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W1843815924 abstract "By ‘Millianism’ and ‘descriptivism’, here, I mean the following two theses: Millianism: The semantic content of a name is its semantic referent. Descriptivism: The semantic content of a name is the semantic content of some definite description. Saul Kripke (1980) has provided three major arguments, namely, semantic, epistemic, and modal, against descriptivism, without intending to embrace Millianism (Kripke, 1980, 20).1 The Semantic argument focuses on the point that the description associated with a name may easily become semantically improper or inappropriate. It may become semantically improper in two cases. First, when there is no object to satisfy the description, for example, suppose that ‘Jonah’ is associated with ‘the prophet who was swallowed by a whale’ when neither Jonah nor any other prophet was ever swallowed by a whale (Kripke, 1980, 67). Second, when there are more than one object to satisfy the description, for example, suppose that ‘Cicero’ is associated with ‘the man who denounced Catiline’ when in fact some, not one, have done so, (Kripke, 1980, 80). And the description may become semantically inappropriate when there is exactly one object to satisfy the description but the object is not the appropriate one, for example, suppose that ‘Columbus’ is associated with ‘the first European who discovered America’ when in fact a Norseman has discovered America (Kripke, 1980, 85).2 The modal argument, in one formulation, focuses on the point that a modal sentence3 containing a name and its counterpart in which the description associated with the name is substituted for may have different truth-values. For example, given that that ‘Aristotle’ is associated with ‘the last great philosopher of antiquity’, the modal sentence ‘Aristotle might not have been Aristotle’ seems to be false when ‘Aristotle might not have been the last great philosopher of antiquity’ seems to be true (Kripke, 1980, 61–62). Another formation of the modal argument focuses on the point that a simple atomic sentence containing a name and its counterpart in which the description associated with the name is substituted for have different counterfactual truth conditions. For example, again given that ‘Aristotle’ is associated with ‘the last great philosopher of antiquity’, ‘Aristotle is fond of dogs’ and ‘The last great philosopher of antiquity is fond of dogs’ have different truth conditions in a counterfactual situation in which not Aristotle but someone else is the last great philosopher of antiquity, or so is claimed (Kripke, 1980, 6–7). Widescopism: The definite description that gives the semantic content of a name must take wide scope with respect to modal operators.4 Millians, e.g., Scott Soames (1998), try to argue that widescopism fails: it turns some valid arguments to invalid. Widescopers, e.g., David Sosa (2001) and David Hunter (2005), reply that Millians neither derive nor follow all the consequences of scope ambiguity of the descriptions that supply the semantic contents of names. Taking all forms of ambiguity into account and considering all modal operators involved in the sentence or in the counterfactual truth conditions, the reply continues, widescopism does not mischaracterize any valid argument as invalid. Millians, e.g., Ben Caplan (2005), rebut that not all consequences of widescopism are plausible: Widescopism overgenerates ambiguities. Moreover, considering modal sentences containing apparently empty names, Andrew Cullison and Ben Caplan (2011) attempt to develop a new argument against widescopism. This last argument against widescopism is what I shall take issue with in this paper. Here, with no attempt to defend widescopism, I will try to show that the latter argument fails to provide a reason against widescopism in favor of Millianism. In section 2, I will formulate Cullison and Caplan's argument against widescopism. Next, in section 3, I will try to evaluate their argument and explain why it does not help Millianism prevail against widescopism: Cullison and Caplan's argument is based on the ambiguity of ‘apparently empty names’ and after disambiguation it either becomes unsound or gives way to a parallel argument against Millianism. Either way, it does not provide a reason against widescopism in favor of Millianism. In section 4, I will consider two objections to my argument and rebut them. Cullison and Caplan (2011) present the following argument against widescopism. Consider: (1) It is necessary that it is not the case that Joss Whedon is Sherlock Holmes. Here is my formulation of their argument: There is at least one reading of (1) on which it is true. That (1) is unambiguously false is incorrect. If widescopism is true, (1) is unambiguously false. Widescopism is not true. The argument only uses modus tollens [(I.2) and (I.3)] and here is the justification of each premise. (I.1) can be justified