FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W17811408> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W17811408 abstract "Title of Dissertation: ESSAYS IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS: APPLYING PROSPECT THEORY TO AUCTIONS Anmol Ratan, Doctor of Philosophy, 2010 Directed By: Prof. Andreas Lange Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics I explore the implications of reference-dependent preferences in sealed-bid auctions. In the first part, I develop a Prospect theory based model to explain bidding in first-price auctions. I show that bidding in induced-value first-price sealed-bid auctions can be rationalized as a combination of reactions to underlying ambiguity and anticipated loss aversion. Using data from experimental auctions, I provide evidence that in induced-value auctions with human bidders, this approach works well. In auctions with prior experience and /or against risk-neutral Nash rivals where ambiguity effects could be altogether irrelevant, anticipated loss aversion by itself can explain aggressive bidding. This is a novel result in the literature. Using data from experiments, I find that ambiguity effects become negligible in auctions with experienced human bidders against (i) experienced human rivals and (ii) Nash computer rivals, when loss aversion is taken in consideration. The estimates for loss aversion are similar in auctions with human bidders (with or without experience). Next, I extend my approach of anticipated loss aversion to address bidding outcomes in firstand second-price sealed-bid auctions. As shown in first part, the model predicts overbidding in first-price induced-value auctions consistent with evidence from most laboratory experiments. However, substantially different bidding behavior could result in commodity auctions where money and auction item are consumed along different dimensions of the consumption space. Differences also result in second-price auctions. The study thereby indicates that transferring qualitative behavioral findings from induced-value laboratory experiments to the field may be problematic if subjects are loss averse and anticipate such losses at the time of bidding. Finally, I explore the effect of resale or procurement opportunities, to which bidders have heterogeneous market access, on bidding in firstprice sealed-bid auctions. My models suggest that in auctions with resale, loss aversion causes underbidding with respect to the risk-neutral-Nash prediction. Bidders with greatest level of market access are least affected by loss aversion and therefore bid closer to the risk-neutral-Nash than bidders with smaller market access. In auctions with procurement, the effect of loss aversion is such that it causes overbidding (underbidding) for bidders with respect to the risk-neutral-Nash. Bidders with greatest level of market access are again least affected by loss aversion and therefore bid much conservatively and closer to the risk-neutral-Nash than bidders with very low market access. If market access is interpreted as a proxy for experience, the predictions of my model are qualitatively similar to the findings in List (2003, 2004). Since these indirect effects are obtained without altering reference-dependent preferences, it raises the possibility that the effects obtained in List (2003, 2004) in field settings may not arise entirely due to the direct effect of experience on reference-dependent preferences. This calls for a more careful reexamination of the underlying issues. ESSAYS IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS: APPLYING PROSPECT THEORY TO AUCTIONS" @default.
• W17811408 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W17811408 creator A5011652659 @default.
• W17811408 date "2010-01-01" @default.
• W17811408 modified "2023-09-27" @default.
• W17811408 title "Essays in behavioral economics: Applying prospect theory to auctions" @default.
• W17811408 cites W1484146821 @default.
• W17811408 cites W1523998854 @default.
• W17811408 cites W1526929508 @default.
• W17811408 cites W1528501399 @default.
• W17811408 cites W1550761040 @default.
• W17811408 cites W1565533678 @default.
• W17811408 cites W1569557206 @default.
• W17811408 cites W1583742324 @default.
• W17811408 cites W1587843808 @default.
• W17811408 cites W1590863449 @default.
• W17811408 cites W1832381054 @default.
• W17811408 cites W1859836455 @default.
• W17811408 cites W1978537395 @default.
• W17811408 cites W1986799195 @default.
• W17811408 cites W1986819560 @default.
• W17811408 cites W1988168828 @default.
• W17811408 cites W1992442244 @default.
• W17811408 cites W1992745568 @default.
• W17811408 cites W1994106313 @default.
• W17811408 cites W2003572096 @default.
• W17811408 cites W2006795264 @default.
• W17811408 cites W2013500674 @default.
• W17811408 cites W2015007620 @default.
• W17811408 cites W2025212221 @default.
• W17811408 cites W2027047704 @default.
• W17811408 cites W2030360026 @default.
• W17811408 cites W2030874315 @default.
• W17811408 cites W2035574843 @default.
• W17811408 cites W2037506918 @default.
• W17811408 cites W2041946752 @default.
• W17811408 cites W2042223112 @default.
• W17811408 cites W2042695214 @default.
• W17811408 cites W2055721458 @default.
• W17811408 cites W2057085101 @default.
• W17811408 cites W2058953064 @default.
• W17811408 cites W2073590234 @default.
• W17811408 cites W2076438548 @default.
• W17811408 cites W2076988222 @default.
• W17811408 cites W2102118103 @default.
• W17811408 cites W2103517563 @default.
• W17811408 cites W2113991325 @default.
• W17811408 cites W2117546413 @default.
• W17811408 cites W2120416704 @default.
• W17811408 cites W2120733867 @default.
• W17811408 cites W2126182847 @default.
• W17811408 cites W2132479407 @default.
• W17811408 cites W2132726456 @default.
• W17811408 cites W2141503762 @default.
• W17811408 cites W2145866011 @default.
• W17811408 cites W2161968837 @default.
• W17811408 cites W2162180605 @default.
• W17811408 cites W2166236773 @default.
• W17811408 cites W3023376117 @default.
• W17811408 cites W3121650482 @default.
• W17811408 cites W3123113172 @default.
• W17811408 cites W3123560697 @default.
• W17811408 cites W3123854535 @default.
• W17811408 cites W3124042502 @default.
• W17811408 cites W3124282819 @default.
• W17811408 cites W3125221859 @default.
• W17811408 cites W3125576485 @default.
• W17811408 cites W3151874472 @default.
• W17811408 cites W3205459585 @default.
• W17811408 cites W79789520 @default.
• W17811408 cites W2048515490 @default.
• W17811408 cites W2099161251 @default.
• W17811408 cites W2144810549 @default.
• W17811408 hasPublicationYear "2010" @default.
• W17811408 type Work @default.
• W17811408 sameAs 17811408 @default.
• W17811408 citedByCount "0" @default.
• W17811408 crossrefType "dissertation" @default.
• W17811408 hasAuthorship W17811408A5011652659 @default.
• W17811408 hasConcept C119857082 @default.
• W17811408 hasConcept C127447990 @default.
• W17811408 hasConcept C129915516 @default.
• W17811408 hasConcept C144237770 @default.
• W17811408 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W17811408 hasConcept C163239763 @default.
• W17811408 hasConcept C175444787 @default.
• W17811408 hasConcept C18619997 @default.
• W17811408 hasConcept C199360897 @default.
• W17811408 hasConcept C205706631 @default.
• W17811408 hasConcept C2776291640 @default.
• W17811408 hasConcept C2778174566 @default.
• W17811408 hasConcept C2780522230 @default.
• W17811408 hasConcept C339426 @default.
• W17811408 hasConcept C41008148 @default.
• W17811408 hasConcept C9233905 @default.
• W17811408 hasConceptScore W17811408C119857082 @default.
• W17811408 hasConceptScore W17811408C127447990 @default.
• W17811408 hasConceptScore W17811408C129915516 @default.
• W17811408 hasConceptScore W17811408C144237770 @default.
• W17811408 hasConceptScore W17811408C162324750 @default.

• next