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• W194414014 abstract "I. IntroductionScientific expertise continues to confound the courts years after the Supreme Court's Daubert1 trio was supposed to solve the dilemma of admitting science into legal argument. The resulting confusion is most apparent in capital sentencing proceedings, in which the judiciary has flung wide the gates to wholly unscientific expert testimony. For a democratic system, in which the rule of law attempts to answer the problems of power and freedom by making the law apply to everyone and by providing rational criteria for distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate uses of power, this lack of rationality has consequences. In this Article, I argue that judicial failure to scrutinize expert testimony relating to future dangerousness results in a massive failure of intellectual due process.2In a democracy, in which the enunciated goal of the rule of law is the search for truth in a system that aspires to rationality, accurate information is a prerequisite.3 This goal begs two questions, of course. What is true? And what is rational? I argue with Quine that truth is empirical and that rationality consists of a structured reasoning process relating sensory input to a web of theoretical output.4 One description of reality is emphatically not just as good as another. That is why courts look to science in the first place: science has primacy in describing the world. It works. Reality bites. Descriptive claims need to correspond to the natural world, and the theory articulated for those claims must be articulable, falsifiable, and open to critique.5 In addition, empirical information about how people actually reach decisions is important in evaluating the truth-seeking and rationality functions of the law.6In our adversary system, the truth-seeking rationality goal of the rule of law forms the basis for evidentiary rules. The basic idea is that the methodologies of the justice system should have truth-generating capacity-a notion of due process.7 A second consequence of the aspiration to rationality is a concern for accurate evidentiary input: in order to reach a justifiable decision, courts must base reasoning on trustworthy information.8 A third consequence is that even trustworthy facts must have some logical tendency to prove or disprove an issue in the case.9 This framework for justice is the inspiration for the rules of evidence, and a fundamental tenet is that only facts having relevance-rational probative value-should be admissible in the search for truth.10In one important category of proceedings, however, courts toss this framework to the winds. Sentencing hearings have become an evidentiary free-for-all.11 Particularly in capital sentencing proceedings, in which death is supposed to be different, courts permit juries to hear expert testimony that even the most optimistic could only characterize as not always wrong.12 This is a far cry from the truth-generating methodologies supposedly fundamental to due process and at the opposite end of the spectrum from what currently happens in civil trials, in which experts must demonstrate the reliability of their testimony.13Outside of sentencing proceedings, courts have approached the issue of reliability with respect to scientific testimony in two basic ways. The first is the Frye14 general consensus approach, in which courts deem scientific testimony trustworthy if a majority of scientists agree that it is-assigning the gatekeeping task to scientists.15 Alternatively, the Federal Rules of Evidence now assign the gatekeeping responsibility to judges.16 My position, as I have argued elsewhere, is that judges are the proper gatekeepers for a number of reasons, but primarily because the structured inquiry process of Daubert gives judges a framework for analysis and a requirement to justify-rationalize-their decisions.17 Whichever approach they use, however, trustworthiness, i.e., relevance, is a crucial aspect of admissibility. And courts use neither the Frye approach nor the Daubert approach (codified in the federal rules), nor any other trustworthiness inquiry, in one critical area of sentencing proceedings: expert testimony about the defendant's future dangerousness. …" @default.
• W194414014 created "2016-06-24" @default.
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• W194414014 date "2003-12-31" @default.
• W194414014 modified "2023-09-26" @default.
• W194414014 title "The Epistemology of Prediction: Future Dangerousness Testimony and Intellectual Due Process" @default.
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