Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W1607562008> ?p ?o ?g. }
Showing items 1 to 80 of
80
with 100 items per page.
- W1607562008 abstract "This paper aims to provide empirical evidence on the effects of CEO’s share option remuneration and CEO’s stock ownership on leasing. Financial contracting theory suggests that ownership structure is important determinant of capital structure, debt financing and leasing. Also, lease financing is a means of reducing the agency costs of debt. CEO’s remuneration packages should be more “highly” concentrated on performance based payments, such as long term share incentives, share options, instead of fixed fees, because it reduces the agency cost by giving CEOs more incentive and ownership in the company, which causes CEOs act more interest on equity holders. Accordingly, on this paper, it was assumed that CEOs having higher ownership and share option compensation should select leasing as a capital structure method since leasing helps to reduce agency cost and increase the firm value. However, it was found that it there are no significant relationship between CEO’s option compensation and total lease shares. For CEO ownership, I found that CEO’s stock ownership in value (£) is significantly and negatively correlated with total lease shares, which is contrary to the above expectation. On the other hand, percentage of CEO’s stock ownership is not significantly related to total lease shares. This paper contributes to practice because it guides shareholders how to decrease agency cost by using right means of financing and it is raising attention on the significance of performance related share option compensation method to increase the ownership of the CEO and to decrease agency cost and agency problem. For academy, due to the lack of research on this topic in Europe, it analyzed one of the biggest leasing sectors in the UK and compared the findings with those in the U.S." @default.
- W1607562008 created "2016-06-24" @default.
- W1607562008 creator A5002108484 @default.
- W1607562008 date "2011-01-01" @default.
- W1607562008 modified "2023-10-14" @default.
- W1607562008 title "Lease Financing, CEO’s Share Option Compensation, CEO’s Ownership: Evidence from the U.K." @default.
- W1607562008 cites W1522515456 @default.
- W1607562008 cites W1579112106 @default.
- W1607562008 cites W1848807236 @default.
- W1607562008 cites W1992314912 @default.
- W1607562008 cites W2039753093 @default.
- W1607562008 cites W2041249290 @default.
- W1607562008 cites W2048534553 @default.
- W1607562008 cites W2059835864 @default.
- W1607562008 cites W2064371962 @default.
- W1607562008 cites W2072325349 @default.
- W1607562008 cites W2079143095 @default.
- W1607562008 cites W2081281397 @default.
- W1607562008 cites W2119886428 @default.
- W1607562008 cites W2130114087 @default.
- W1607562008 cites W2130209614 @default.
- W1607562008 cites W2145377320 @default.
- W1607562008 cites W2232999985 @default.
- W1607562008 cites W2479655471 @default.
- W1607562008 cites W2752617332 @default.
- W1607562008 cites W3122114201 @default.
- W1607562008 cites W3122251413 @default.
- W1607562008 cites W3122300128 @default.
- W1607562008 cites W3123427834 @default.
- W1607562008 cites W3124587926 @default.
- W1607562008 cites W3125263373 @default.
- W1607562008 cites W3125975775 @default.
- W1607562008 cites W314202994 @default.
- W1607562008 cites W4236101181 @default.
- W1607562008 cites W4250822814 @default.
- W1607562008 doi "https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2038675" @default.
- W1607562008 hasPublicationYear "2011" @default.
- W1607562008 type Work @default.
- W1607562008 sameAs 1607562008 @default.
- W1607562008 citedByCount "1" @default.
- W1607562008 countsByYear W16075620082018 @default.
- W1607562008 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
- W1607562008 hasAuthorship W1607562008A5002108484 @default.
- W1607562008 hasConcept C10138342 @default.
- W1607562008 hasConcept C11171543 @default.
- W1607562008 hasConcept C121955636 @default.
- W1607562008 hasConcept C144133560 @default.
- W1607562008 hasConcept C151392489 @default.
- W1607562008 hasConcept C15744967 @default.
- W1607562008 hasConcept C2779614062 @default.
- W1607562008 hasConcept C2780023022 @default.
- W1607562008 hasConcept C39389867 @default.
- W1607562008 hasConcept C73283319 @default.
- W1607562008 hasConceptScore W1607562008C10138342 @default.
- W1607562008 hasConceptScore W1607562008C11171543 @default.
- W1607562008 hasConceptScore W1607562008C121955636 @default.
- W1607562008 hasConceptScore W1607562008C144133560 @default.
- W1607562008 hasConceptScore W1607562008C151392489 @default.
- W1607562008 hasConceptScore W1607562008C15744967 @default.
- W1607562008 hasConceptScore W1607562008C2779614062 @default.
- W1607562008 hasConceptScore W1607562008C2780023022 @default.
- W1607562008 hasConceptScore W1607562008C39389867 @default.
- W1607562008 hasConceptScore W1607562008C73283319 @default.
- W1607562008 hasLocation W16075620081 @default.
- W1607562008 hasOpenAccess W1607562008 @default.
- W1607562008 hasPrimaryLocation W16075620081 @default.
- W1607562008 hasRelatedWork W2083043864 @default.
- W1607562008 hasRelatedWork W2102514869 @default.
- W1607562008 hasRelatedWork W2122630792 @default.
- W1607562008 hasRelatedWork W2147302369 @default.
- W1607562008 hasRelatedWork W2148347497 @default.
- W1607562008 hasRelatedWork W2287638999 @default.
- W1607562008 hasRelatedWork W2318868287 @default.
- W1607562008 hasRelatedWork W2802820587 @default.
- W1607562008 hasRelatedWork W2920750548 @default.
- W1607562008 hasRelatedWork W3125741472 @default.
- W1607562008 isParatext "false" @default.
- W1607562008 isRetracted "false" @default.
- W1607562008 magId "1607562008" @default.
- W1607562008 workType "article" @default.