in three ways. First, it is warranted by speakers' intuition, or so is claimed. Many rational, competent, and well-informed speakers have “the intuition that there is at least one reading of (1) on which it is true” (Cullison and Caplan, 2011, 285). For one thing, Joss Whedon exists and thus he is necessarily distinct from anything else, including nonexistent fictional characters, in particular Sherlock Holmes. I couldn't have been Sherlock Holmes. Joss Whedon is not modally different from me in this respect. Joss Whedon couldn't have been Sherlock Holmes. The truth of (I.1.1) can be verified by “the observation that, if one asks oneself the question ‘Could I have been Sherlock Holmes?’, one is likely to answer ‘No' ” (Ibid). (I.1.2) should be accepted in the following sense: Joss Whedon, like me, should preserve his identity across possible worlds. Therefore, there is a fixed set of non-identity facts about Joss Whedon. (I.1.3) follows from (I.1.1) and (I.1.2). (1) is false. There is a possible world, w, in which Joss Whedon is Sherlock Holmes. In w, Joss Whedon has the property of existing in the actual world. In w, Sherlock Holmes does not have the property of existing in the actual world. In w, Joss Whedon is not Sherlock Holmes. But (I.1.e) contradicts (I.1.b), hence (I.1.a) is false, namely, (1) is true. (I.1.a) is the assumption of reductio, (I.1.b) formulates the conditions in which (1) is false in possible worlds semantics. (I.1.c) and (I.1.d) are premises: It is actually the case that Joss Whedon exists and Sherlock Homes does not. By indexing the property of existence to the actual world, the world-indexed property of existing in the actual world can be introduced. (I.1.c) and (I.1.d) formulate the existence of Joss Whedon and the non-existence of Sherlock Holmes in the actual world from the point of view of w by means of the world-indexed property of existing in the actual world. (I.1.e) follows from (I.1.c) and (I.1.d) and the principle of indiscernibility of identicals, namely, if in a possible world v, a has a property and b does not, then in v, a is not b. (I.1.b) contradicts (I.1.e). Therefore, (I.1.a) should be rejected. Hence, there is at least one reading of (1) on which it is true, thus (I.1.f). This much for the justification of (I.1). The justification of (I.2), namely, ‘That (1) is unambiguously false is incorrect’, is straightforward: It follows from (I.1), if a sentence has a true reading, then it is not unambiguously false. [the x:Bx] [the y:Dy] □ ¬ x = y Finally, (I.4) follows from (I.3) and (I.2) by modus tollens. Cullison and Caplan (2011) conclude that widescopism should be rejected. I will try to argue that (ARG I) does not provide a reason to reject widescopism in favor of Millianism. Recall, (1) It is necessary that it is not the case that Joss Whedon is Sherlock Holmes. There is at least one reading of (1) on which it is true. That (1) is unambiguously false is incorrect. If widescopism is true, (1) is unambiguously false. Widescopism is not true. My argument goes like this: ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is an apparently empty name. An apparently empty name, semantically speaking, is either genuinely referring or not. If it is genuinely referring, then (I.3) is not true and hence (ARG I) is not sound. If it is genuinely empty, then a parallel argument would show that Millianism is not true. Either way, (ARG I) does not help Millianism prevail against widescopism. I will explain. Let's assume that an apparently empty name like ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is genuinely referring, as the view developed by Nathan Salmon (2005), among others, suggests (at least for some uses of ‘Sherlock Holmes’). Therefore, there is an individual that the name semantically refers to. Thus, regardless of the metaphysical nature of this individual, ‘Sherlock Holmes’ has a semantic referent. Putting the semantic argument against descriptivism aside (see section 1), it is reasonable to assume that ⎡the y:Φy⎤ (i.e., the description that provides the semantic content of ‘Sherlock Holmes’) gives the correct semantic content of ‘Sherlock Holmes’—after all, if there is Sherlock Holmes, he is, in some sense, a famous detective who lives at 221B Baker Street. Perhaps, for the descriptivist, the description that provides the ‘sense’ of ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is something like ‘the one who according to such and such story is a famous detective and lives at 221B Baker Street’. Recall that both the Millian and the descriptivist are concerned with well-informed speakers, i.e., those who know that Sherlock Holmes is fictional and that according to Sherlock Holmes stories, Sherlock Holmes is a famous detective who lives at 221B Baker Street. Therefore, given these assumptions, the proper description supplying the semantic content of ‘Sherlock Holmes’ should in some sense be true of the semantic referent