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• W1969900413 abstract "Previous articleNext article No AccessCommunicationsThe Equilibrium Size of a Budget-maximizing Bureau: A Note on Niskanen's Theory of BureaucracyAlbert Breton, and Ronald WintrobeAlbert Breton Search for more articles by this author , and Ronald Wintrobe Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 83, Number 1Feb., 1975 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/260313 Views: 143Total views on this site Citations: 135Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1975 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Sechindra Vallury, Bryan Leonard Canals, climate, and corruption: The provisioning of public infrastructure under uncertainty, Economics & Politics 34, no.11 (Jul 2021): 221–252.https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12196Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, Silvia Fedeli, Michele Santoni Public Provision of Goods and Services under Cost Uncertainty: The Government’s Bureaucratic Organization, Mathematics 10, no.11 (Dec 2021): 77.https://doi.org/10.3390/math10010077Sung-Jin Park, Sungkyu Jang Asymmetric information and excess budget: the influence of performance-based budgeting on budgetary slack in US states, International Review of Public Administration 26, no.44 (Jan 2022): 353–372.https://doi.org/10.1080/12294659.2022.2027599Stephanie Ortynsky, Jim Marshall, Haizhen Mou Budget practices in Canada's K‐12 education sector: Incremental, performance, or productivity budgeting?, Canadian Public Administration 64, no.11 (Apr 2021): 74–98.https://doi.org/10.1111/capa.12402Kaitlyn Woltz The Role of Prisoner Voice in Criminal Justice Reform, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2020).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3748768Elton Beqiraj, Silvia Fedeli, Massimiliano Tancioni Bureaucratic Reshuffling and Efficiency: Do n-Competing Bureaus Determine Inefficient Results?, Mathematics 7, no.1010 (Oct 2019): 998.https://doi.org/10.3390/math7100998Aman Khan An Overview of Government Expenditures, (Nov 2019): 81–104.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19226-6_3Franklin G. 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• W1969900413 title "The Equilibrium Size of a Budget-maximizing Bureau: A Note on Niskanen's Theory of Bureaucracy" @default.
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