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• W1599225050 abstract "MOST MILITARY EMBERS, especially those with operational combat experience, understand that intelligence drives operations. Unfortunately, getting good, actionable intelligence is almost always a formidable challenge, a truth borne out in our recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. In these two conflicts, most of the collection methods we have used--technical means such as imagery exploitation and signals intercepts--depended on the adversary being somewhat cooperative (although that adversary might not recognize it as such). For example, if signals intelligence is to work well, the enemy must employ some type of emitting or broadcasting equipment in sufficient numbers and times for meaningful intercept and analysis to be done. Likewise with imagery: the enemy must, even if he employs sophisticated camouflage, present himself at some point as a somehow identifiable member of his side. In an insurgency, however, where the enemy imitates the seemingly innocuous traveler or nomad and restricts his communications to word of mouth or passing of notes, identifying him and collecting intelligence about him become much more difficult, In such instances, human intelligence (HUMINT) may be the only effective method of gaining needed information. Discussion about how to do HUMINT has mainly focused on extracting information from individuals by interrogation or debriefing (the former implying hostile extractions from prisoners, the latter suggesting neutral or friendly extractions from friendly forces, civilians, etc). In such cases, much of the value of the information derived depends upon the training, knowledge, ability, and stamina of the person conducting the interrogation, as well as the cooperativeness of the person being questioned. Human intelligence can also be collected through personal tactical observation (static) or combat patrolling, with observations and reports being submitted during or after the duty period or patrol. Again, however, we need the enemy's cooperation: he must come out of hiding and do something that we can observe. There is one type of HUMINT, however, that does not require the enemy's cooperation. That method is media exploitation, also referred to as document exploitation, or DOCEX. Unfortunately, despite the real potential of obtaining intelligence information simply by reading the enemy's paperwork, coalition forces all too olden have ignored this means of collection. Sometimes they have simply overlooked exploitable information; other times, they have actively destroyed it before it could be examined. The following example is illustrative of such lamentable practices. On 10 November 2003, U.S. forces conducted a raid into the mountains of Nuristan in Afghanistan. Their target was a small cluster of buildings, reportedly a Taliban administrative center, perched on the side of a mountain just south of the small town of Aranas. Information about the objective came from the highest levels, which meant it was not to be questioned, just acted on. First the buildings were attacked by air, then they were assaulted and occupied by troops from the 10th Mountain Division (after a 2,000-foot uphill attack). Unusually, the raiding force included a follow-on multi-agency intelligence team. Its mission was to identify enemy casualties (by gathering DNA samples) and examine any documents or equipment that might be about. Although the assault was vigorous, the results were disappointing: only three prisoners of questionable value were detained, and no Taliban casualties were confirmed. Moreover, the site didn't seem to be the Taliban ops center higher level intelligence had claimed it was; in fact, it was hard to determine just what it was. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Much of the difficulty in determining the site's nature was caused by the assault force's lack of attention to media on the objective. Between the Soldiers' occupation of the buildings and the intelligence team's arrival, there was a delay of several hours. …" @default.
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• W1599225050 date "2007-09-01" @default.
• W1599225050 modified "2023-09-27" @default.
• W1599225050 title "Paper and COIN: Exploiting the Enemy's Documents" @default.
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