of ‘Sherlock Holmes’, i.e., Sherlock Holmes. Put differently, assuming that ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is genuinely referring, premise (I.3) loses its force. Accordingly, given widescopism, there is a reading of (1) on which (1) is true, namely, there is something, i.e., the semantic referent of ‘Sherlock Holmes’, that is necessarily distinct from Joss Whedon. Were ‘Sherlock Homes’ genuinely referring but the description substituted for it did not pick out any object, I would conclude that (ARG I) does not pick out an appropriate description as the semantic content of ‘Sherlock Holmes’, rather than concluding that widescopism cannot handle the intuition of the truth of (1). Note that the problem of getting the right referent via a definite description is not only a problem for the descriptivist, widescoper or not, since if there is Sherlock Holmes, then a sentence like ‘the one who according to such and such story is a famous detective and lives at 221B Baker Street is Sherlock Holmes’ should be true, independently of how one treats ‘Sherlock Holmes’. The Millian is not committed to the view that if there is Sherlock Holmes then no description can pick him out; quite to the contrary, she also needs some way of descriptive reference to Sherlock Holmes, even if ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is a device of direct reference to Sherlock Holmes. Thus, how a proper definite description refers to Sherlock Holmes, if there is any, is not a problem for the widescoper. To summarize, there is nothing in descriptivism or widescopism that prohibits the descriptivist or the widescoper from acknowledging a form of realism regarding fictional characters and assigning a descriptive content to ‘Sherlock Holmes’ that is true of him. If so, widescopism may accommodate a true reading of (1). Thus (I.3) is not true and (ARG I) is not sound. Now let's assume that an apparently empty name like ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is genuinely empty or consider such a use of the name. (A name is genuinely empty, as I use the term here, if it has no semantic referent. Therefore, there is nothing that the name semantically refers to.) Under this assumption, let's grant that (ARG I) shows that widescopism fails since it cannot explain the intuition of the truth of (1). I submit that a parallel argument, namely (ARG II), would then show that Millianism fails since it cannot explain the intuition of the truth of (2). I will explain. It is possible that Sherlock Holmes is Sherlock Holmes. Here, we're not relying on the strong claim that there is no reading of (1) on which it's false. (As it happens, we're inclined to accept the strong claim, and informal polling suggests that most, but not all, speakers agree with us.) Rather, we're relying on the weak claim that there is at least one reading of (1) on which it's true. And the weak claim, we think, is more plausible than the strong claim. (Cullison and Caplan, 2011, 285) Therefore, if we follow Cullison and Caplan's strategy, we should say that the same story goes with (2). Thus, one might derive the weak claim that there is at least one reading of (2) on which it is true. But, then, if (ARG I) works, the following argument against Millianism should work too: There is at least one reading of (2) on which it is true. That (2) is unambiguously not true is incorrect. If Millianism is true, (2) is unambiguously not true. Millianism is not true. Given that ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is genuinely empty, no Millian view gives a true reading of (2). If the Millian, following David Braun (1993; 2005), considers all atomic gappy propositions truth-evaluable, since no such proposition can be true, they all should be false. Therefore, ‘Sherlock Holmes is Sherlock Holmes’ is false and the same goes with ‘It is possible that Sherlock Holmes is Sherlock Holmes’, given the standard interpretation of ‘it is possible that’. In other words, (2) is unambiguously not true. And if the Millian, following Nathan Salmon (2005), considers all atomic gappy propositions as neither true nor false, again ‘Sherlock Holmes is Sherlock Holmes’ is neither true nor false and the same goes with ‘It is possible that Sherlock Holmes is Sherlock Holmes’.6 Hence, once more, (2) is unambiguously not true. Thus, (II.3) holds. Back to (II.1), one may try to justify it in ways parallel to Cullison and Caplan's justification for (I.1). First, if the ‘intuition’ about the truth-value of (1) supports (I.1), a similar ‘intuition’ about the truth-value of (2) should support (II.1), as discussed above. I could have been myself. Sherlock Holmes (though nonexistent) is not modally different from me in this respect. Sherlock Holmes could have been Sherlock Holmes. The truth of (II.1.1) can be verified by the observation that, if one asks oneself the question ‘Could I have been myself?’, one is likely to answer ‘Yes’. (II.1.2) should be accepted in the following sense: Sherlock Holmes, though nonexistent in the actual world, should preserve his identity across possible worlds in which he exists. Therefore, there is a fixed set of identity facts about Sherlock Holmes. (II.1.3) follows from (II.1.1) and (II.1.2). (2) is false. In every possible world, Sherlock Holmes is not Sherlock Holmes. According to Sherlock Holmes stories, Sherlock Holmes is Sherlock Holmes. In some possible world w, i.e., the world of Sherlock Holmes stories, Sherlock Holmes is Sherlock Holmes. (II.1.d) contradicts (II.1.b), hence (II.1.a) is false, namely, (2) is true. This argument has one line less than its parallel, since it contains only one name, not two. (II.1.a) is the assumption of the reductio. (II.1.b) is reformulation of (II.1.a) in possible worlds semantics. (II.1.c) is an assumption, perhaps a truism about Sherlock Holmes; if there is any truth about Sherlock Holmes, it should be true that according to Sherlock Holmes stories, Sherlock Holmes is Sherlock Holmes. (II.1.d) follows from (II.1.c) given that Sherlock Holmes stories characterize a (class of) possible world(s). But then (II.1.d) contradicts (II.1.b). Therefore (II.1.a) should be rejected, namely (2) is true, thus (II.1.e). I conclude that, under the assumption that ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is genuinely empty, if (ARG I) works against widescopism, (ARG II) would work against Millianism. The following two objections focus on the second horn of my argument and thus both presuppose that ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is genuinely empty. Here is the first objection: If Millianism, then ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is rigid. If ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is rigid, then there is no true reading of (2). There is no true reading of (2). Therefore, (ARG II) against Millianism is not sound since (II.1), i.e., ‘There is at least one reading of (2) on which it is true’, is false. O1 may be justified as follows. Millianism holds that names are rigid. (ARG II) is based on the assumption that ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is a genuinely empty name; thus, by assumption, ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is a name. Hence, if Millianism, ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is rigid.7 O2 may be justified like this. If ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is genuinely empty, it has no semantic referent. If ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is rigid, then that ‘Sherlock Holmes’ has no semantic referent is necessary, so to speak. As Nathan Salmon puts it, “[o]n Kripke's view, the name ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is a rigid nondesignator, designating nothing—not even a merely possible thing—with respect to every possible world” (Salmon, 2005, 68). But if ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is a rigid nondesignator, there is no possible world in which Sherlock Holmes is Sherlock Holmes. Hence, there is no true reading of (2), namely, ‘It is possible that Sherlock Holmes is Sherlock Holmes’. Given Millianism, (O3) follows by iteration of modus ponens. Assuming that ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is rigid, to elaborate on the justification for (O2), the three ways in which (II.1), i.e., ‘There is at least one reading of (2) on which it is true’, is justified may be explained away as follows. First, that speakers may have the intuition that it is possible that Sherlock Holmes is Sherlock Holmes is because they may easily ignore the assumptions that ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is genuinely empty or that it is rigid. If there is nothing to be Sherlock Homes and it is necessarily so, then what would be possibly identical with Sherlock Holmes? Second, that speakers may positively answer to a question like ‘Could Sherlock Holmes be Sherlock Holmes?’ is because they may easily make a mistake regarding the modal facts about Sherlock Holmes, which, in turn, may be explained by the first point. If there is no Sherlock Holmes whatsoever, there is no identity fact, actual or modal, about Sherlock Holmes. According to Sherlock Holmes stories, Sherlock Holmes is Sherlock Holmes. In some possible world w, i.e., the world of Sherlock Holmes stories, Sherlock Holmes is Sherlock Holmes. From the truth of (II.1.c) one may derive (II.1.d), namely, there is a possible world that witnesses the truth of ‘Sherlock Holmes is Sherlock Holmes’, only if it is presupposed that ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is not rigid, otherwise there would be no such possible world. But presupposing that ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is not rigid violates the assumption of rigidity of ‘Sherlock Holmes’. My reply to (OBJ 1) is basically tu quoque and such an appeal, I hope, is not a fallacy in