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• W1723609497 abstract "ABSTRACT.Thought experiments about de se attitudes and Jackson's original Knowledge Argument are compared with each other and discussed from the perspective of a computational theory of mind. It is argued that internal knowledge, i.e. knowledge formed on the basis of signals that encode aspects of their own processing rather than being intentionally directed towards external objects, suffices for explaining the seminal puzzles without resorting to acquaintance or phenomenal character as primitive notions. Since computationalism is ontologically neutral, the account also explains why neither Lewis's two gods nor Mary's surprise in the Knowledge Argument violate physicalism.Keywords: phenomenal character, computationalism, de se attitudes, physicalism, acquaintance, the Knowledge ArgumentYou could not step twice into the same river; for other waters are ever flowing on to you. To those entering the same river, other and still other waters flow.- Heraclitus, Fragments 4 1 & 42IntroductionIn this article a theory of internal knowledge is proposed that provides an explanation of de se puzzles like those of H. N. Castaneda (1967, 1975, 1989), Perry (1977, 1979, 1989), Lewis (1989), and Stalnaker (1981, 2004, 2008) as well as allowing for an alternative way of solving Jackson's Knowledge Argument. While the view defended in this article bears many similarities with the acquaintance hypothesis of Conee (1994), Bigelow & Pargetter (1990, 2006), and Tye (1999, 2000, 2009) it differs from these accounts in various aspects, most notably in assuming computationalism. As will be argued below, computationalism gives rise to a form of ontological neutrality that makes the solution to the Knowledge Argument (almost) trivial. In a nutshell, the following theses will be defended: (i) A certain kind of knowledge arising from sensory inputs or from reflecting on one's own cognition is factual and also propositional in a sense that will be explicated in more detail below, (ii) Internal knowledge cannot be reduced to external knowledge about the physical world, but this irreducibility arises trivially from the way it is formed, (iii) Despite the previous points the position remains compatible with physicalism.So according to the way Nida-Rumelin (2009) puts it an instance of the New Knowledge/New Fact thesis will be defended that does not violate physicalism. As the view is widespread that such a combination must in one way or another be incompatible with physicalism, a section on its own will be devoted to a defense of the proposal against possible criticisms. The account will also be briefly compared to the acquaintance view by which it has been inspired.1. Some PuzzlesThe following example will serve as a point of departure for the subsequent discussion of similar thought experiments from the literature:Suppose you have never eaten a truffle omelet in your life. When you eat one for the first time, you taste something that you have never tasted before. Given certain ceteris paribus clauses - your olfactory sense is working in the normal way and you're not seriously ill - it is safe to assume that you already have had the ability to experience the taste of a truffle omelet prior to having tasted one. Given, again, certain ceteris paribus clauses - the meal wasn't violently forced down your throat, the surrounding air was not polluted with toxic waste, and so on - after having eaten a particular truffle omelet you will have learned how that particular omelet tasted and be able to recall certain, though not all, aspects of this experience from memory. And after your second or third truffle omelet you will likely have learned how truffle omelets taste in general, although all of them differ from each other a little bit in taste.One might think that something as innocuous as tasting a new dish would not stir up many philosophical controversies. Yet it seems that scenarios very similar to the omelet example have caused a decent amount of bewilderment among contemporary philosophers of mind and language. …" @default.
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• W1723609497 date "2012-01-01" @default.
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• W1723609497 title "De Se Puzzles, the Knowledge Argument, and the Formation of Internal Knowledge" @default.
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