labor laws that sanction and regulate the process, affected terms employment subject compulsory bargaining, and concerned only parties the collective bargaining relationship.(5) All major professional team sports clubs have joined with other league clubs bargain in multiemployer units with unions representing the athletes that they employ. As long as a multiemployer bargaining relationship exists, league-imposed restraints on player labor markets should easily meet the Court's other conditions. The Brown holding, therefore, effectively enables leagues in every sport be as free antitrust constraints in order control player mobility and salaries as Major League Baseball has been under its special, long standing antitrust exemption.(6) How one greets Brown inevitably will depend in part on how one views the antitrust challenges that players have made against such league-imposed labor market restraints as restrictions on mobility between teams,(7) rookie drafts,(8) and salary caps.(9) Those individuals who think that the antitrust laws should be concerned only with restraints on product markets, and not with restraints on input markets in general or with labor markets in particular, may welcome Brown's exemption labor market restraints.(10) Those individuals who think that the labor market restraints typically imposed by sports leagues are reasonable under an antitrust analysis that weighs heavily the contributions such restraints maintaining athletic balance that enhances the league's competitiveness with other forms entertainment also may welcome the decision.(11) Others who believe that the antitrust laws should protect a player's negotiation a free-market wage for any extraordinary services the player provides should give Brown a cold reception. This should be true for those concerned with the ultimate impact on the sports product restraints discouraging talent development(12) and for those concerned with insuring the extraction a just wage for labor from a cartel employers.(13) Regardless their inclinations on these ultimate issues antitrust law, however, both sports fans and lawyers (including those who are both), have reason lament the result in Brown. For reasons elucidated in the final section this Article,(14) sports fans interested primarily in uninterrupted presentations athletic competition are likely be disappointed by more work stoppages in professional sports as a result Brown. For lawyers, whether sports fans or not, the Brown decision should be most troubling because it failed provide a proper clarification how antitrust law should accommodate federal labor law. The accommodation that Brown did articulate sacrificed antitrust goals a degree unnecessary the service labor law goals. As explained more fully below, in order protect established and legally approved multiemployer collective bargaining in myriad industries other than sports, the Court properly rejected the players' lawyers' formulation a limited antitrust exemption that would not have protected the concerted employer action challenged in Brown. …" @default.
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• W1572274902 date "1997-07-01" @default.
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• W1572274902 title "Multiemployer Bargaining, Antitrust Law, and Team Sports: The Contingent Choice of a Broad Exemption" @default.
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