this context since I am not trying to argue for widescopism; rather I am tying to argue against an argument against widescopism. The reply, as well as the objection, presupposes that ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is genuinely empty. Here is the reply: If Widescopism, then ‘Sherlock Holmes’ behaves rigidly. If ‘Sherlock Holmes’ behaves rigidly, then there is no true reading of (1). There is no true reading of (1). Therefore, (ARG I) against widescopism is not sound since (I.1), i.e., ‘There is at least one reading of (1) on which it is true’, is false. R1 may be justified as follows. Widescopism, to wit, holds that “the definite description that gives the semantic content of a name must take wide scope with respect to modal operators.” Therefore, the object that the definite description contributes to the truth conditions of sentences containing the name (even if they contain modal operators) is necessarily the object that actually satisfies the definite description, if any. In other words, the name necessarily contributes exactly one and the same object, i.e., what may be called ‘its actual referent’, to the truth conditions of sentences in which it appears. This is tantamount to the thesis that names behave rigidly. (ARG I) is based on the assumption that ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is a genuinely empty name; thus, by assumption, ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is a name. Hence, if Widescopism, ‘Sherlock Holmes’ behaves rigidly. R2 may be justified like this. If ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is genuinely empty, it has no semantic referent. In other words, there is no object that satisfies the description that gives the semantic content of ‘Sherlock Homes’. If ‘Sherlock Holmes’ behaves rigidly, then ‘Sherlock Holmes’ contributes no object to the truth conditions of sentences in which it appears. Thus, ‘Sherlock Holmes’ contributes no object to the truth conditions of (1), namely ‘It is necessary that it is not the case that Joss Whedon is Sherlock Holmes’. However, a sentence containing a proper name has standard truth conditions only if the name contributes one and only one object to the truth conditions of the sentence. Therefore, (1) does not have standard truth conditions. A sentence that does not have standard truth conditions cannot be true, in the standard sense of the term. Hence, there is no true reading of (1). Given widescopism, (R3) follows by iteration of modus ponens. Assuming that ‘Sherlock Holmes’ behaves rigidly, to elaborate on the justification for (R2), the three ways in which (I.1), i.e., ‘There is at least one reading of (1) on which it is true’, is justified may be explained away as follows. First, that speakers may have the intuition that it is necessary that Joss Whedon is not Sherlock Holmes is because they may easily ignore the assumptions that ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is genuinely empty or that it behaves rigidly. If ‘Sherlock Holmes’ contributes no object to the truth conditions of (1), and it is necessarily so, then what would be necessarily distinct from Joss Whedon? Second, that speakers may negatively answer to a question like ‘Could I have been Sherlock Holmes?’ is because they may easily make a mistake regarding the modal facts about Sherlock Holmes, which, in turn, may be explained by the first point. If ‘Sherlock Holmes’ contributes no object to the truth conditions of the sentence in which it appears, there is no distinctness fact, actual or modal, about Sherlock Holmes. (1) is false. There is a possible world, w, in which Joss Whedon is Sherlock Holmes. From the truth of (I.1.a), namely, it is not the case that it is necessary that it is not the case that Joss Whedon is Sherlock Holmes, one may derive (I.1.b), namely, there is a possible world that witnesses the truth of ‘Joss Whedon is Sherlock Holmes’, only if it is presupposed that ‘Sherlock Holmes’ does not behave rigidly, otherwise there would be no such possible world. But presupposing that ‘Sherlock Holmes’ does not behave rigidly, at this stage of the argument, violates the assumption that ‘Sherlock Holmes’ behaves rigidly. Now to the second objection. It is a follow up to (REP 1). It rejects (R1). Otherwise put, the objection claims that it is not the case that if widescopism, then ‘Sherlock Holmes’ behaves rigidly. Therefore, since (O1) holds, namely, if Millianism, then ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is rigid, and (O2) is true, namely, if ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is rigid, then there is no true reading of (2), (OBJ 1) is successful and shows that (ARG 2) against Millianism fails. However, since (R1) does not hold, even if (R2) is true, namely if ‘Sherlock Holmes’ behaves rigidly, then there is no true reading of (1), (REP 1) is not successful and does not show that (ARG 1) against widescopism fails. Therefore, the