FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W1590582010> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W1590582010 abstract "This thesis aims at explaining the reasons behind Mexico's tax revenue stagnation, by exploring the structural weaknesses of the tax system, identifying the main actors in the tax policy making process, and studying the tax reforms attempts and the role policy actors played to shape them in the last thirty years. The dissertation first shows Mexico's low tax collection yield and its stagnation for more than thirty years. The analysis portrays an inefficient tax collection system, with a tax structure plagued with a plethora of privileges and exemptions that dilute collection. A large number of interviews with public authorities, politicians, intellectual, representatives of businesses, social and international organizations showed a common concern over Mexico's low tax effort. An issue, which surprisingly has always been in the rhetoric of the political agenda, but has received very little political, social or scholarly attention. The thesis rises a puzzling paradox. By looking at the dynamics of tax reform, the evidence seems to suggest that even in a strongly centralized and hierarchical state like Mexico, frequently depicted as authoritarian, policy makers have been constrained to shape tax policy. Government's policy objectives and the uniqueness of the relationship with socio-economic actors, principally the business community, have affected the nature, profile and outcome of the tax reforms. I argue that the Mexican political system has been upheld by a very fragile political coalition with socio-economic actors, which has become the most important constraint on reform. The historical analysis shows that a substantial tax reform has been avoided, despite that increasing government revenue is crucial for the long-term economic development of the country. Instead, the government pursued other less politically troublesome means for financing the State. However, these alternative revenues- raising policies exacted a very high social and economic cost in he long run. The study of the tax policy decision making highlights the dominant role of politics in the policy making process, concluding the clientelism best describes the politics of tax policy making. As a result, the current shape of the Mexican tax system responds largely to the political accommodation of powerful vested interests. Economic policies have been subordinates to political stability, as well as upholding the fragile coalitions that support the Mexican political regime." @default.
• W1590582010 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W1590582010 creator A5064171840 @default.
• W1590582010 date "2002-01-01" @default.
• W1590582010 modified "2023-09-23" @default.
• W1590582010 title "The political economy of tax collection in Mexico : the constraints on reform, 1970-2000" @default.
• W1590582010 cites W1480663897 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W1502443551 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W1530798903 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W1534207035 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W1567594430 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W1568742305 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W1590621261 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W1600702199 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W1604669109 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W1969996562 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W1977457376 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W1982799350 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W2003945975 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W2006435537 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W2007940292 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W2014769828 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W2028764802 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W2038653250 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W2049614314 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W2053002577 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W2053458356 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W2054422547 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W2057084527 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W2063215731 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W2071142727 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W2075368726 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W2082164958 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W2115996874 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W2116132470 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W2118258824 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W2120946983 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W2124825646 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W2130925227 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W2151430150 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W2156280884 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W2323341645 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W2329910554 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W2482517283 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W259723893 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W2795870639 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W2973622987 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W3121459005 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W3124872167 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W3124998481 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W3146489412 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W3204852705 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W321378119 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W385182533 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W402733383 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W560908222 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W564729595 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W591033937 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W597643356 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W610701796 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W613483346 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W620403170 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W622761940 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W631758958 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W643184847 @default.
• W1590582010 cites W2320223037 @default.
• W1590582010 hasPublicationYear "2002" @default.
• W1590582010 type Work @default.
• W1590582010 sameAs 1590582010 @default.
• W1590582010 citedByCount "0" @default.
• W1590582010 crossrefType "dissertation" @default.
• W1590582010 hasAuthorship W1590582010A5064171840 @default.
• W1590582010 hasConcept C100001284 @default.
• W1590582010 hasConcept C113216237 @default.
• W1590582010 hasConcept C138921699 @default.
• W1590582010 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W1590582010 hasConcept C17744445 @default.
• W1590582010 hasConcept C193681711 @default.
• W1590582010 hasConcept C199539241 @default.
• W1590582010 hasConcept C2776805697 @default.
• W1590582010 hasConcept C514942387 @default.
• W1590582010 hasConcept C551662922 @default.
• W1590582010 hasConcept C94625758 @default.
• W1590582010 hasConceptScore W1590582010C100001284 @default.
• W1590582010 hasConceptScore W1590582010C113216237 @default.
• W1590582010 hasConceptScore W1590582010C138921699 @default.
• W1590582010 hasConceptScore W1590582010C162324750 @default.
• W1590582010 hasConceptScore W1590582010C17744445 @default.
• W1590582010 hasConceptScore W1590582010C193681711 @default.
• W1590582010 hasConceptScore W1590582010C199539241 @default.
• W1590582010 hasConceptScore W1590582010C2776805697 @default.
• W1590582010 hasConceptScore W1590582010C514942387 @default.
• W1590582010 hasConceptScore W1590582010C551662922 @default.
• W1590582010 hasConceptScore W1590582010C94625758 @default.
• W1590582010 hasLocation W15905820101 @default.
• W1590582010 hasOpenAccess W1590582010 @default.
• W1590582010 hasPrimaryLocation W15905820101 @default.
• W1590582010 hasRelatedWork W1516612433 @default.
• W1590582010 hasRelatedWork W1519771791 @default.
• W1590582010 hasRelatedWork W1569464319 @default.

• next