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• W1608070087 abstract "TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION I. THE INABILITY OF STANDARD THEORIES OF FEDERALISM TO EXPLAIN FEDERAL-STATE FISCAL RELATIONSHIPS A. Theoretical Differences Between Regulatory and Fiscal Federalism 1. Dual Sovereignty Theories 2. Comparative Process Theories 3. Pluralist Theories 4. Comparative Efficiency Theories B. Practical Differences Between Regulatory and Fiscal Federalism II. FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN STATES' FISCAL AFFAIRS A. The Development of a Cooperative Fiscal Federalism 1. Separatism in Fiscal Federalism 2. Cost-Shifting in Areas of Joint Federal-State Concern 3. Three Cooperative Models of Fiscal Federalism (a) The Compensatory Model (b) The Superior Capacity Model (c) The Leadership Model B. Practical Problems in Cooperative Fiscal Federalism 1. The Puzzle of Substantive Mandates on States 2. Cyclical Stresses on Federal-State Spending Programs (a) Matching Programs (b) Unmatched Programs 3. Impacts of Federal Deficit Reduction Efforts C. Conflict and Cooperation in Raising Revenue 1. Cooperative Federalism in Taxation 2. Congressional Interventions (a) Direct Restrictions (b) Indirect Impacts 3. Priorities Implicit in Judicial Limitations on State Revenue-Raising 2598 D. Conclusion III. STATE BUDGETS AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE A. Central Principles of State Fiscal Constitutions B. Pre-Keynesianism and State Budgets C. States' Budgets During the Last Two Economic Cycles IV. SUBSTANTIVE BIAS IN STATE BUDGET PROCEDURES A. Substantive Constitutional Preferences B. Dedicated Revenue Sources C. Method and Timing of Expenditures 1. Advantages for Slow-Spending Programs 2. Binding Future Legislatures 3. Methods of Limiting Temporal Budgetary Manipulations D. Cyclical Biases 1. Programs' and Taxes' Varying Sensitivity to the Business Cycle 2. The Competitive Disadvantage of Countercyclical Programs and Taxes (a) Countercyclical Spending Programs (b) Noncyclical Revenue Sources 3. Differences Between Popular and Vestigial Programs V. TOWARD A NEW FISCAL FEDERALISM A. Reforming State Budgetary Procedures 1. Financing Public Programs During Economic Downturns with Open Borrowing and Rainy Day Funds 2. Restricting Borrowing for Capital Projects 3. Balancing Budgets, Not Outlays 4. Construing Linkages Between Federal and State Tax Systems 5. Budget Transparency B. The Federal Role 1. Spending Programs 2. Revenue Collection CONCLUSION Although interactions between federal and state taxes and spending programs are becoming increasingly controversial, this Article asserts that major theories of federalism built to divide regulatory authority between the two levels of government poorly account for the quite different problems of fiscal cooperation and competition. The Article therefore identifies and distinguishes three justifications for federal funding of states' operations: In some programs, funding seeks to insulate states from particular fiscal burdens, such as the side effects of federal policies or the abrupt termination of federal responsibility for particular problems. In other programs, funding provides an incentive for states to follow federal policy leadership. And in still others, the federal government assumes financial responsibility because of its superior fiscal capacity. The Article finds recent congressional action on unfunded mandates and the Court's new federalism jurisprudence lacking coherent justification under these three models. The Article then turns to programs that aid low-income people, which present excellent examples of spending programs that suffer from design defects because of the current lack of a coherent theory of fiscal federalism. …" @default.
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• W1608070087 date "2005-06-01" @default.
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• W1608070087 title "Rethinking Fiscal Federalism" @default.
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