dialectical moral is this: there is an argument against widescopism and no parallel argument against Millianism. My reaction to the above objection is to resist that (R1) does not hold. Thus, in what follows, I will be trying to push the line of reasoning according to which if widescopism, then names behave rigidly. Following David Sosa (2001, 2–3), one may distinguish two formulations of rigidity: one in terms of the semantic reference of a term and the other in terms of what a term contributes to the truth conditions of sentences in which it appears. The first characterization models rigidity as rigid designation. A Rigid designator has the same semantic referent, if any, in all possible worlds. The second characterization, instead of using the notion of semantic reference, models rigidity as the contribution of exactly one and the same object to the truth conditions of sentences in which the term appears. If a term is rigid in this sense, it behaves rigidly, even though we may not consider the term in isolation as a designator in the first place. Accordingly, given widescopism, it does not follow that a proper name, and in particular a genuinely empty name like ‘Sherlock Holmes’, is a rigid designator because the widescoper may not consider the proper name in isolation as a designator in the first place. However, given widescopism, it does follow that a proper name behaves rigidly because to behave rigidly is nothing but contributing exactly one and the same object to the truth conditions of sentences in which the name appears and widescopism guarantees this much.8 Kripke's concern about rigidity and widescopism, in his introduction of Naming and Necessity (1980), is not clear. He apparently criticizes widescopism by saying that “rigidity”, as he interprets, “is a doctrine about the truth conditions, with respect to counterfactual situations, of (the propositions expressed by) all sentences, including simple sentences” (Kripke, 1980, 12). The concern might be that widescopism is only able to capture rigidity in modal sentences containing both proper names and modal operators because only in such cases both the name and the modal operator are present in a sentence and one may talk about the name taking wide scope over the modal operator. This concern, however, is misguided. The widescoper lets the description that supplies the semantic content of a proper name take wide scope over all modal operators, namely, the modal operators that appear in modal sentences of language (e.g., ‘possibly’ and ‘necessarily’) and the modal operators featuring in the truth conditions, with respect to counterfactual situations, of all sentences, simple or modal (e.g., ‘with respect to w’ or ‘in w’, w being a possible world).9 Therefore, following Sosa (2001), I am inclined to conclude that widescopism, as presented here, can capture rigidity: “Russell's theory has rigidity in its scope” (Sosa, 2001, 24).10 As far as I can see, (ARG I) has no advantage over (ARG II). If an apparently empty name like ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is genuinely referring then both arguments are unsound since the third premise of each is false; to wit, in (ARG I), widescopism does not necessarily imply that (1) is false (or not true) and, in (ARG II), Millianism does not necessarily imply that (2) is false (or not true). And if ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is genuinely empty, then if (ARG I) works, then (ARG II) works too. Either way, apparently empty names do not help Millianism prevail against widescopism. I would like to thank Omid Karimzadeh, Mostafa Mohajeri, Sajed Tayebi, Mohammad Saleh Zarepour, and Masoud Zia for helpful discussion. I should thank an anonymous referee of this journal whose constructive comments on an earlier draft of this paper significantly helped me to revise the structure of my argument. Soames claims there is a “persistent confusion” about the content of the wide-scope analysis. He finds it a “striking feature of the relationship between rigidity and wide scope” that the two are confused with such frequency. In particular, “the wide-scope analysis as often been mischaracterized, even by proponents, as claiming that names are rigid” (p. 10). Soames finds this an understandable mistake. I think it may be Soames who is making an understandable mistake here. Perhaps some proponents of the wide-scope analysis have characterized that analysis as claiming that names are rigid. And Soames may be right that the wide-scope analysis, by itself, at least as Soames has characterized it, does not make that claim. But the defender of the wide-scope analysis can claim, compatibly with her view, that names are rigid (Sosa, 2001, 29)." @default.
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W1843815924 title "Do Apparently Empty Names Help Millianism Prevail Against Widescopism? A Note" @default.
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