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• W163209506 abstract "This paper explores the legal measures that have been enacted in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) to counter the threat of terrorism, focusing particularly on the international and domestic political context in which the reform of the Bosnian criminal code was carried out, on the apparent origins of Article 201 of the BiH criminal code in the European Union (EU) Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism of June 2002 and on the strengths and weaknesses of this definition in the Bosnian context. The paper argues firstly that the events of 9/11, while certainly of significance, were less salient to the definition of terrorism adopted in the BiH criminal code than the enhanced engagement of the European Union with processes of law reform in BiH in recent years seems to have been. The paper also concludes that despite various shortcomings (which should be addressed) the treatment of terrorism in the BiH criminal code has a number of strengths that make it particularly appropriate in the context of BiH. I Terrorism in Bosnia-Herzegovina Terrorism is a particularly emotive topic in BiH, the term having been used to refer to organised crime generally, as well as historically providing a political tool to be leveraged by each of the three ‘constituent peoples’ of BiH against the others. At least until recently, however, BiH was not considered to be a country that either produced terrorists or that faced an identifiable terrorist threat to its citizens and/or public institutions. That said, BiH has for some time been considered a transit country for terrorists seeking to enter Europe, owing largely to the involvement of militant Islamic groups in the Bosnian war of 1992-1995. During the war, the Bosnian government accepted the help of the Iranian government and of various groups of Islamic militants to bolster its position against the Croatian and Serb factions fighting in 1 LL.M. Candidate, University of Toronto. I am grateful to Kent Roach, Yaara Lemberger-Kenar and Chris Waters (amongst others) for their suggestions and assistance in the preparation of this article. The first version of this paper was drafted in the context of a University of Toronto Law School seminar on comparative anti-terrorism and national security law in the spring of 2006. 2 For the sake of convenience, the terms ‘Bosnia’ and ‘BiH’ will also be used to refer to Bosnia-Herzegovina in this paper. The three terms can be read interchangeably. 3 This is perhaps unsurprising given the extensive scope of corrupt practices in BiH and the alleged connivance between various levels of government and organised crime. Inefficient, over-complex and weak governmental structures have also allowed organised crime to flourish BiH. (See: Minister of Justice of Bosnia and Herzegovina, “International Cooperation in the Fight Against International Terrorism and Implementation of the Relevant Instruments of the Council of Europe; The Response of the Justice System – Civil and Criminal – to Terrorism”, 25 Conference of European Ministers of Justice, Sofia 9-10/10/2003. Available at: http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal_Affairs/Legal_cooperation/Conferences_and_high-level_meetings/European_Ministers_of_Justice/MJU-25%282003%296E-BH.pdf.) 4 In discussing terrorism in BiH, one aspect of popular discourse in that country that must be borne in mind is that – as intimated above owing to the legacy of war-time conflicts, accusations of ‘terrorism’ have significant political undertones. Members of each ethnic group – that is, Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs have, from time to time, termed the activities of its opponents ‘terrorist’, and in particular Bosnian Serbs have often accused Bosnian Muslims of supporting (or of being) Islamic radicals. See e.g. Woehrel, S. “Bosnia and Herzegovina: Issues for US Policy”, CRS Report for Congress, 10/02/2005, at 12. Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32392.pdf. See also e.g. Armatta, J., “Milosevic’s Propaganda War”, Institute of War and Peace Reporting, 27/02/2003. Available at: http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/yugo/2003/0227prop.htm. 5 The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo by a Bosnian Serb ‘freedom fighter’ in 1914, however, does perhaps suggest that Bosnian authorities have had at least some historical experience of dealing with relatively home-grown terrorism. 