FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W1939264131> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W1939264131 abstract "The recent scholarly and policy debate concerning state fiscal crises has appropriately focused on the question of the money states have committed to their employees, bondholders, and citizens, and the implications of economic recession for those promises to pay. In that sense, the debate is not strictly about state fiscal crises, but state debt crises, and proposals to resolve them focus on ways in which the states can restructure their debts without triggering further fiscal decline. This focus on debt is understandable. The collective debts of the several states are staggering, and frequently rely on unrealistic projections of tax and pension fund growth that, during an economic recession, may render the states unable to meet those obligations. But what if the problem facing the American states is not simply a problem of too much debt, but the more insidious problem of too much law? That is, state debt crises might be symptomatic of a deeper crisis whereby the state fiscal policy-making process is gummed up by statutory and constitutional restrictions on the use of public resources, such that combating budgetary shortfalls - whether caused by economic recession, political gridlock, or some combination of the two - becomes increasingly unlikely.In the states that allow them, constitutional amendments by direct democracy - whether by popular initiative or by legislature-approved referendum - can place unyielding restrictions on the state budgets which, in times of crisis, may render the state unable to meet its fiscal demands. Add this problematic dynamic to the frequently dysfunctional fiscal policy processes so often associated with these same states’ legislatures and the result can be fiscal deadlock, and potentially, fiscal crisis. In a federal system as exists in the United States, these state fiscal crises can quickly create moral hazard, as states take risks that they hope the federal government will absorb. If the federal government agrees, federal taxpayers would thus absorb the losses of state fiscal crises in a way that, if history is a guide, will distort political conversations regarding fiscal policy for a generation. These twin problems - the inherent instability of fiscal policy by constitutional amendment and the risk of moral hazard in a federalist system - are important and understudied dynamics of state fiscal crises.This symposium essay offers a preliminary, counter-intuitive solution to these problems: use direct democracy to combat direct democracy, and thereby provide protection to federal taxpayers exposed to losses by state fiscal crises. Taking a cue from the Financial Review Board system seen in the municipal bankruptcy context, the essay proposes a state constitutional amendment by referendum or initiative that dislodges the fiscal policy-making process from the legislature and referendum-burdened state constitution. In place of these traditional fiscal policy-making regimes, the referendum would accept the authority of a federally created commission, what this essay calls the Fiscal Restoration Commission (FRC). The FRC would then recreate the state’s budgetary laws from the ground up. The release of federal funds to save a state’s fiscal affairs would be contingent on the adoption, again by referendum, of the Commission’s proposals. The result is thus a clearing of restrictive law, rather than the clearing of restrictive debt, the mechanism that characterizes most state restructuring proposals." @default.
• W1939264131 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W1939264131 creator A5048504375 @default.
• W1939264131 date "2012-03-19" @default.
• W1939264131 modified "2023-09-26" @default.
• W1939264131 title "Direct Democracy and State Fiscal Crises: The Problem of Too Much Law" @default.
• W1939264131 hasPublicationYear "2012" @default.
• W1939264131 type Work @default.
• W1939264131 sameAs 1939264131 @default.
• W1939264131 citedByCount "0" @default.
• W1939264131 crossrefType "posted-content" @default.
• W1939264131 hasAuthorship W1939264131A5048504375 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConcept C10138342 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConcept C105639569 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConcept C11413529 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConcept C114708693 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConcept C120527767 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConcept C138921699 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConcept C139719470 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConcept C17744445 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConcept C186229450 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConcept C195742910 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConcept C199539241 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConcept C202000216 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConcept C2778558725 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConcept C2780014084 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConcept C2781462389 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConcept C2994482091 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConcept C41008148 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConcept C45237549 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConcept C48103436 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConcept C524878704 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConcept C556758197 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConcept C94625758 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConceptScore W1939264131C10138342 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConceptScore W1939264131C105639569 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConceptScore W1939264131C11413529 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConceptScore W1939264131C114708693 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConceptScore W1939264131C120527767 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConceptScore W1939264131C138921699 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConceptScore W1939264131C139719470 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConceptScore W1939264131C162324750 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConceptScore W1939264131C17744445 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConceptScore W1939264131C186229450 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConceptScore W1939264131C195742910 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConceptScore W1939264131C199539241 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConceptScore W1939264131C202000216 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConceptScore W1939264131C2778558725 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConceptScore W1939264131C2780014084 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConceptScore W1939264131C2781462389 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConceptScore W1939264131C2994482091 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConceptScore W1939264131C41008148 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConceptScore W1939264131C45237549 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConceptScore W1939264131C48103436 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConceptScore W1939264131C524878704 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConceptScore W1939264131C556758197 @default.
• W1939264131 hasConceptScore W1939264131C94625758 @default.
• W1939264131 hasLocation W19392641311 @default.
• W1939264131 hasOpenAccess W1939264131 @default.
• W1939264131 hasPrimaryLocation W19392641311 @default.
• W1939264131 hasRelatedWork W1598514470 @default.
• W1939264131 hasRelatedWork W1609064867 @default.
• W1939264131 hasRelatedWork W1819839757 @default.
• W1939264131 hasRelatedWork W2146200278 @default.
• W1939264131 hasRelatedWork W2147760552 @default.
• W1939264131 hasRelatedWork W2501831543 @default.
• W1939264131 hasRelatedWork W290351722 @default.
• W1939264131 hasRelatedWork W2964752322 @default.
• W1939264131 hasRelatedWork W3014372330 @default.
• W1939264131 hasRelatedWork W3096783909 @default.
• W1939264131 hasRelatedWork W3123526811 @default.
• W1939264131 hasRelatedWork W3123862451 @default.
• W1939264131 hasRelatedWork W3125684161 @default.
• W1939264131 hasRelatedWork W3125943162 @default.
• W1939264131 hasRelatedWork W3140407308 @default.
• W1939264131 hasRelatedWork W3189969703 @default.
• W1939264131 hasRelatedWork W3194048475 @default.
• W1939264131 hasRelatedWork W2183195035 @default.
• W1939264131 hasRelatedWork W2608754361 @default.
• W1939264131 hasRelatedWork W3152190458 @default.
• W1939264131 isParatext "false" @default.
• W1939264131 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W1939264131 magId "1939264131" @default.
• W1939264131 workType "article" @default.