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• W1594183711 abstract "Economic models relating to the organization of the judicial system attempt to describe and explain the development and outcome of trials. They enable a more precise idea to be gained as to the outcome of strategic interaction rendered even more complex inasmuch as one of the actors may hold personal information or present characteristics the other party cannot see. As noted by Swanson and Mason (1998), “the intuition behind these models is the following: When one side in a litigation case has information that the other does not, it may be rational for one party to wait to convey the information credibly. Delaying settlement will be the preferred strategy when the cost of waiting is outweighed by the benefit of establishing credibility. In some cases, information asymmetries may be so large as to preclude agreement.” However, the literature concerning pretrial negotiations presents several restrictive hypotheses on the type of negotiation because the offer is generally of a “take-it-orleave-it” nature [Bebchuck (1984); Reinganum and Wilde (1986); Nalebuff (1987)]. In screening models (in which the uninformed party makes the offer in such a way that no information is transmitted), when a complaint has been lodged, the noninformed party puts forward the negotiating terms at the outset. In the second stage, the party holding confidential information either accepts or refuses this offer. If an agreement is reached, the judge will no longer intervene, except to witness and record the outcome of the dispute when the affair is taken off the court lists. The aim of the optimal offer of the uninformed party is to make a selection among the various unobservable types of the opposing party. This type of model is inherently static. It enables the probability of an agreement and its amount to be determined, but it is not possible to appreciate the moment it happens. Any analysis of the date implies reasoning within a dynamic context. A very interesting point is then to determine whether the agreement appears early in the negotiation or, a contrario, very late, thereby reflecting the existence of a deadline effect. Empirical and theoretical explanations of the deadline effect have been proposed, notably by Roth et" @default.
• W1594183711 created "2016-06-24" @default.
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• W1594183711 date "1999-12-01" @default.
• W1594183711 modified "2023-09-24" @default.
• W1594183711 title "The dynamics of pretrial negotiation in France:" @default.
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• W1594183711 doi "https://doi.org/10.1016/s0144-8188(99)00023-x" @default.
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