6 The Bosnian ‘Muslim’ government, that is. During the period 1992-1995 this body can be distinguished from the Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb authorities. After 1995 the term ‘Bosnian government’ can be taken, however, as referring to the body established under the Dayton Peace Accords, and in particular to the Council of Ministers as distinct from the Parliamentary Assembly. See discussion of Bosnian governmental structures below. Page 2 of 16 Bosnia in the early 1990s. After the war, a number of these militants stayed behind, some becoming Bosnian citizens by marrying into the local population. Estimates of the numbers involved during the war vary, but have ranged up to several thousands while around 750 are estimated to have remained behind after 1995. During the war and its immediate aftermath a few areas within Bosnia also came under the effective control of these groups, including most (in)famously the town of Bocinja in central Bosnia where large numbers of ‘mujihadeen’ settled. There have also been reports that Al Qaeda were active in Bosnia during the war. The wartime Bosnian government also received support from Iranian and Saudi Arabian humanitarian and charitable organisations, with a number of such organisations remaining active in BiH after the war. Over time, however, relations between the Bosnian government and these organisations changed amid suspicion that many organisations were in effect fronts for anti-Western Islamist groups seeking to foment violence and to radicalise the local Muslim community. Wartime experiences are also said to have resulted in links being developed between Bosnian intelligence services and Al Qaeda, although the credibility of these reports, as well as the extent and nature of the alleged connections, remain uncertain. In 2003, however, a number of Bosnian officials did come under investigation for having helped to set up terrorist training camps in BiH in the mid-1990s. Bosnian Muslims are known for being particularly secular and ‘westernised’. Nonetheless, in the aftermath of 9/11 a number of militant Islamic organisations do seem to have become more active in promoting terrorist activities in BiH. Instances have been cited, for example, of threats being made against US military and civilian facilities in BiH, while former foreign combatants in Bosnia have also been described as providing a ‘one stop shop’ for weapons and other resources for terrorists en route to Europe. Commencing shortly after 9/11, the Bosnian government took steps to clamp down on the threat of Islamic terrorism in BiH. These included raiding and closing down the offices of organisations suspected of involvement with terrorism, as well as arrests and renditions of individuals suspected of terrorist activities. Among the most prominent of these incidents was the arrest in late 2001 of 6 men of Algerian and Yemeni origin – 5 with Bosnian citizenship – by Bosnian police acting alongside 7 See Woehrel, supra note 4 at 11. 8 Woehrel, S. “Islamic Terror and the Balkans”, CRS Report for Congress, 26/07/2005, at 3. Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL33012.pdf. 9 Some initial steps towards resolving the situation of the Islamic fighters who had remained in Bosnia were taken between July 2000 and March 2001 when, in the context of the internationally-supported Property Law Implementation Plan, many former foreign fighters were evicted from Bocinja. For an overview of the Property Law Implementation Plan see: OSCE/UNMIBH/OHR/UNHCR/CRPC, “PLIP Inter-Agency Framework Document”, 10/2000. See also: “Bosnia evicts ‘holy war’ settlers”, BBC, 24/07/2000. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/848808.stm, and: “Bosnian Serbs return to ‘holy war’ village”, BBC, 15/03/2001. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1221996.stm. 10 See: Woehrel, supra note8 at 3. 11 See Woehrel, supra note 8 at 3. Also see e.g. “Bosnia: Muslim Newspaper Points to Existence of Islamic Terror Camps”, ADN Kronos International, 30/08/2005. Available at: http://www.adnki.com/index_2Level.php?cat=Security&loid=8.0.202217820&par=0. See also e.g. Pyes, C., Meyer, J. & Rempe, W. “Terrorists Use Bosnia as Base and Sanctuary”, Los Angeles Times, 07/10/2001. Available at: http://www.balkanpeace.org/rs/archive/oct01/rs185.shtml. 12 See Woehrel, supra note 8 at 3. 13 Paraphrased from Woehrel, supra note 4 at 11-12. See also: “NATO raids 'terrorist' camp in Bosnia”, CNN, 16/02/1996. Available at: http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/Bosnia/updates/9602/16/. 14 See Woehrel, supra note 8 at 3. See also: Hedges, S. “Extremism lingers After Balkan wars”, Chicago Tribune, 25/11/2001. Available at: http://www.balkanpeace.org/hed/archive/nov01/hed4397.shtml. 15 For further details see “Report of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Counter-Terrorism Committee pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001” (“CTC Report”) of 31/12/2001 (hereinafter ‘Bosnia’s First CTC Report’). Available at: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/b.htm. 16 See Woehrel, supra note 8 at 4-5. See also: “Bosnia suspects headed for Cuba”, BBC, 18/01/2002. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1767554.stm." @default.
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• W163209506 title "Combating Terrorism in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Explaining and Assessing Article 201 of the Bosnian Criminal Code" @default.
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