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• W186119150 abstract "I. INTRODUCTION National governments often undertake efforts to privatize state-run enterprises in order to transition to a market economy or to achieve other economic and political development goals.(1) Often the impetus for such effort results from pressure placed on the country by foreign governments and multilateral institutions during times of economic crisis.(2) The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and other lending institutions tend to link monetary assistance to government promises to privatize state-run industries--a concept consistent with these lending agencies' traditional free market orthodoxy.(3) Private actors, these agencies argue, generally deploy assets more efficiently than the public sector, which in turn benefits both domestic .consumers and the long-term growth of the overall economy. The push to privatize comes not only from lending agencies, but also from policy makers in countries attempting to remain competitive in an increasingly open and global commercial world.(4) Even though a number of developed nations used protectionism and created massive state owned enterprises (SOEs) to foster economic growth for decades after the Second World War, today many of these countries view privatization and deregulation as central components of economic restructuring and the promotion of continued GDP growth.(5) It now appears that most of the world has adopted the conventional wisdom that privatization is the best route to the development of competitive industries, the deepening of domestic and international capital supplies, and to continued economic growth in a world fixated on reducing commercial barriers and promoting a free market.(6) However, governments and lending agencies now recognize that privatization not only affects economic restructuring, but also has far reaching impacts on a nation's political and social environment.(7) Labor unions and employees of SOEs generally oppose the process because many workers are declared redundant and laid off under the control of private actors.(8) Also, when governments engage in trade sales or sell shares of state owned enterprises on the market, public control of services provided to the general population is necessarily forfeited. Governments looking to slash budgets will no longer subsidize some of these services--for example, electricity, transportation, or waste disposal--and, in the short term, prices may rise.(9) Opponents of privatization claim that once SOEs are sold, salaries will be cut, employees will be laid off, income distribution gaps will widen, service standards will be lowered, and prices will increase--assertions that easily generate vocal opposition to privatization.(10) Moreover, in a number of countries, many SOE board members and executives are well-connected politically and have profited handsomely from their positions.(11) These insiders may oppose the privatization of their companies, as it will likely result in decreased political influence and a loss of the budgetary kickbacks to which they have become accustomed.(12) Therefore, while economists can easily espouse the benefits of a privatization program, actors with vested interests--SOE employees, managers, directors, and often consumers--frequently mount stiff and unrelenting opposition to the concept.(13) In countries suffering economic downturns, like much of Southeast Asia was in the late 1990s, such opposition becomes much more pronounced; those who benefit from maintaining the status quo SOE system must fight harder to retain their slice of a rapidly shrinking pie.(14) For privatization to succeed in these instances, governments must not only be acutely aware of the economic complexities of the restructuring and sale of public enterprises; they must also address the political and social factors underlying the process. In the summer of 1998, the Royal Thai Government (RTG) unveiled plans for privatization as part of an overall strategy to recover from its recent financial downturn. …" @default.
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• W186119150 date "2000-01-01" @default.
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• W186119150 title "Thailand's Privatization of State Owned Enterprises during the Economic Downturn" @default.
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