FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W1593076105> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W1593076105 abstract "Since Friedrich Hayek, debates about the proper relationship between the state and the market, and about the optimal design of regulatory institutions, often turn on assumptions about the workings of legal expertise — and in particular about the difference between public expertise (bureaucratic knowledge) and private expertise (private law). Hayek’s central argument, adopted uncritically by a wide array of policy-makers and academics across the political spectrum, is a temporal one: bureaucratic reasoning is inherently one step behind the market, and hence effective market planning is impossible. In contrast, Hayek argues, private ordering is superior because it is of the moment, happening in real time. My research suggests that Hayek’s description of the limitations of bureaucratic planning resonates with the sense of powerlessness and frustration experienced by many government officials themselves as they attempt to manage economic fluctuations. But Hayek’s rich (and even empathetic) account of the limits of well-meaning public legal expertise is far less complete when it comes to the strengths of private legal reasoning. Public reasoning has temporal weaknesses, so private reasoning must have equivalent temporal strengths, the argument goes. This chapter from a forthcoming book, Collateral Knowledge: Legal Reasoning in the Global Financial Markets, takes on Hayekian arguments against government regulation through a detailed examination of real-world examples of how public and private legal technologies manage the temporal dimensions of risk in the over-the-counter derivatives markets. It draws upon over ten years of fieldwork conducted among regulators and market participants involved in the global derivatives markets in Japan. The specific examples are: the usage of collateral on the private law side, and the usage of “real time gross settlement” payment settlement systems on the public side. My research shows that while there is no reason to believe that either of these is actually more effective than the other as a stop-gap against future uncertainties in the market, there is nevertheless a kind of “Hayekian” perception, by market participants and government officials alike, that the private devices are more legitimate, and that the experts who deploy these are more knowledgeable, more expert. In order to understand the root of this legitimacy gap, the paper explores in detail how collateral, as a private legal technology, handles the temporal uncertainties surrounding market risk. At the heart of “collateral” is a deceptively mundane, but actually quite audacious legal trick called the legal fiction. In legal terms, a legal fiction is a statement that is consciously understood to be false, and hence is irrefutable. An example would be the statement that “a corporation is a person”. Collateral is actually just a set of legal fictions, layered one on top of another. I explain how these fictions — which are just as problematically related to market “realities” as government planning technologies — nevertheless come to be much more readily accepted predictors, and indeed creators of market realities. So does this mean that private regulation is inherently superior to public regulation? The fallacy of the Hayekian argument is the assumption that these “private” technologies can only be deployed by private actors. In fact, there is nothing inherently private or public about the legal fiction or other similar devices of private law. The paper demonstrates this by showing how financial regulators in Japan redeployed the trick of the legal fiction and hence regained legitimacy in their own eyes and in the eyes of market participants." @default.
• W1593076105 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W1593076105 creator A5066485794 @default.
• W1593076105 date "2009-10-24" @default.
• W1593076105 modified "2023-09-24" @default.
• W1593076105 title "Placeholders: Engaging the Hayekian Critique of Financial Regulation" @default.
• W1593076105 cites W1516934970 @default.
• W1593076105 cites W1523227389 @default.
• W1593076105 cites W1569047046 @default.
• W1593076105 cites W1998150960 @default.
• W1593076105 cites W2062199894 @default.
• W1593076105 cites W2112148378 @default.
• W1593076105 cites W2140234722 @default.
• W1593076105 cites W2142933064 @default.
• W1593076105 cites W2589879338 @default.
• W1593076105 cites W2797591251 @default.
• W1593076105 cites W2993650909 @default.
• W1593076105 cites W3125254426 @default.
• W1593076105 cites W3200033382 @default.
• W1593076105 cites W609475615 @default.
• W1593076105 hasPublicationYear "2009" @default.
• W1593076105 type Work @default.
• W1593076105 sameAs 1593076105 @default.
• W1593076105 citedByCount "0" @default.
• W1593076105 crossrefType "posted-content" @default.
• W1593076105 hasAuthorship W1593076105A5066485794 @default.
• W1593076105 hasConcept C138885662 @default.
• W1593076105 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W1593076105 hasConcept C17744445 @default.
• W1593076105 hasConcept C185592680 @default.
• W1593076105 hasConcept C190253527 @default.
• W1593076105 hasConcept C199539241 @default.
• W1593076105 hasConcept C2778137410 @default.
• W1593076105 hasConcept C41895202 @default.
• W1593076105 hasConcept C51575053 @default.
• W1593076105 hasConcept C55493867 @default.
• W1593076105 hasConcept C94625758 @default.
• W1593076105 hasConcept C98184364 @default.
• W1593076105 hasConceptScore W1593076105C138885662 @default.
• W1593076105 hasConceptScore W1593076105C162324750 @default.
• W1593076105 hasConceptScore W1593076105C17744445 @default.
• W1593076105 hasConceptScore W1593076105C185592680 @default.
• W1593076105 hasConceptScore W1593076105C190253527 @default.
• W1593076105 hasConceptScore W1593076105C199539241 @default.
• W1593076105 hasConceptScore W1593076105C2778137410 @default.
• W1593076105 hasConceptScore W1593076105C41895202 @default.
• W1593076105 hasConceptScore W1593076105C51575053 @default.
• W1593076105 hasConceptScore W1593076105C55493867 @default.
• W1593076105 hasConceptScore W1593076105C94625758 @default.
• W1593076105 hasConceptScore W1593076105C98184364 @default.
• W1593076105 hasLocation W15930761051 @default.
• W1593076105 hasOpenAccess W1593076105 @default.
• W1593076105 hasPrimaryLocation W15930761051 @default.
• W1593076105 hasRelatedWork W111924231 @default.
• W1593076105 hasRelatedWork W1497097033 @default.
• W1593076105 hasRelatedWork W1905552442 @default.
• W1593076105 hasRelatedWork W1958612891 @default.
• W1593076105 hasRelatedWork W197278995 @default.
• W1593076105 hasRelatedWork W1977018298 @default.
• W1593076105 hasRelatedWork W2032053698 @default.
• W1593076105 hasRelatedWork W2112655692 @default.
• W1593076105 hasRelatedWork W2113151700 @default.
• W1593076105 hasRelatedWork W2481045706 @default.
• W1593076105 hasRelatedWork W2506348598 @default.
• W1593076105 hasRelatedWork W265361373 @default.
• W1593076105 hasRelatedWork W2896480369 @default.
• W1593076105 hasRelatedWork W2950092422 @default.
• W1593076105 hasRelatedWork W3117372217 @default.
• W1593076105 hasRelatedWork W3121327239 @default.
• W1593076105 hasRelatedWork W3122648523 @default.
• W1593076105 hasRelatedWork W3122999231 @default.
• W1593076105 hasRelatedWork W3123796384 @default.
• W1593076105 hasRelatedWork W3167207344 @default.
• W1593076105 isParatext "false" @default.
• W1593076105 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W1593076105 magId "1593076105" @default.
• W1593076105 workType "article" @default.