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- W18537060 abstract "Abstract Since the seminal contribution of Jensen and Murphy (1990), our understanding of executive compensation and incentives has greatly improved. Through time, the strength of incentives has increased. In the 1990s, this was accomplished primarily through the use of stock options. The two most important sources of aggregate incentives are holdings of stock and holdings of stock options—these align managers’ interests with those of shareholders. Firm size, firm risk, executive aversion to risk, executive productivity, the extent to which executives like or dislike taking certain actions that matter for shareholders, and characteristics of the industry all determine how strong or weak incentives should be. We know that, because shareholders have limited information about what managers do and limited ability to monitor managers, managers need to be provided with some incentives. The key limitation on the provision of incentives is the need to share risk between managers and other shareholders. Actual compensation practices reflect this trade-off. We also know now that boards and shareholders do not have the complete ability to set managerial compensation. Either because of CEO power or a limited supply of managerial talent, at least some CEOs have the ability to extract more compensation than what is dictated by straightforward pay for performance. At this stage, we have a reasonably strong understanding of the determinants of incentives, and incentives seem to work well. We still do not fully understand the level of compensation. A number of well-documented examples are consistent with the rent extraction view of the level of compensation. Instances of excessive compensation and rent extraction seem to be correlated with corporate governance failure, accounting fraud, and poor corporate outcomes." @default.
- W18537060 created "2016-06-24" @default.
- W18537060 creator A5008241621 @default.
- W18537060 date "2008-01-01" @default.
- W18537060 modified "2023-10-01" @default.
- W18537060 title "Executive Compensation and Incentives" @default.
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- W18537060 doi "https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-444-53265-7.50009-3" @default.
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